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Abstract
Since 1993, health authorities have had a responsibility for the co-ordination of the 
health aspects of response to chemical incidents. The public health team within health 
authorities currently takes the lead in complying with this duty. However, the majority 
of public health professionals have had minimal training and experience in this area. 
The focus of this investigation has therefore been the provision of management tools to 
improve the public health response to chemical incidents, with the aim of minimising 
adverse health and environmental impacts.
A detailed investigation of the current state of knowledge was conducted, and the 
research engineer was involved in the management of 70 chemical incidents resulting in 
water pollution, as reported to the Chemical Incident Response Service. A best practice 
model for the public health response to chemical incidents was developed, based on 
lessons learnt from the management of chemical incidents, involvement in incident 
exercises and training days, and relevant literature on chemical incident management. 
The model was then used to guide the development of a chemical incident management 
guidance manual providing detailed information and guidance on the issues raised in the 
model. A quantitative evaluation method was also devised for assessing the 
performance of public health professionals in managing chemical incidents.
Validation testing of the guidance manual was conducted to assess its effectiveness in 
improving the public health response to chemical incidents. A group of 79 public health 
professionals took part in the testing, which concluded that the manual was effective in 
improving performance in the response to a chemical incident exercise. Statistical 
analysis further demonstrated that this improvement would be expected across the 
general public health population. The value of previous training on chemical incident 
management was also confirmed. However, previous experience in managing chemical 
incidents was not shown to influence performance levels.
© Faith Goodfellow, 2001
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1 Introduction
The overall aim of the University of Surrey/Brunei University Engineering Doctorate 
(EngD) Programme in Environmental Technology, as stated in the course handbook 
(University of Surrey/Brunei University, 2000, p.5), is:
“ ...to create graduate research engineers with the necessary 
background knowledge, skills and experiences to understand the 
relationship between the environment, technology and business and to 
apply this understanding to the development, promotion and execution 
of corporate strategy.”
In particular, the objective is for research engineers to:
“have expert knowledge in the field of environmental technology and 
be able to apply techniques that balance social and economic benefit 
against resource utilisation and environmental impact.”
For Engineering Doctorate projects, the presentation of the final thesis is referred to as 
the portfolio, which comprises the different strands of the research project and also 
demonstrates the progress of the project throughout the research period. The aim of this 
executive summary is to summarise and bring together the different aspects of the 
project. As stated in the programme regulations detailed in the course handbook 
(University of Surrey/Brunei University, 2000), the executive summary should:
(i) set the portfolio contents within the context o f environmental 
technology;
(ii) direct the reader to evidence in the portfolio which describes the 
innovation(s) and contribution(s) to the knowledge in the field of 
environmental technology.
The following sections provide a summary of the project as a whole, discuss the project 
in the context of environmental technology, identify the innovations and contributions to 
knowledge, and detail possible future areas of research.
2 Project Summary
2.1 Background Information and Problem Definition
The research project was sponsored by the Chemical Incident Response Service (CIRS). 
A chemical incident is considered to potentially encompass any event that involves the 
release of a chemical, this could be an uncontrolled release or one resulting from normal 
industrial operations, and includes both accidental and deliberate releases. Chemical 
incidents include both acute and chronic events and may involve contamination from 
natural as well as anthropogenic sources. Since 1993, District Health Authorities
(DHAs) have had a responsibility for the co-ordination of the health aspects of response 
to chemical incidents (NHSME, 1993). The designated individual who fulfils this 
responsibility is usually the Consultant in Communicable Disease Control (CCDC), who 
will work within the HA as part of the public health team. CIRS is one of the five 
Chemical Incident Regional Service Provider Units (RSPUs) across the UK. RSPUs 
provide information and advice to health authorities (HAs) on public health, 
environmental, scientific, toxicological and epidemiological aspects of chemical 
incidents to enable them to meet their responsibilities. CIRS covers six National Health 
Service Executive (NHSE) Regions, which encompasses 69 DHAs, with a total 
population of 37.9 million (Health Service Journal, 1999). The role of HAs and CIRS in 
managing chemical incidents is specified in more detail in Chapter 1.
Public health professionals have only recently become responsible for managing the 
health care aspects of chemical incidents, and the majority have had minimal training 
and experience in this area. Therefore, the basis of the original project proposal was to 
provide specific guidance to assist them in the management of chemical incidents. In 
addition, a need was identified to broaden the approach of CIRS, from the provision of 
advice mainly on the toxicological/medical issues involved in chemical incident 
management, to include environmental technology issues.
In order to establish the current state of knowledge in chemical incident management, 
and to enable the research needs to be further defined and focused, two literature reviews 
and a questionnaire survey were conducted. The findings from these investigations are 
presented in Chapter 2. Results from the questionnaire paper were also published as a 
journal paper, a copy of which can be found in Volume 2 (Goodfellow et al, 2000a). 
The focused research needs identified from the literature reviews and questionnaire 
survey were as follows:
1. The published literature yields few accounts of incidents that have occurred in the 
past few years. Even those that are reported, show that most research is concentrated 
on analysing the actual effect o f the incident, rather than in devising procedures for 
managing incidents in such a way as to protect human health and the environment.
2. A review of the literature on procedures for chemical incident management did not 
find any generic guidance specifically aimed at the public health management of the 
emergency response to chemical incidents. Only one publication providing general 
guidance on chemical incident management aimed at public health professionals was 
found and its primary focus was on preparation prior to a chemical incident.
3. The questionnaire survey confirmed that levels of training and experience in 
chemical incident management by public health professionals is variable and 
generally quite limited and that the development of comprehensive guidance for the 
public health response to chemical incidents is required.
2.2 Aims and Objectives
The general aims identified at the start of the project were to:
• Evaluate the management of water-related chemical incidents reported to CIRS to 
establish how a chemical incident evolves and what lessons can be learnt from these 
events; and
• Develop procedures for managing chemical incidents to improve and provide a 
consistent response from public health professionals, with the main focus being the 
protection of the public health.
From the assessment of the current state of knowledge, and further defining and
focusing of the research needs it was possible to develop more specific project aims,
these were to:
• Specify the criteria of a best practice model for the public health response to 
chemical incidents;
• Develop a chemical incident management guidance manual to guide those involved 
in managing a chemical incident towards the best practice model;
• Develop a quantitative evaluation method to assess the level of performance 
achieved by public health professionals in managing a chemical incident;
• Assess the performance levels achieved by public health professionals with the use 
of the chemical incident management guidance manual; and
• Modify the guidance manual in response to the evaluation results and consultation 
comments and provide recommendations for future improvements in management 
tools.
Although the main focus o f the research investigation was on water-related chemical 
incidents, the chemical incident management tools that have been developed are 
intended to be applicable to all types of chemical incident.
2.3 Investigation and Learning from the Management of 
Chemical Incidents
Personal involvement in managing actual chemical incidents provided the opportunity to 
collect information about how incidents are currently managed by public health 
professionals and to identify areas for improvement. A total of 246 water-related 
chemical incidents were reported to CIRS during the research period, October 1997 to 
April 2001. The research engineer had direct involvement in the management of 
70 incidents. Fourteen incidents were selected for in depth study, these are listed in 
Table 1, details are provided in Chapter 3.
Table 1: Selected Case Studies 
ACUTE INCIDENTS
Lindane spill into a stream feeding a river used for drinking water abstraction (CIRS, 
1997a, Hochuli et al, 1998).
Elevated PAHs in drinking water following public supply pipe rehabilitation (CIRS, 
1997b).
Contamination of drinking water in a hospital following re-lining of water tanks (CIRS, 
1998a and Goodfellow et al, 2000b).
Solvent permeation through plastic water supply pipes into drinking water from a spill 
onto land (CIRS, 1998c, Goodfellow e/ al, 1999 and Goodfellow e/1 al, in press 2001). 
Diesel in drinking water supplies from land contamination and pipe damage (CIRS, 
1998e and Goodfellow et al, in press 2001).
Sewage/trade effluent flooding of residential properties (CIRS, 1998f and Mac Arthur et 
al, 2000).
Drinking water contamination in blocks of flats following re-lining of water tanks (CIRS 
1999a, Crook and Finn, 1999 and Goodfellow et al, 2000b).
Backflow from a central heating system containing chemical additives into the drinking 
water system within a block of flats (CIRS, 2000a).
Chemical fire and subsequent flooding leading to surface water and land contamination. 
CHRONIC INCIDENTS
Beach and seawater contamination from an adjacent former gas works site (CIRS, 1998b 
and Goodfellow et al, 2001).
Heating oil leak leading to surface water contamination and permeation through plastic 
water supply pipes to a small housing estate (CIRS, 1998d, Goodfellow et al, 1999 and 
Goodfellow, 2000).
Fuel leak from a petrol station leading to permeation through plastic water supply pipes 
to a block of flats (CIRS, 1999b and Goodfellow et al, in press 2001).
Spill of engine degreaser permeating plastic water supply pipes to three properties 
(CIRS, 2000b).
Raised levels of bromate in a drinking water aquifer (CIRS, 2000c).
For the fourteen incidents studied in depth by the research engineer, full details of the 
circumstances of the incident were recorded. By comprehensively documenting each 
event, it was then possible to analyse the incidents at a later date. This enabled specific 
lessons to be identified and included in incident management tools and procedures for 
application in future incidents. From the fourteen case studies, and also from 
involvement in a range of other incidents requiring less in depth involvement of the
research engineer, a number of principles of best practice for the management of 
chemical incidents were identified; these are specified in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.5.1. 
Two specific types of chemical incident were also identified that seemed to occur on a 
reasonably frequent basis and posed a threat to public health, these were:
• Permeation of organic chemicals through plastic water supply pipes; and
• Contamination of drinking water from water tank and pipe linings.
The lessons from these particular types of chemical incident are addressed in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.1.5.2. An additional aspect of the investigation was to take part in the 
chemical incident management training sessions conducted by CIRS and also in regional 
chemical incident exercises. Participation in training and exercises provided an 
opportunity both to establish the base line expertise of public health professionals, and to 
ascertain the most effective methods for providing guidance to assist in the improvement 
of the public health response to chemical incidents. A summary of the lessons learnt 
from this aspect of the investigation is provided in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.5.
2.4 Methodology for Development of Tools to Improve 
Chemical Incident Management
The primary tool that was developed to improve the management of chemical incidents 
by public health professionals was a best practice model. The model specifies the issues 
that need to be considered and the actions that need to be taken in a chemical incident. 
The aim is to be able to conduct a risk assessment of the potential impact of the incident 
on the public health, and to prevent or mitigate any adverse effects. The best practice 
model was then used to guide the development of a chemical incident management 
guidance manual. This provides an overview of the framework behind the public health 
response to chemical incidents and detailed information and guidance on the issues 
raised in the model. The best practice model was also used to devise a quantitative 
evaluation method for use in assessing the performance of public health professionals in 
managing chemical incidents. The information basis of all three chemical incident 
management tools was the lessons learnt from involvement in actual chemical incidents,
training sessions, incident exercises, and relevant literature. In developing the tools, 
consultation with experts in the field of chemical incident management was carried out.
The evaluation method was then used in the assessment of the effectiveness of the 
chemical incident management guidance manual in improving the public health response 
to chemical incidents. An exercise scenario was devised to simulate a chemical incident 
and a group of 79 public health professionals, from across the six NHSE Regions, 
worked through the exercise. Each participant was instructed to provide an individual 
written response to the exercise, with only half the participants having access to the 
guidance manual. The responses were then assessed using the evaluation method and 
performance scores were determined for each of the participants. The performance of 
those with and without use of the manual was compared. The effect on performance of 
different levels of previous experience and training in chemical incident management 
was also assessed. The detailed methodology used in developing and validating the 
chemical incident management tools is addressed in Chapter 4.
2.5 Results and Interpretation from the Validation Testing of 
the Chemical Incident Management Guidance Manual
Detailed results and interpretation of the validation testing of the guidance manual can 
be found in Chapters 5 and 6. The measure of performance used was the percentage of 
actions completed, as detailed in the evaluation method, for the specified incident 
exercise. A number of ‘key’ actions were specified for each stage of the exercise, these 
were considered to have a higher priority for completion. Therefore, a percentage score 
was provided for the ‘total’ actions completed and the ‘key’ actions completed. Some of 
the actions specified in the evaluation method could only be achieved in the exercise by 
completing several sub tasks; therefore, in some cases an action may be completely or 
partially achieved.
The participants in the exercise sessions were all public health professionals. For each 
participant three details were collected:
• Number of chemical incidents that the participant had been involved in managing;
• Number of CIRS training days (or equivalent) attended; and
• Occupational title.
This information was used to categorise the participants as: experienced and trained; 
experienced only; trained only; and inexperienced and untrained.
The calculation of mean percentage scores showed that within each exercise stage and 
experience/training group, the score for those with the manual was greater than for those 
without the manual, for both ‘total’ actions and ‘key’ actions. Figure I  shows the mean 
percentage scores for the ‘total’ actions and ‘key’ actions for the exercise as a whole for 
each of the experience/training groups. Scores for participants with and without use of 
the manual are shown separately. No data are included for those with experience only as 
this only consisted of three people. The percentage improvement in ‘total’ and ‘key’ 
scores was calculated for the total group and each of the training and experience groups, 
as shown in Table 2. These were determined from comparisons of scores between 
participants with and without use of the manual for the exercise as a whole.
Table 2: Percentage improvement in ‘total ’ and ‘key ’ scores fo r  those using the manual
Experience/training group Total/key
actions
Improvement in score 
when using the manual
Total Total 16%
(n=79) Key 16%
Experienced and trained Total 31%
(n=12) Key 27%
Trained Total 16%
(n=28) Key 15%
Inexperienced and untrained Total 12%
(n=36) Key 14%
Statistical analysis of the performance scores was also conducted to show the 
significance of the independent variables: use of manual; experience; training; and 
occupational status. Variables were considered to be significant where the p value was
less than, or equal to, 0.05. Univariable analysis using thet-test and one-way analysis of 
variance showed that:
• The manual was a significant factor in affecting the ‘total’ score and ‘key’ score, 
with p values of 0.0007 and 0.0004 respectively.
o the improvement in mean ‘total’ score for those with the manual was 6.4 
percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval of 2.8 to 10.1. 
o the improvement in mean ‘key’ score for those with the manual was 7.4 
percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval 3.4 to 11.3.
• Experience showed some significance in affecting the ‘total’ score, with p=0.0525, 
but this is not very strong (i.e. statistical significance at p=0.050 has not been 
achieved) and the effect on ‘key’ score was not shown to be significant (p=0.0709).
• The effect of training on ‘total’ score was shown to be significant with p=0.0029, the 
improvement in mean ‘total’ score for those with training was 5.7 percentage points, 
with a 95% confidence interval of 2.0 to 9.4. No effect was shown on ‘key’ score 
(p=0.1145).
• The occupational status of the participant did not have a significant effect on ‘total’ 
or ‘key’ scores (p=0.1587 and p=0.5192, respectively).
The statistical analysis therefore also demonstrated an improvement in the response to 
the exercise for the public health professionals who used the manual. In addition, 
training was shown to be a significant factor. This confirms the importance of specific 
training of public health professionals in the methods and knowledge required to 
effectively manage chemical incidents. Experience was not shown to result in an 
improvement in performance. Public health doctors are only likely to have experience 
in a small number of chemical incidents, so will not acquire the breadth of knowledge 
necessary to prepare them to respond to all types of chemical incident. In addition, 
experience does not provide a structured framework for evaluating and responding to 
chemical incidents.
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2.6 Conclusions
In conclusion, the research project involved the development of chemical incident 
management tools to improve the public health response to chemical incidents. A best 
practice model was devised based on:
• Lessons learnt from the management of chemical incidents throughout the research 
period;
• Lessons learnt and comments from incident exercises and training days; and
• Lessons learnt and information extracted from relevant literature on chemical 
incident management.
This model was then used to direct the development of two further management tools:
1. A comprehensive chemical incident management guidance manual for use by public 
health professionals during the emergency response to chemical incidents;
2. A quantitative evaluation method to assess the performance of public health 
professionals in responding to a chemical incident.
The evaluation method was used in the validation testing of the guidance manual. The 
assessment, conducted on a group of 79 participants, concluded that the manual was 
effective in improving performance in the response to a chemical incident exercise. 
Statistical analysis further demonstrated that this improvement would be expected across 
the general public health population.
3 The Project in the Context of Environmental 
Technology
The term environmental technology encompasses not only technical solutions to 
environmental problems, but also improvements in management processes and 
techniques to minimise environmental impact. The Engineering Doctorate Programme 
in Environmental Technology embraces the concept of clean technology. Clean 
technology is concerned with developing and applying new methods of approaching 
environmental problems in a more holistic manner and considering industrial processes 
in their entirety, including whole life resource inputs and environmental impacts. For 
example, in the clean technology approach to sulphur dioxide emissions from power 
stations, the first action would be to reassess the demand for energy. Once the true 
needs were established, the next step would be to determine how this level of energy 
should be provided with maximum efficiency of production, transmission, and use, and 
with minimal environmental impact and use o f non-renewable energy resources. In 
contrast, the traditional clean-up or ‘end-of-pipe’ approach would be to install a flue gas 
desulphurisation unit to remove the sulphur from the power station emissions.
The focus of this project has been on the improvement of management systems for 
responding to incidents of environmental contamination, with the aim being to prevent 
future events and to minimise the environmental impact of those incidents that do occur. 
The total environment includes humans, and the majority of environmental regulation is 
ultimately aimed at preventing or minimising adverse effects on human health or 
damage to the environmental resources on which we depend. An additional 
environmental aspect of the project is the need to study the impact o f the chemical 
incident on the natural environment. For example, determining the concentrations of 
chemicals in various environmental media, and providing information on the behaviour 
of the chemical in the environment to enable effective methods for removal or 
remediation to be identified. In many of the incidents described, the solution to 
preventing any further possibility of adverse human health effects resulting from
environmental contamination was to remove the contaminant source, thereby enhancing 
the quality of the natural environment. Where contamination cannot be removed 
through natural degradation, the safe disposal of hazardous materials to licensed and 
properly managed waste sites is required.
The objective of the project has been to provide improved tools and procedures to enable 
public health professionals to prevent or minimise the impact of chemical incidents on 
the public health. Successful management of a chemical incident inherently involves the 
protection and/or remediation of the natural environment. The ultimate aim of 
improving the management of chemical incidents is to prevent the occurrence of 
incidents involving chemical contamination of the environment; this philosophy is the 
basis behind clean technology, which requires the minimisation of environmental 
problems at source. The balance to be achieved is between the social and economic 
benefits of industrial activities, and the potential health and environmental impact of 
accidents arising from such activities.
Returning to the EngD Programme objective stated in the introduction, the project has 
involved the study of the relationship between technology and environmental hazards 
and also the business, or organisational, limitations of managing environmental impacts. 
This understanding has led to the development of management tools to improve National 
Health Service (NHS) strategies for responding to chemical incidents. These tools are 
specifically intended for use by the public health profession.
4 Areas of Innovation and Contributions to 
Knowledge
In order to be eligible for the award of the degree of Doctor of Engineering, candidates 
must fulfil the following criterion (University of Surrey/Brunei University, 2000, 
p.Al/5):
Demonstrate evidence of innovation and a contribution to knowledge 
via research into either:
(i) novel understanding of the environmental consequences of 
systems for providing goods or services; or
(ii) novel methods of improving the environmental performance of 
systems for providing or using goods or services thereby 
contributing to more sustainable development.
This research project has investigated both the environmental consequences of chemical 
incidents themselves, which occur as the result of accidents from industries providing 
goods and services, and also the management of chemical incidents by health 
authorities, which form part of the service industry. The output of the project has been 
the development of methods to improve the management of chemical incidents, thereby 
enhancing the environmental performance of the management systems employed by 
health authorities in responding to chemical incidents.
The specific contributions to knowledge achieved have been:
• Development of a best practice model for the public health response to chemical 
incidents, based on the lessons learnt from the management of actual chemical 
incidents. The best practice model sets out in one document all the issues and 
actions required in the response to a chemical incident. This constitutes original 
work as no similar model currently exists.
• Development of an evaluation method to quantitatively assess the performance 
in responding to chemical incidents. This is a novel tool that could be useful for
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both assessing effectiveness of chemical incident training and in ensuring an 
adequate level of competency in those professionals required to manage the health 
aspects of environmental hazards.
• Creation of a chemical incident management guidance manual providing a 
framework and detailed guidance on: the risk assessment of the potential impact of a 
chemical incident on the public health; communication with other organisations 
involved in the management of chemical incidents and with the public; management 
actions to prevent or mitigate adverse health impacts; and documentation of 
incidents. The effectiveness of this manual in improving response of public health 
professionals was also demonstrated. Generic guidance aimed at the emergency 
response to chemical incidents by public health professionals is not currently 
available and the publication of this manual will provide a valuable and unique 
resource for the public health profession. A copy of the chemical incident 
management guidance manual can be found in Volume 2.
• Dissemination of lessons learnt in the management of chemical incidents through 
conferences and training sessions and the publication of journal papers, including:
>  ‘Water-Related Chemical Incidents: A National Survey’ - in the journal 
Health and Hygiene (Goodfellow et al 2000a);
>  ‘The Public Health Response to an Incident of Secondary Chemical 
Contamination at a UK Beach’ - in the BMJ journal Occupational and 
Environmental Medicine (Goodfellow et al, 2001);
>  ‘Permeation of Organic Chemicals Through Plastic Water Supply Pipes’ - 
accepted for publication in the CIWEM journal Water and Environmental 
Management Journal (Goodfellow et al, in press 2001).
Copies of all papers produced during the research period can be found in the 
Publications Section in Volume 2.
xvi
5 Areas of Future Research
In Chapter 7, Section 7.5, details of the further possible developments of the chemical 
incident management tools are provided. In Chapter 9, more general areas for further 
research are discussed. In summary, with respect to the best practice model, further 
consultation both within the public health field and also with other organisations 
involved in the management of chemical incidents needs to be conducted, particularly 
with regard to the prioritisation of management actions. The coverage of the chemical 
incident management guidance manual needs to be further broadened to encompass all 
types of environmental chemical incidents and for application across the UK. Further 
consultation is also to be conducted prior to final publication of the manual as part of a 
Stationery Office Book, ‘Environmental Management of Chemical Incidents’. Further 
investigation with respect to the evaluation method and validation testing process could 
also be conducted. In particular, testing the applicability of the evaluation method in 
other types of scenarios and for measuring performance in actual chemical incidents. 
Further investigation into the effect of experience on chemical incident management 
performance would also be of interest.
For chemical incident management in general, further research is required with respect 
to the following issues:
• Further specification of the role of public health professionals in chemical incident 
management.
• Further research to ascertain how well the best practice model reflects actual 
management practice and whether any differences are due to inadequacies of the 
model or the response.
• Development of geographical information systems (GIS) as a chemical incident 
management tool.
• Further information on the most effective techniques and the frequency and duration 
of training required, in order to ensure competency of those required to manage 
chemical incidents.
• Development of improved methods of chemical incident surveillance and 
investigation of causal links between environmental exposures and disease 
outcomes.
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1 Introduction
The Engineering Doctorate (EngD) Programme in Environmental Technology is 
conducted jointly by the University of Surrey and Brunei University and is largely 
funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). Each 
research engineer is sponsored by a company who proposes a research project within the 
environmental technology theme and provides additional funding. The research 
engineers are based at the sponsor company where the research work is conducted.
This introduction provides background information on the sponsor company, the initial 
problem definition and research needs, and the aims and objectives of the project. 
Details of further investigation into the problem and assessment of the research needs 
are provided in Chapter 2.
1.1 Background to the Sponsor Company
The sponsor company for the research project was the Chemical Incident Response 
Service (CIRS). CIRS was formed as a specialised department at the Medical 
Toxicology Unit (MTU), Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Hospital Trust. It was developed 
from a chemical incident research programme, which was established in 1990, and 
became a contracted service in 1995. CIRS is now one of five Chemical Incident 
Regional Service Provider Units (RSPUs or CIPUs) across the UK, that provide 
information and advice to health authorities (HAs) on public health, environmental, 
scientific, toxicological and epidemiological aspects of chemical incidents. The 
historical focus of expertise at CIRS has been on the toxicological and medical issues 
related to chemical incidents, due to its development out of the National Poisons 
Information Service (NPIS), also part of MTU. The core professional staff at CIRS 
consists of consultant toxicologists, information scientists (with expertise in 
toxicological data) and, since 1997, an environmental epidemiologist.
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HAs have a responsibility for the protection of the public health from environmental 
hazards. In a chapter specifically on chemical incidents, the National Health Service 
(NHS) Guidance ‘Planning for Major Incidents’, states that HAs must ensure that 
satisfactory arrangements are in place for handling the public health and health care 
aspects of the response to chemical incidents (NHSE, 1998). The designated individual, 
usually the Consultant in Communicable Disease Control (CCDC), must ensure that the 
HA has access to the necessary advice and expertise concerning public health hazards 
arising from chemical incidents. Each HA is therefore required to have a service level 
agreement with a Chemical Incident RSPU for provision of this advice and expertise.
There are a total of 119 District Health Authorities (DHAs) across England, Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, which are grouped under 11 National Health Service 
Executive (NHSE) Regions (the organisation of HAs across the UK will be changing 
over the next year, with different arrangements for England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland). The five Chemical Incident RSPUs are listed in Table 7.7; the NHSE 
Regions covered and their total population are specified for each unit (Health Service 
Journal, 1999). From the table, it can be seen that CIRS covers 6 NHSE Regions, which 
encompasses 69 DHAs, with a total population of 37.9 million, 64% of the total UK 
population.
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Table 1.1: Coverage o f the Five Chemical Incident Regional Service Provider Units in 
the UK
Unit NHSE Regions 
covered
Population
Chemical Hazard Management and 
Research Centre at the Institute of Public 
and Environmental Health, University of 
Birmingham
West Midlands 5.3 million
Chemical Incident Management Support 
Unit at the College of Medicine, 
Therapeutics and Toxicology Centre, 
University of Wales
Northern Ireland 
Wales
4.6 million
Chemical Incident Response Service at the
Medical Toxicology Unit, Guy’s and St 
Thomas’ NHS Hospital Trust
Eastern 
London 
North West 
South East 
South West 
Trent
37.9 million
Chemical Incident Service at the
Department of Environmental and 
Occupational Medicine, The Medical 
School, University of Newcastle
Northern and Yorkshire 6.4 million
Scottish Centre for Infection and 
Environmental Health
Scotland 5.1 million
1.2 Problem Definition
The following section outlines the initial definition of the research problem and a 
definition of a chemical incident is provided and the type of incident covered by the 
project is specified. The role of public health professionals and CIRS in responding to 
chemical incidents is discussed, and the research needs, as identified at the time the 
project was proposed, are detailed.
1.2.1 Chemical Incidents
In general terms, a chemical incident is considered to be any event that involves the 
release of a chemical. This could be an uncontrolled release or one resulting from 
normal industrial operations, and includes both accidental and deliberate releases. 
Biological contamination is not considered to be a chemical incident, except in the case
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where a biological agent releases chemical substances. Radioactive substances are also 
not included, unless the substance poses a toxic as well as a radiation risk.
1.2.1.1 Definition
CIRS uses the definition of a chemical incident as specified by Hill and O'Sullivan, who 
undertook a survey in 1991 of the arrangements for the identification and investigation 
of incidents of acute exposure to the public to toxic substances (Hill and O’Sullivan, 
1992). For the purpose of the survey, an incident was defined as:
“An unforeseen event involving any non-radioactive substance resulting in 
potential toxic risk to public health or leading to exposure o f two or more 
individuals resulting in illness or potential illness ”
or
“Two or more individuals suffering from a similar illness, which might be 
due to such an event”
CIRS is concerned with chemical incidents that pose an actual or potential hazard to the 
public health. Therefore, an individual exposure is not included within their definition 
and occupational hazards are also not investigated unless there is the possibility of the 
general population becoming exposed.
Chemical incidents include both acute and chronic events. For example, a spill into a 
watercourse causing only short-term contamination, or contamination of water supplies 
over a long time period due to leaching of chemicals from the pipe material or lining. In 
addition, chemical incidents involving contamination from natural sources are also 
included, for example raised levels of manganese in private drinking water supplies due 
to the local geology.
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1.2.1.2 Numbers and types o f chemical incidents
All chemical incidents reported to CIRS are recorded on a computer database. Incidents
categorised as:
Air • Medicine
CS gas • Spill
Explosion • Suspicious
Fire • Transport
Food/drink • Waste
Land • Water
Leak • Other
Malicious • Not known
Additional fields allow the specification of whether there has been a release to air, water, 
water supply or land. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show, the total number of incidents reported 
to CIRS in the years 1994 to 2000, and the percentage of the 913 incidents for the year 
2000 as categorised by type, respectively.
Figure 1.1: Number o f Chemical Incidents Reported to CIRS fo r the Years 1994-2000
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1.2.1.3 Project scope
The type of chemical incidents included in the scope of study of the project was 
restricted to water-related chemical incidents. Although there is a water category within 
the CIRS database, incidents studied were not restricted to this type as incidents 
categorised as other types, in particular spill and leak, could also result in the 
contamination of water. The subset of water-related chemical incidents from all the 
chemical incidents reported to CIRS therefore included all incidents that resulted in the 
chemical contamination of surface waters, ground waters, marine waters and drinking 
water supplies. The majority of the incidents studied in depth were restricted further to 
those affecting surface waters or drinking water supplies.
1.2.2 Role of Public Health Professionals in Managing Chemical Incidents
In recent years, public health doctors have taken on a much greater role in the 
investigation of environmental hazards that impact on the health of the general 
population, including the management of both acute and chronic chemical incidents. 
The current system, which requires public health doctors within HAs to manage 
chemical incidents, has only been in place since the Health Service Guidelines were 
produced in 1993 (DH et al, 1993 and NHSME, 1993). The guidelines for the 
‘Arrangements to deal with health aspects of chemical contamination incidents’ state 
that (NHSME, 1993):
• The responsibility for the co-ordination of the health aspects of response to chemical 
accidents lies with the DHAs;
• Regional and District Health Authorities should ensure that they have adequate 
arrangements in place for handling health aspects of accidents involving actual or 
potential chemical contamination of air, soil, water and food; and
• Each DHA should designate an appropriate individual to be responsible for ensuring 
that the DHA has access to the necessary advice and expertise concerning public 
health hazards arising from chemical contamination and to prepare appropriate plans 
to respond to these.
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The specific responsibilities of the DHA include (NHSME, 1993):
• The protection of the health of, and provision of health care to, those who have been 
or may be exposed to a chemical hazard;
• Co-ordinating the NHS response to the accident with other agencies, including those 
involved in the collection of non-biological, i.e. environmental, samples for analysis 
(in particular local authority environmental health officers);
• Promptly advising the local authority (LA), and as appropriate the emergency 
services, on the measures to limit or prevent further exposure of the public to the 
hazard;
• In consultation with Accident and Emergency (A&E) consultants, other clinicians 
and the ambulance service, determining what measures are required within the health 
service to assist and treat those who have or may have been exposed;
• Ensuring that members of the health professions (including general practitioners, 
health visitors and other members of the primary health care team) are given 
adequate information about the accident and the health consequences;
• In the light of available exposure data, the results of biological and non-biological 
sampling and epidemiological findings, and with appropriate specialist advice, 
evaluating the risk to the health of the public; and
• In consultation with the LA and other agencies involved in the accident, issuing any 
necessary public statements about the medical care of people who have or may have 
been exposed to a hazard, how to avoid or minimise exposure, and providing 
information on the probable effects of exposure including reassurance where no or 
minimal risk exists.
However, despite the requirement for HAs and public health professionals to manage the 
health aspects of chemical incidents, their experience and training is variable and largely 
quite limited. The 1991 survey by Hill and O'Sullivan into the identification and 
investigation of chemical incidents, found that few public health doctors have been 
trained in managing such events or have access to the resources required for
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identification and investigation of chemical incidents and the mitigation or prevention of 
adverse health effects in humans (Hill and O’Sullivan, 1992). Bakhshi (1997) reported 
that, whereas the emergency services have learnt to cope efficiently and effectively with 
acute incidents, there is a gap in public health preparedness for the provision of a 
continuing assessment of the impact on the exposed community as a result o f a chemical 
accident and the resulting action to preserve the health of the community. Bakhshi 
(1997) also found that familiarity with knowledge of environmental hazards, related 
clinical features, and technical laboratory procedures, is no longer central to the training 
and expertise of public health practitioners.
1.2.3 CIRS Approach to Chemical Incident Management
CIRS provides advice and expertise to public health professionals in those HAs with 
which it has service level agreements. Advice may also be provided to other health 
responders, in particular A&E hospital departments and the Ambulance Service. The 
management of a chemical incident requires a multi-agency response and CIRS will 
often collaborate with other organisations involved in the management, for example, 
Local Authority Environmental Health, Police, Fire Service, Environment Agency (EA), 
and water companies.
CIRS may become aware of a chemical incident through the emergency services, A&E 
hospitals, NHS Direct, Environmental Health or directly from the industry or company 
involved, in which case they will alert the public health doctor in the relevant HA within 
30 minutes. Alternatively, the public health doctor within the HA may contact CIRS 
directly for advice with respect to an incident of which they are already aware.
The aim of CIRS in managing a chemical incident is to assist the public health doctor to 
assess the potential impact of the chemical incident on the public health and to take 
appropriate action to prevent or minimise any adverse effects on the health of the 
population in their HA area. The specific objectives are to:
• Assist in identifying the chemical hazard and determine the toxic risk;
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• Provide the relevant medical toxicology information on the chemical or chemicals 
involved;
• Advise on personal decontamination, medical treatment, biological sampling and 
health follow-up;
• Advise and assist with epidemiological investigations, incident documentation and 
surveillance; and
• Assist with the provision and interpretation of environmental information and carry 
out site visits where appropriate.
As the incident develops CIRS will assist in monitoring and recording any changes in
the situation and updating hazard and risk assessment information.
1.2.4 Preliminary Research Needs
Prior to the commencement of the project, two general research needs were identified
with respect to the public health and CIRS response to chemical incidents:
1. The advice offered by CIRS in responding to chemical incidents has historically 
been of a toxicological/medical nature. In order to cover the breadth of issues 
involved in chemical incident management, CIRS sought to expand its knowledge 
base through environmental technology research projects. Therefore, in 1997, two 
Engineering Doctorate in Environmental Technology projects were started focusing 
on air and water-related chemical incidents. In 1998, an additional project was 
initiated to study land-related incidents.
2. HAs and their public health professionals have only been responsible for managing 
the health care aspects of environmental hazards, including chemical incidents, since 
such a duty was placed on them in the NHS Guidelines in 1993 (DH et al, 1993 and 
NHSME, 1993). The majority of public health professionals have minimal training 
and experience in this area and would greatly benefit from the provision of specific 
guidance to assist them in the management of chemical incidents.
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1.3 Aims and Objectives
From the research needs identified in the previous section, the aim at the start of the 
project was specified as being to develop procedures for the management of chemical 
incidents. Chemical incident response and management is a multi-disciplinary operation 
involving public health professionals in HAs, A&E hospitals, primary care groups, 
emergency services, Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) in local authorities (LAs), 
the Environment Agency, toxicologists, and, in the case of water related incidents, water 
companies. Additional specialists are also often involved, for example, environmental 
consultants, the Water Research Centre (WRc), the National Chemical Emergency 
Centre (NCEC), Health and Safety Executive (HSE), and the Meteorological Office. 
The aim of this research was to provide procedures for chemical incident management 
primarily aimed at UK HAs, but that would also be applicable to other organisations in 
the UK and internationally. The focus of the procedures for managing chemical 
incidents is the protection of the public health.
The output from the project was therefore planned to be a guidance manual for use by 
public health professionals in the emergency response to chemical incidents, in order to 
assist in the mitigation and prevention of the impact on human health. In addition to 
developing the current toxicological response, a supplementary aim of the project was to 
introduce an environmental technology perspective into the process of chemical incident 
management within the public health field.
The main objectives identified at the start of the project were therefore to:
• Evaluate the management of water-related chemical incidents reported to CIRS and 
establish how a chemical incident evolves and what lessons can be learnt from these 
events; and
• Develop procedures for managing chemical incidents to improve and provide a 
consistent response from public health professionals, with the main focus being the 
protection of the public health.
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From the assessment of the current state o f knowledge and further defining and focusing 
of the research needs, as will be described in Chapter 2, it was possible to develop more 
specific project aims. Therefore, the aim of the project was refined to be the 
development of a best practice model for the public health response to chemical 
incidents. This model would then be used to direct the development of guidance 
materials to assist those involved in the management of chemical incidents to meet the 
best practice criteria. A quantitative evaluation method would also be devised to assess 
the public health response to chemical incidents. This would enable the effectiveness of 
the chemical incident management guidance manual to be assessed.
The specific objectives were detailed as:
• Specify the criteria of a best practice model for the public health response to 
chemical incidents;
• Develop a chemical incident management guidance manual to direct those involved 
in managing a chemical incident towards the best practice model;
• Develop a quantitative evaluation method to assess the level of performance 
achieved by public health professionals in managing a chemical incident;
• Assess the performance levels achieved by public health professionals with the use 
of the chemical incident management guidance manual; and
• Modify the guidance manual in response to the evaluation results and consultation 
comments, and provide recommendations for future improvements in the 
management tools.
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2 Current State of Knowledge in Chemical Incident 
Management
An extensive literature search has been undertaken to enable the current state of 
knowledge in the field to be determined. In order to gather the necessary information, 
two literature reviews were conducted, one searching specifically for reports of water- 
related chemical incidents and a second identifying any existing procedures on the 
management of chemical incidents. The results of the findings, which enabled the most 
important research needs to be identified, are reported in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
In addition, in order to establish the current state of knowledge in chemical incident 
management, a questionnaire survey was developed to determine the current levels of 
training and experience of the lead doctors in managing chemical incidents within health 
authorities (HAs), usually Consultants in Communicable Disease Control (CsCDC). 
The level of resources they had access to, and particular areas requiring investigation 
were also identified. The results of the survey are reported on in Section 2.3.
2.7 Water-Related Chemical Incidents in the Published 
Literature
At the start of the research project, a comprehensive literature search of English 
language journal reports looking specifically at water-related chemical incidents in 
Britain was conducted for the period 1994-1997. A full literature review paper was 
published in the Chemical Incident Report (CIRS in-house newsletter), and can be found 
as Paper 1 in the Publications Section in Volume 2 (Oliver and Holmes, 1998). For the 
purposes of the review, only incidents affecting water, either as the primary or secondary 
media of contamination, were considered. Only chemical incidents, as opposed to 
microbiological contamination, were included; both drinking water and natural waters 
were considered, but not swimming pools, or similar artificial environments. An 
incident was defined as an event where a chemical in water had been found to be
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elevated, or suspected to be elevated, above UK drinking water guideline levels and had 
the potential to cause adverse health effects. Within this definition, both acute and 
chronic incidents were included. With respect to those exposed, only the threat to the 
public was considered, occupational or individual exposures were not included.
The results from the searches are shown in Table 2.1. A  total of only eight acute and 
chronic incidents were identified from the literature search. Table 2.1 also shows that 
there were two categories of papers; those that primarily focused on the reported 
symptoms and health effects, and those that actually documented how the incident 
occurred and how it was managed.
Table 2.1: Incident Reports in the Published Literature
Health Effects Management of the Incident
An epidemiological study after a water 
contamination incident near Worcester (Fowle 
et al, 1996)
Thetford plastics fire: the role of a preventive 
medical team in chemical incidents (Baxter, et 
al, 1995)
Incidence of childhood diabetes mellitus in 
Yorkshire is associated with nitrate in 
drinking water (Parslow et al, 1997)
Sheep dip chemicals and water pollution 
(Virtue and Clayton, 1997)
Copper in drinking water - an investigation 
into possible health effects (Fewtrell et al, 
1996)
Containing run-off at Allied Colloids (Anon, 
1995)
The legend of Camelford: Medical 
consequences of a water pollution accident 
(David and Wessely, 1995)
The Environmental Impact of a Chemical 
Spill from a Timber-Treatment Works on a 
Lowland River System (Dowson et al, 1996)
The four papers focusing on the health effects cover two acute and two chronic 
incidents.
• In April 1994, an acute incident occurred involving a major river pollution event 
with the chemical 2 ethyl 5,5 dimethyl 1,3 dioxane and 2 ethyl 4 methyl 1,3 
dioxolane, which led to a considerable increase in the number of complaints from the 
public concerning an unusual taste and odour in the drinking water in Worcester city 
(Fowle et al, 1996).
• A follow-up report was identified regarding health effects, and the general public 
response as a consequence of the infamous incident water incident that occurred in
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Camelford on 6 July 1988 (David and Wessely, 1995). The incident involved the 
inadvertent deposition of 20 tonnes of aluminium sulphate into the wrong storage 
reservoir, which resulted in a massive aluminium load in the domestic water supply 
of 12 000 residents and 8 000 holiday visitors in the district of Lowermoor, north 
Cornwall.
The two papers on chronic incidents dealt with the possible health effects related to long 
term exposure to nitrate and copper in drinking water supplies, and in particular, the 
association with childhood diabetes and liver disease (Parslow et al, 1997 and Fewtrell 
et al, 1996).
The second category o f papers were more relevant to the research project as they 
provided more information regarding incident management responses and their 
environmental consequences, with some offering lessons learnt that could be applied to 
future events. Papers were identified detailing the response to three acute inciderts, as 
summarised below:
• On 11 October 1991 in Thetford, there was an incident involving a fire that 
consumed 1000 tonnes of plastic, mainly PVC, over 72 hours and resulted in the 
emission of a large smoke plume threatening the health of both local residents and 
emergency workers (Baxter, et al, 1995). The incident also threatened secondary 
contamination of water from contaminated fire water entering rivers or storm drains. 
The paper focuses specifically on the role of a medical team in the emergency 
management of a major polyvinyl chloride fire in an urban area.
• Blocked site drains and pumping systems, as the consequence of a chemical fire at 
an Allied Colloids chemical production plant in South Bradford on 21 July 1992, 
resulted in the existing drains and effluent treatment facilities being unable to 
contain much of the fire-fighting run-off waters (Anon, 1995). This caused a 
significant quantity of polluting material to be released off-site and eventually into 
the local river system, leading to a major fish kill as far downstream as 30 miles.
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• A major timber preservative spillage in March 1990 resulted from a fire at a timber 
yard (Dowson et al, 1996). Substantial quantities of tributyltin and lindane (y- 
hexachlorocyclohexane) were released into the River Bourne, with contamination 
extending 80 km into the Thames estuary causing extensive fish mortality and virtual 
eradication of the invertebrate population in the immediate vicinity of the spill. In 
addition, three drinking water intakes were closed for a period of 5-7 days as a 
precautionary measure.
Another paper identified a chronic problem of pollution of watercourses by 
organophosphate sheep dip (Virtue and Clayton, 1997). The paper describes the 
approach used by the Tweed River Purification Board in 1990-1991 to meet their 
objective of reducing the numbers and significance of water pollution incidents caused 
by sheep dipping.
The number of incidents identified through the literature search takes on more 
significance when compared to the number of incidents reported to CIRS. From the 
analysis of the database compiled by CIRS on reported incidents, from 1997 alone, at 
least 31 reports were identified of chemical incidents that actually, or potentially, 
affected water and resulted in a threat to human health. Due to the categorisation of the 
incidents within the database, it was difficult to identify cases where water had been 
polluted through secondary contamination, for example via fire water runoff, therefore 
this is a conservative estimate of the number of incidents reported. The comparison of 
the number of incidents reported to CIRS with those described in the published literature 
clearly indicates a significant disparity. The opportunities for learning from past events 
are greatly reduced without dissemination to the wider professional community through 
publication. Valuable information on lessons learnt from the management o f chemical 
incidents could be passed on through publication. This would be o f particular benefit to 
public health professionals, who may only be called upon to respond to incidents on an 
infrequent basis. Consequently, they would benefit from being able to keep up to date
16
with the types of hazards that exist, current practice in responding to incidents, and the 
shortfalls identified from the management of past events.
2.2 Chemical Incident Management Procedures in the 
Published Literature
The aim of this literature review was to identify any procedures currently available to 
assist in the management of chemical incidents. The particular focus was on the 
management o f chemical incidents and environmental hazards by public health doctors 
in order to minimise the adverse impact on the public health. This covers a wider remit 
than just the medical management of casualties, which is considered to be largely the 
responsibility of hospital accident and emergency clinicians.
A systematic and comprehensive literature search of a range of electronic databases, and 
also internet searches, were undertaken covering the period of 1985 up to January 2001. 
In addition to the materials identified from these searches, publications not necessarily in 
the public domain, for example internal publications from public bodies or commercial 
organisations, were collated throughout the research period. A detailed version of the 
literature review has been prepared as a separate paper and can be found as Paper 2 in 
the Publications Section in Volume 2. A summary of the findings is provided below.
Results from the literature search identified various publications on particular aspects of 
chemical incident management and related issues, including:
• Site specific technical management - a number of papers were found detailing 
specific emergency procedures at industrial sites. The Center for Chemical Process 
Safety, part of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers provides guidelines on 
the prevention, preparedness, response and recovery stages of on-site emergencies 
within the process industry in particular (Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1995). 
The American Institute of Chemical Engineers have also produced a document with 
guidelines that aim to establish a basis for successful feedback through investigation
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of process incidents to determine the many causes and to implement changes which 
will prevent recurrence (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1992).
• Medical management of casualties - several references were identified that 
specifically covered the medical management of casualties from chemical accidents, 
for example, assessing level of injury, initial treatment, and management of large 
numbers of casualties (Hall, 1995 and Murray, 1990). Another source of 
information on the medical management of casualties from acute chemical exposures 
is provided by the US Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR, 
1992). These guidelines were developed to aid emergency department physicians 
and other emergency healthcare professionals who manage acute exposure resulting 
from chemical incidents. Twenty-seven chemical-specific medical management 
protocols are provided with information on the medical treatment of exposed 
patients, how to avoid contamination or injury to medical staff and decontamination 
techniques.
• Computer based expert systems for emergency management of chemical 
incidents - several computer based expert systems or models exist which aim to aid 
the emergency response to chemical incidents (Chang et al, 1988, Mendoza et al, 
1989, Finch and Lees, 1997 and Gheorghe and Vamanu, 1999). The use o f a 
simulation-based decision support tool for management of chemical incidents and 
the application of a three-dimensional numerical model in emergency response 
management is also reported in the literature (Morin et al, 1999 and Yamada, 1993).
• Collation of information during an emergency - management systems, including 
computer based tools, have been developed for use in emergency management in 
general and also specifically for chemical incidents, in order to collect and collate 
the large array of information from such events (Comfort, 1985, Ernst, 1985, 
Gordon, 1988, Marker, 1988 and May hew, 1988).
• Procedures for the management of chemical incidents - only a limited number of 
publications were identified that dealt with general procedures or issues related to 
the management of chemical incidents. The Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development (OECD), the International Programme on Chemical
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Safety (IPCS), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and World 
Health Organization (WHO) jointly produced a book in 1994 on the ‘Health aspects 
o f chemical accidents: Guidance on chemical accident awareness, preparedness and 
response for health professionals and emergency responders’ (OECD et al, 1994). 
The main subject matter is preparedness, with some specific response information 
relating to managing the health impact of a chemical accident. In 1999, IPCS 
produced a book on public health and chemical incidents aimed at policy makers 
(IPCS, 1999). It is not designed for use as a tool in the emergency response to 
chemical incidents. However, it does identify various aspects of the public health 
management of chemical incidents and in particular, covers issues to be considered 
when planning the resources required for incident response. WHO have also 
produced a book for an international audience on rapid health assessment protocols 
for emergencies. This focuses mainly on large-scale emergencies involving 
infectious diseases or natural disaster. However, there is also a short chapter on 
chemical emergencies that introduces the issues to consider in a preliminary 
assessment of a chemical incident (WHO, 1999). CIRS has also been involved in a 
number of publications aimed at providing guidance to those involved in the 
emergency response to chemical incidents. In 1995, a toolkit for handling chemical 
incidents for trainees in public health was produced (Schonfield et al, 1995). This 
document was further developed and revised, and published as the first in a series of 
books on chemical incident management produced by CIRS and published by The 
Stationery Office (Irwin et al, 1999). This book, which is targeted to public health 
physicians, looks at the role of the public health department of a health authority in a 
chemical incident in some detail, however, the focus is largely on preparedness, 
rather than actual management actions. Another book, aimed at accident and 
emergency clinicians and their role in chemical incident management, also forms 
part of this series (Fisher et al, 1999). This book is focused on the hospital role and 
medical management of patients in a chemical incident. In 1997, the Environmental 
Health and Emergency Planning Services of Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Local 
Authorities produced a practical guide for Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) 
providing information and advice to support the attending officer at an incident
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involving chemicals (Environmental Health and Emergency Planning Services of 
Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Local Authorities, 1997). The toolkit was intended 
to be a practical working document for EHOs providing guidelines and information. 
This toolkit has recently been further developed and extensively revised, and 
published as part the CIRS series on chemical incident management (Fairman et al, 
2001). The NHS Management Executive provides some guidance on the health 
aspects of chemical incident management (DH et al, 1993 and NHSME, 1993). 
However, these guidelines largely focus on specifying the role of public health 
doctors and others in dealing with chemical incidents, and also on resource planning 
for the management of chemical incidents, rather than detailing the specific issues 
and actions involved in managing an incident. NHS guidance has also recently been 
provided covering all types of major incidents, a chapter is included referring 
specifically to chemical incidents (NHSE, 1998). The focus of this guidance is on 
emergency planning and defining roles and responsibilities. Some guidance is 
provided on particular aspects of response to incidents, for example, basing with the 
media, decontamination and personal protective equipment, and long-term health 
investigations. The Home Office has also produced more general guidance for all 
types of disaster; this document deals with large-scale disasters in general, with only 
minimal reference to chemical incidents (Home Office, 1997). However, several 
emergency management issues are raised that are applicable to the management of 
major chemical incidents. Finally, the Health and Safety Laboratory have produced 
a manual for use when sampling for human exposure following a chemical incident 
(White et al, 1999). The focus is clearly on biological sampling following an 
incident, and information is provided on establishing the sampling protocol, sample 
collection, transport and analysis. However, more general advice is also provided on 
collecting information in a chemical incident and defining the scale of an incident.
• Specific aspects of chemical incident management - other references deal with 
specific aspects of chemical incident management, which may be useful to public 
health doctors. For example, the Department of Health has produced a publication 
specifically providing guidance to the NHS on managing the health consequences of 
a deliberate release of a chemical or biological agent (DH and NHSE, 2000). In
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addition, the former Department o f the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
(DETR) recently published guidance on environmental sampling after a chemical 
incident (DETR, 2000). The Committee on the Medical Effects of Air Pollutants 
(COMEAP) has also produced some good practice guidelines for investigating the 
health impact of local industrial emissions (DH, 2000). This guidance is largely 
aimed at long-term chronic problems from chemical point source emissions, and 
focuses on air pollution. However, some general guidance for the management of 
chemical incidents can be gained from the document. WHO has also produced draft 
guidelines for the investigation of diseases of chemical aetiology and follow-up of 
exposed subjects, this is just one aspect of chemical incident management, but 
important issues are raised in relation to their management (WHO, 2000). Guidance 
on investigation of disease clusters has been produced by the US Center for Disease 
Control (CDC, 1990) and the UK Leukaemia Research Fund (Arrundale et al, 1997). 
A paper from the Birmingham Communicable Disease Unit also provides a 
framework of epidemiological principles that underlie chemical incident surveillance 
(Bakhshi, 1997).
• Management of water-related incidents - information related specifically to the 
management of water-related incidents has also been collected. Some water 
companies have developed written procedures for the management of chemical 
incidents affecting water supplies, for example North West Water (United Utilities) 
(1996). Thames Water (1999) also provides guidance for all types of events affecting 
drinking water and this includes chemical contamination incidents. Three chemical 
incidents of particular note that resulted in the contamination of drinking water 
supplies have occurred in recent years, namely: phenol pollution of the River Dee in 
1984 (Welsh Water and North West Water, 1984), aluminium contamination o f the 
water supply at Camelford in 1988 (Lowermoor Health Advisory Group, 1989); and 
pollution of the River Severn with 2EDD (2-ethyl-5,5-dimethyl-l-3-dioxane) and 
2EMD (2-ethyl-4-methyl-l,3-dioxolane) in 1994 (Ives et al, 1994). These incidents 
were thoroughly investigated and comprehensive reports were produced. Lessons 
can be learnt from these incident investigations and general recommendations with 
respect to chemical incident management were made.
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In conclusion, the review of the literature on procedures for the management of chemical 
incidents found that the only generic guidance specifically aimed at the public health 
management of chemical incidents is the book published by CIRS on ‘Chemical Incident 
Management for Public Health Physicians’ (Irwin et al, 1999). Although this book is 
aimed at public health doctors in particular, and details aspects of chemical incident 
management, it primarily focuses on the preparation prior to a chemical incident, rather 
than providing easy to follow procedures for the emergency response stage of chemical 
incident management. It also does not address many of the wider issues involved in the 
investigation of environmental hazards, and does not cover many of the specific 
problems encountered in water-related chemical incidents in particular.
In addition, two publications by WHO et al were identified through the review of the 
literature that are of particular relevance:
• Health aspects of chemical accidents: Guidance on chemical accident awareness, 
preparedness and response for health professionals and emergency responders 
(OECD et al, 1994); and
• Public Health and Chemical Incidents -  Guidance for National and Regional Policy 
Makers in the Public/Environmental Health Roles (IPCS, 1999).
However, these books are aimed more at emergency planning and policy-making rather 
than guidance to be followed in the actual emergency response to an incident.
2.3 Assessment of the Current State of Knowledge Through a 
Questionnaire Survey
In the first year of the research project, a nationwide survey was conducted on the 
management of chemical incidents within HAs, concentrating on water-related chemical 
incidents in particular. The overall aim of the survey was to focus the research project to 
particularly relevant and important aspects of water-related chemical incidents. The 
objectives of the survey were to assess:
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• The actual number and type of water-related chemical incidents that are managed 
within HAs; and
• The resources held and used by public health professionals.
2.3.1 Survey Methodology
The survey was conducted by devising a postal questionnaire aimed at collecting the 
necessary information to assess how public health doctors currently manage water- 
related chemical incidents. A summary of survey techniques was completed as part of 
an assignment for an EngD module, which also includes a detailed description of the 
methodology used in this survey. A copy of the report can be found in Appendix 1. The 
questionnaire was devised in May 1998, piloted in June, and a final version distributed 
at the beginning of July (a copy of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2). The 
majority of replies were received by September, and analysis was carried out in October 
and November, with a preliminary report produced in November 1998.
The definition of a chemical incident used for the survey was:
An unforeseen event leading to exposure o f two or more individuals to any 
non-radioactive substance resulting in illness or a potentially toxic threat to health 
Further qualification was provided of which incidents were covered by the definition. 
Water incidents involving both primary and/or secondary contamination (including fire 
water run-off) of any water medium (drinking water, surface water, ground water, 
recreational waters) were included; in addition, both acute and chronic incidents were 
specified.
Initially, 77 questionnaires were distributed at the beginning of July 1998, to CsCDC, or 
equivalent positions, at all the HAs in England who held service level agreements with 
CIRS. At the time of the survey, this encompassed 73 HAs across England. A second 
distribution of questionnaires to Scotland was carried out with the agreement of the 
Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health (SCIEH). Fifteen questionnaires 
were distributed in November 1998 to Consultants in Public Health Medicine (CsPHM), 
or equivalent positions, at the Scottish Health Boards.
23
2.3.2 Survey Results
From the initial 77 questionnaires sent to HAs in England, 65 were returned completed, 
a response rate of 84%. In Scotland, 10 of the 15 questionnaires were returned 
completed, a response rate of 67%. However, it should be noted that questionnaires 
were not received from the areas of Greater Glasgow and Lanarkshire, which account 
for 21% of the population in Scotland (Health Service Journal, 1999).
2.3.2.1 Involvement o f  public health in managing chemical incidents
CsCDC and CsPHM were asked if they considered non-infectious environmental 
hazards, and specifically chemical incidents related to water to be included in their work 
responsibilities. All the respondents agreed that this was the case. However, there was a 
wide range in the extent of experience in managing chemical incidents amongst public 
health doctors. Level of experience was determined from length of time working as 
CCDC/CPHM, background educational and professional training, and how many actual 
chemical incidents individuals had managed. The vast majority, 69%, of respondents 
had educational and/or professional experience in public health. Alternative training 
backgrounds included microbiology, general practice and clinical positions, with a small 
number of individuals having trained as epidemiologists, engineers and researchers.
The responses indicated that 88% of the respondents had dealt with some sort of 
chemical incident. A breakdown of how many incidents have been managed by public 
health doctors is shown in Figure 2.1. The proportions of these incidents that were 
stated to be water-related are illustrated in Figure 2.2.
24
Figure 2.1: Number o f Chemical Incidents (n—75)
n zero incidents
□ 1-4 incidents
□ 5-10 incidents 
B >10 incidents
Figure 2.2: Proportion o f Chemical Incidents that are Water-Related (n=66)
□ 0
□ <25%
□ 25-50%
■ 50-75%
□ >75%
2.3.2.2 Types o f contamination involved in water-related chemical incidents
Overall, 61% of the total 75 respondents had been involved in a water-related chemical 
incident. Classification of the water incidents by contamination category showed that 
the most frequent scenario by far was drinking water contamination (« 70%), 
followed by chemical spills and contamination of recreational waters (~ 30% each), as 
shown in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Types o f Contamination in Water-Related Chemical Incidents (n =  46)
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Figure 2.4 illustrates the specific chemicals encountered in these incidents. The top six 
most frequently occurring chemicals were: lead, algal toxins, nitrates, pesticides, 
hydrocarbons and iron.
Figure 2.4: Types o f Chemicals in Water-Related Chemical Incidents (n = 46)
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2.3.2.3 Resources used in managing water-related chemical incidents
A number of resources are available to support CsCDC/CsPHM in managing chemical 
incidents. One of the survey aims was to identify how well these resources are utilised. 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the percentage of respondents who used a particular organisation as 
a resource when managing a water-related chemical incident.
Figure 2.5: Percentage o f Respondents Using Particular Organisations (n = 46)
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Key:
CIRS = Chemical Incident R esponse Service
NPIS = National Poisons Information Service
SEPA = Scottish Environmental Protection Agency
SCIEH = Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health
National Focus = UK centre for surveillance of acute chemical incidents
The most widely used resources were both CIRS and the National Poisons Information 
Service (NPIS) in London, and local water companies. In Scotland, the most widely 
used resource was SCIEH. Local EHOs also play an important role in the management 
of water-related chemical incidents. In terms of particular personal contacts when 
managing a water-related chemical incident, the main resource is EHOs, with 70% of 
the respondents collaborating with their EHO. Half of the respondents consulted with 
their regional epidemiologist (or SCIEH in Scotland), and 43% with CsCDC/CsPHM in 
other HAs.
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2.3.2.4 Water resource information
When dealing with water-related chemical incidents, specific information may be 
required, which water companies or local authorities (LAs) will hold. The vast majority 
of respondents, 95%, were able to name the water companies that serve their HA area. 
With respect to the involvement of water companies with the HAs, 95% of respondents 
stated that their emergency plans included collaboration with relevant water companies, 
and 92% hold meetings between the HA and local water companies at least once a year.
An impressive 81% of respondents stated that their local water companies informed 
them about incidents of chemical contamination, with 61% stating that they were 
informed about all incidents. The type of information supplied by the water companies 
included: chemical identification; incident details; information on action being taken by 
the water company; analytical results; estimates of population exposed; and maps of the 
affected areas.
A number of questions were asked about information held by HAs on water resources, 
and action taken in an incident. Only 28% of respondents said that if environmental 
samples were being supplied they would obtain duplicate samples, provided by someone 
independent to the water company. When asked about locations of drinking water 
abstraction points within HA areas, 11% of respondents knew the locations of all 
abstraction points, and 13% knew some locations. However, in addition to those that 
actually held this information within their HA, 52% knew where to get access to the 
information if necessary.
Water resources are also used for recreational purposes. Polluted recreational waters can 
lead to chemical exposure and a threat to the public health. When asked about whether 
they knew which water resources in their HA area were used for recreational purposes, 
16% of respondents stated that they knew all the water resources used for recreational 
uses in their area, and an additional 64% knew some of them.
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2.3.2.5 Private water supplies
Private water supplies can present different problems to those affecting public water 
supplies, and responsibilities for remedial action when water quality does not meet 
legislative limits are more problematic. Three quarters of respondents stated that they 
have private water supplies in their area.
Of those respondents with private water supplies in their areas, 32% were aware of 
chemical problems associated with them. The chemicals most often stated as causing 
problems were: nitrate, iron, manganese and pesticides. It is a requirement of the 
Private Water Supplies Regulations (SI 1991, No.2790) that private water supplies are 
routinely monitored for biological and chemical water quality. LAs are responsible for 
this monitoring and will hold any results. Only 11% of respondents with private water 
supplies in their areas stated that they routinely received analytical results from the LA, 
however, another 48% were informed when drinking water quality standards were not 
met.
2.3.2.6 Incident report publication
In order to establish the reasons behind the lack of publication, and also the level of 
interest in more incident reports being published, the survey included questions about 
publication of chemical incident case reports. More than half (59%) responded that the 
publication of more water-related chemical incident reports would be useful, 15% 
thought it would not. Figure 2.6 illustrates some of the reasons stated for not publishing 
incident reports.
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Figure 2.6: Reasons fo r Not Publishing Incident Reports (n-75)
percentage of respondents
70
lack of time
only a minor incident
no obvious journal to 
publish in
confidentiality is su e s
possibility of legal action
The most frequently stated reason is the lack of time to prepare papers for publication. 
The fact that the incident is only considered to be a minor event is another frequently 
stated reason.
2.4 Analysis of the Current State of Knowledge Based on the 
Survey
The survey confirmed that public health professionals are aware of their responsibilities 
with regard to the management of chemical incidents, but identified a broad range of 
experience, in terms of the length of time working as CCDC/CPHM, background 
educational and professional training, and the actual management of chemical incidents. 
Chemical Incident Regional Service Provider Units (RSPUs) and NPIS can provide 
significant support in managing the health aspects of chemical incidents, but 
CsCDC/CsPHM should have a core knowledge base themselves. A pressing need was 
identified by the survey for the production of more comprehensive guidance that can be 
used by those managing chemical incidents.
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One of the survey aims was to identify how well the resources available to assist public 
health doctors in managing chemical incidents are utilised. The results revealed that 
greater use could be made of the wide range of resources available. With respect to 
water-related incidents, key providers are RSPUs, EHOs, water company personnel, 
Environment Agency (EA) personnel, and experienced people within HAs. The survey 
also identified a lack of access to important water resource information, which is 
imperative for an effective response to water-related chemical incidents. Important 
information includes location of: water abstraction points; private water supplies; 
permitted wastewater discharges; and recreational waters. Even if the CCDC/CPHM 
does not directly possess such water resource information, they should be able to access 
the information and have close communication with representatives from local water 
companies and LAs. Further evidence for a need to establish good working 
relationships between HAs and water companies was demonstrated by the identification 
that drinking water contamination was the most frequently reported water-related 
chemical incident.
Finally, there is a need for greater dissemination of the lessons learnt from managing 
chemical incidents. An effective method of communicating these lessons is through the 
dissemination of information by proper record and publication of the detailed incident. 
The survey identified some of the possible reasons for the lack of publication of incident 
reports.
The results of the questionnaire survey were published as a paper in the journal Health 
and Hygiene, a copy of which can be found as Paper 3 in the Publications Section in 
Volume 2 (Goodfellow et al, 2000a).
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2.5 Conclusions
The literature reviews and questionnaire survey provided further information on the 
research needs with respect to the public health response to chemical incidents, as 
summarised below:
1. The literature review of water-related chemical incidents conducted at the start of the 
project identified a gap in terms of research in the area of chemical incident 
response, particularly from the public health point of view. The published literature 
yields few accounts of incidents that have occurred in the past few years. Even those 
that are reported, show that most research is concentrated on analysing the actual 
effect of the incident, rather than in devising procedures for managing incidents in 
such a way as to protect human health and the environment.
2. A review of the literature on procedures for chemical incident management did not 
find any generic guidance specifically aimed at the public health management of the 
emergency response to chemical incidents. Only one publication providing general 
guidance on chemical incident management aimed at public health professionals was 
found, and its primary focus was on preparation prior to a chemical incident.
3. The questionnaire survey confirmed that levels of training and experience in 
chemical incident management by public health professionals is variable and 
generally quite limited, and that the development of comprehensive guidance for the 
public health response to chemical incidents is required.
This additional information combined with the original project specification identifies a 
clear need for the development of guidance to assist public health professionals in 
responding to chemical incidents. Procedures are required to allow a more effective and 
co-ordinated response to be provided in a timely manner in the event o f a chemical 
incident, in order to protect both public health and the environment. Currently, such 
procedures covering the broad scope of chemical incident management do not exist.
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3 Investigation of the Management of Chemical 
Incidents
In order to form the basis for developing improved procedures for the public health 
management of chemical incidents, the first stage of the research project was a direct 
and personal involvement in managing actual chemical incidents as they were reported 
to CIRS. The aim was to collect information about how incidents are currently managed 
by public health professionals and to identify areas for improvement. Involvement in 
the management of actual water-related chemical incidents is reported in Section 3.1. 
An additional aspect of the investigation was to take part in the chemical incident 
management training sessions, as conducted by CIRS, and in regional chemical incident 
exercises. Participation in training and exercises provided an opportunity both to 
establish the base line expertise of public health professionals, and to ascertain the most 
effective methods for providing guidance to assist in the improvement of the public 
health response to chemical incidents. This aspect of the project is discussed in Section 
3.2.
3.1 Management and Study of Actual Chemical Incidents
3.1.1 Numbers and Types of Water-Related Chemical Incidents
An analysis of the CIRS database to select all incidents involving primary or secondary 
contamination of water identified 246 water-related chemical incidents that have been 
reported to CIRS since the start of the project in October 1997 up until April 2001. A 
detailed table of these incidents is presented in Appendix 3. The research engineer had 
direct involvement in the management of the 70 incidents illustrated in Table 3.1. In 
addition, two incidents that occurred in the few months prior to the start of the project 
were also investigated. These were an incident involving ele\ated polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons (PAHs) in drinking water following rehabilitation of public supply pipes, 
and a spill of the pesticide lindane into a stream feeding a river used for drinking water 
abstraction.
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Table 3.1: Table o f  the 70 Water-Related Chemical Incidents With Significant Research 
Engineer Involvement, October 1997—April 2001
CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
L/97/11/016 07/11/97 Water Lead pipes in home NA NA Lead
L/98/02/055 24/02/98 Water Concern about nitrate in drinking water N Y Nitrates
L/98/02/057 28/02/98 Leak Cold water tanks in hospital were drained 
for resin application, vapour tainted water
N Y Acetone
Styrene
L/98/02/084 01/08/97 Water Concern that chemicals from an old gas 
works are seeping onto a beach and 
subsequently contaminating water
Y N Cyanide
PAH
Ammonia
Phenol
L/98/03/102 28/02/98 Water High levels in water supply Y Y Manganese
L/98/04/024 27/04/98 Water Concern about the health implications of 
levels of chemicals in drinking water in severa 
farmhouses and cottages
N Y Iron
Potassium
L/98/04/127 Water Concern about raised water levels and 
links with Parkinsons disease
Y Y Iron
Manganese
Nitrates
Arsenic
L/98/05/032 01/01/01 Leak Lead battery factories have contaminated 
irrigation water with lead; water goes to salad and 
crop vegetables
Y Y
Lead
L/98/05/094 20/05/98 Spill Truck spilt contents into lake Y Y Sodium cyanide
L/98/06/005 01/01/96 Leak Contaminated stream running out of 
Colliery
Y U Phenols
Degreasing agent 
Cyanide
L/98/06/122 11/05/98 Water Chemical seeped through land and through water 
supply pipes and contaminated water
U Y
Trichloroethane
L/98/07/032 30/06/98 Food & 
Drink
Concern over levels in water used to wash 
vegetables
N Y
Sulphate magnesium
L/98/07/094 24/07/98 Leak Accidental spill into river Cyanide
L/98/07/123 Leak Fuel oil tank broke several years previously 
substance contaminated water supply through 
pipes
Y Y
Kerosene
L/98/08/104 04/08/98 Water Request for information about high levels o 
nitrates in drinking water supplies
U U
Nitrates
L/98/09/035 11/09/98 Water Concerns about contamination of drinking 
water supplies
N Y Cadmium
Chromium
Lead
Mercury
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CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
L/98/09/060 22/09/98 Water Levels in spa 0.2, as opposed to 0.1. Members of 
public can get water from spa
U U
Nitrates
L/98/10/119 28/10/98 Water Pesticide leak into private water supply on a 
holiday caravan park
U Y
Atrazine
L798/10/132 27/10/98 Water Contaminated water supply U Y Diesel
L/98/11/029 12/11/98 Land Chemicals penetrated land and affected 
drinking water supplies
N Y Xylene
1-methyl-4-tert-
butylbenzene
L/98/11/056 30/10/98 Water Family has long standing health problems, 
concern about water quality
U U Cadmium
Mercury
L/98/11/115 30/11/98 Water Raised levels in drinking water Y Y Nitrates
L/98/11/123 26/11/98 Leak Sewage overflowed from pumping 
stations and into residential street.
Effluent later found to contain industrial 
compounds. Residents evacuated from their 
homes and remediation work is to be carried out
N N Sewage
Butoxyethanol
Cyanide
Toluene
L/98/12/074 24/12/98 Water Elevated levels found in private drinking water 
supply
Y Y
Nitrates
L/98/12/076 30/12/98 Spill Petrol found to be in sewage drains; strong smell 
found in houses
U U
Petrol
L/99/01/035 15/01/99 Water Customers reported discoloration of drinking water 
to local water company
U Y
Iron
L/99/02/014 09/02/99 Routine check of private water supply detected 
raised levels of chemicals
Y Y Sulphates
Magnesium
L/99/02/067 18/02/99 Spill Water tanks contaminated by fibre glass resins 
and curing agents
N Y Hydroxy methyl
pentane
MEK
Fibre glass
L/99/02/077 24/02/99 Water Water supply contaminated with styrene U Y Styrene
L/99/04/013 01/04/99 Leak Water company has become aware of a Petrol 
leak of unleaded Petrol from a garage which they 
think has contaminated a borehole/groundwater
U (J
Petrol
L/99/04/052 19/04/99 Water Spill of Kerosene into private well Y Y Kerosene
L/99/04/058 22/04/99 Water Rerouting of water supplies to 80 households, 
sampling of samples detected high levels of Coal 
tar in the water
Y Y
Coal tar
L/99/04/073 01/04/99 Info. High levels of Copper detected in water supply at 
a hospital
U Y
Copper
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CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
L/99/04/074 22/04/99 lA/ater Complaints of bad taste in the water from 
residential water supply
U Y Xylene
Benzene
L/99/04/093 27/04/99 Land Football pitch size site, not normally available to 
public discovered by accident noticed drainage 
problems due to illegally connected pipes from site 
to sewer pipe.
N U
Cyanide
L/99/05/026 Other Stream next to old leather works is 
contaminated with chemicals. (Has been going on 
for several years)
Y U Trichloroethylene
Perchlorethylene
L/99/06/030 24/06/99 Water Pt is 70 yr old pharmacist with colitis who claims 
his water supply is contaminated with lead. EHOs 
contacted public health.
N U
Lead
L/99/06/108 16/06/99 Malicious Terrorist threat to public water supply N U Paraquat
L/99/07/050 19/07/99 Water EHO found high levels of nitrates in a private 
water supply.
U Y
Nitrates
L/99/07/077 01/07/99 Water Water was initially noticed to be blue in the 
hospital. CCDC requested info, on copper toxicity. 
Blue water was especially noticeable on a Monday 
and a measurement of 14ppm was recorded. 
Typical results ranged from 3-6 micro-g/L
N Y
Copper
L/99/07/121 26/07/99 Spill Kerosene oil spill from a damaged tank caused 
land contamination on a private property.
N N
Kerosene
L/99/08/069 23/08/99 Water Contamination of water supply by lead. N Y Lead
L/99/09/002 02/09/99 Water Raised levels of manganese detected in water 
supply.
N Y
Manganese
L/99/09/031 01/09/99 Water A private water supply that supplies a primary 
school has high levels of naturally occurring 
fluoride.
U Y
Fluoride
L/99/09/107 Water Contaminated water supply in a residential area 
due to contaminated pipes.
N Y
Hydrocarbons
L/99/11/010 05/11/99 Water Water contaminated in a block of flats with 
chemicals.
U Y Petrol
Benzene
Toluene
L/99/12/035 Leak Fuel oil contaminated residential water supply of 3 
cottages.
N Y
Oil
L/00/01/090 13/01/00 Spill A resident reported an incident at his property 
involving spillage of hydraulic oil from a broker 
tank. The oil covered his garden and pathway anc 
has now made its way into the house.
N N
Hydraulic oil
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CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
L/00/01/093 Land Hexachlorobutadiene found in peoples homes 
build on the edge of a chemical dump.
U U
Hexachlorobutadiene
L/00/02/077 02/02/00 Water Tenants in a block of flats, noticed that 
their drinking water was pink.
U Y Caustic soda 
Sodium bicarbonate 
Sodium hypochlorite
L/00/02/082 01/08/99 Leak Leak from the petrol station migrated through soil 
into houses.
Y Y
Petrol
L/00/03/005 02/03/00 Water Routine sampling of a private water supply, 
identified herbicide present in water.
U Y
Herbicide
L/00/03/029 Spill Canning factory own water supply caused an 
unknown quantity of bromine to enter into mains 
water supply.
N Y
Bromine
L/00/03/096 25/02/00 Water A shutdown for repairs caused flow 
changes which resulted in disturbance of main 
sediments causing discoloration.
N Y Iron
Manganese
Aluminium
L/00/04/005 14/04/00 Water Pump failure at the water works caused 
iron deposits in the mains to be distributed. 
Resulted in discoloration of water and health 
effects in customers.
N Y Iron
Manganese
L/00/05/009 05/05/00 Water Person that lives in an army camp was told to stop 
drinking the water. 62-3mg/l alcohol & benzenes 
found.
U Y
Petrol
L/00/05/010 Water Water company received 20 complaints. Thought 
to be contaminated with bitumen lined tanks or 
PAHs.
U Y
Unknown
L/00/05/090 Water Private water supply persistently fails 
PCVs
U Y Iron
Aluminium
Trihalomethanes
L/00/06/057 Water Petrochemicals found in domestic water 
supply of 3 families.
N Y Toluene
Benzene
Ethylbenzene
Xylene
L/00/06/061 Water Raised levels of bromate found in a domestic 
aquifer.
Y Y
Bromate
L/00/07/048 Water Hydrocarbons contamination of a private 
water supply.
N Y Hydrocarbons
Oil
L/00/07/079 Water Xylene found in water system of hospital. U Y Xylene
L/00/09/067 10/08/00 Air Diesel spill in a basement caused fumes to 
contaminate domestic water supply.
N Y
Diesel
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CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
L/00/10/069 30/10/00 Fire Fire at a chemical recycling plant. Y Y Hydrocarbons 
Acid (unknown) 
Smoke 
Products of 
combustion
Chlorinated phenols
L/00/12/071 Water Elevated levels of nitrates found in 18 homes. U U Nitrates
L/01/01/029 01/08/00 Water Copper in drinking water. U U Copper
L/01/02/093 01/09/00 Water Elevated levels of chemicals in drinking 
water.
U U Zinc
Copper
L/01/02/120 Water Elevated levels of contaminants found in drinking 
water.
U Y
Arsenic
Fluoride 
Sodium oxide
L/01/03/081 Water Rural farmsteads private water supply 
found to have excess levels of chemicals.
U Y Aluminium
Nitrates
L/01/03/085 Water Chemical in water mains. U Y Pentachlorophenol
Y - release to water or water supply U - unknown
N - no release to water or water supply NA - information not available
It is clear from Table 3.1 that not all incidents were categorised as water incidents under 
the type category. As a result, Figure 3.1 was developed to illustrate the incidents as 
documented by type, for the total 246 water-related chemical incidents identified. 
Relevant incidents can also be identified in the database through the release to water and 
release to water supply fields. However, out of the incidents not categorised as water, 
42% did not have a ‘Y ’ in the release to water or water supply fields. For this reason the 
identification of water-related chemical incidents from the database required the 
examination of each record and in some cases reference to the paper incident file to 
determine whether it should be included.
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Figure 3.1: Water-Related Chemical Incidents as Type Documented (n=246)
Food/drink Other Not know n 
1% Fire 2% 3%
Malicious
formation
Waste
Water
59%
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3.1.2 Incident Summaries of the Selected Case Studies
Out of the 70 incidents identified as forming part of the investigation, a limited number 
were selected for more in depth study, these are listed in Table 3.2. Fourteen case 
studies were selected on the basis of the level of involvement by the research engineer in 
the incident management and on the availability of detailed information about the 
incident. In addition, the aim was to cover a range of incident types over the period of 
investigation. Details of the acute incident involving a chemical fire and subsequent 
flooding cannot be provided, as there is currently an embargo on any publication of 
information regarding the incident, due to ongoing legal proceedings.
Table 3.2: Selected Case Studies
ACUTE INCIDENTS
Lindane spill into a stream feeding a river used for drinking water abstraction (CIRS, 
1997a, Hochuli et al, 1998).
Elevated PAHs in drinking water following public supply pipe rehabilitation (CIRS, 
1997b).
Contamination of drinking water in a hospital following re-lining of water tanks (CIRS, 
1998a and Goodfellow et al, 2000b).
Solvent permeation through plastic water supply pipes into drinking water from a spill 
onto land (CIRS, 1998c, Goodfellow et al, 1999 and Goodfellow et al, in press 2001).
Diesel in drinking water supplies from land contamination and pipe damage (CIRS, 
1998e and Goodfellow et al, in press 2001).
Sewage/trade effluent flooding of residential properties (CIRS, 1998f and MacArthur et 
al, 2000).
Drinking water contamination in blocks o f flats following re-lining of water tanks (CIRS 
1999a, Crook and Finn, 1999 and Goodfellow et al, 2000b).
Backflow from a central heating system containing chemical additives into the drinking 
water system within a block of flats (CIRS, 2000a).
Chemical fire and subsequent flooding leading to surface water and land contamination.
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CHRONIC INCIDENTS
Beach and seawater contamination from an adjacent former gas works site (CIRS, 1998b 
and Goodfellow et al, 2001).
Heating oil leak leading to surface water contamination and permeation through plastic 
water supply pipes to a small housing estate (CIRS, 1998d, Goodfellow et al, 1999 and 
Goodfellow, 2000).
Fuel leak from a petrol station leading to permeation through plastic water supply pipes 
to a block of flats (CIRS, 1999b and Goodfellow et al, in press 2001).
Spill of engine degreaser permeating plastic water supply pipes to three properties 
(CIRS, 2000b).
Raised levels of bromate in a drinking water aquifer (CIRS, 2000c).
The following sections provide summaries for each of the case studies.
3.1.2.1 Lindane spill into surface waters (CIRS, 1997a, Hochuli et al, 1998)
In June 1997, a small fish kill in a village pond was reported to the Environment Agency 
(EA). The pond was used as a recreational resource by the local population, and was 
also fed by a stream that drained into a river used for drinking water abstraction. The 
EA conducted an initial investigation at the pond and the dead fish were found to have 
heavy parasitic infection. There were no visible signs of pollution and it was concluded 
that the fish deaths were due to parasites.
On the following day, further fish deaths were reported and a full biological 
investigation was ordered for the next day. It was then discovered that there was no sign 
of invertebrate life in the stream feeding the pond. During the investigation, a 20 kg 
chemical drum was found 300 metres upstream of the pond and white sediments were 
found on the streambed. The drum was removed from the stream and further 
investigations revealed five more drums in a very dilapidated and unsecured shed on 
agricultural land adjacent to the stream. The shed was heavily contaminated with a 
white powder and the surrounding area was used by children for play.
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The local water company was advised of the incident and water abstraction from the 
river ceased. Intense sampling of the pond, stream, river and drinking water supply was 
conducted, and a thorough clean up of the area was instigated. Four days after the initial 
report of the incident, the laboratory results showed lindane concentrations in the 
original pond sample at such high levels that the analytical instrumentation had been 
damaged. At this stage, the local authority (LA) environmental health department 
erected warning signs around the pond and also contacted the local public health 
department.
Calculations were made to estimate the likely maximum concentration that would have 
been present at the drinking water intake. Further analysis showed heavy contamination 
of the stream and pond and lower lindane concentrations at the drinking water 
abstraction point. The drinking water abstraction was re-opened after several days to 
avert supply shortages, once concentrations had been stabilised below the analytical 
limit of detection. The area is known for heavy pesticide use, routine lindane 
monitoring is undertaken and additional water treatment processes are used to remove 
pesticides. Therefore, the threat to drinking water supplies was thought to be limited.
Press releases and a leaflet were issued to the local population and attempts were made 
to trace a Cub Scout group who had been ‘pond dipping’ in the area at the beginning of 
the incident. The general population reported no adverse health effects, but some of the 
EA officers involved in the clean up reported various minor health symptoms.
3.1.2.2 Drinking water contamination following rehabilitation work (CIRS, 1997b)
This incident occurred following routine pipe rehabilitation work in a small village, in 
July 1997. The problem was identified by customer complaints to a local water 
company about interrupted supplies and poor water quality. Realisation that there was a 
widespread problem was delayed due to the fact that the water company personnel were 
dealing with individual complaints independently and therefore the common cause was 
not immediately established. Further problems regarding recognition of the scale of the
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incident were encountered as initially it was thought that only 50 properties were 
affected when the total number was in fact 240.
Analysis of drinking water samples identified contamination with metal particulates and 
PAHs. The source of contamination was pipe sediments that had been dislodged during 
maintenance work; coal tar had been used in the past for lining the affected pipes. The 
highest PAH results were reported to be well below health related guidelines for short­
term exposure, but exceeded standards for aesthetic quality. Customers were advised of 
the problem by letter and supplied with bottled water. It was assumed that customers in 
the affected area would not consume the contaminated drinking water due to its 
unpleasant appearance and smell. However, an elderly lady used the contaminated 
water to prepare a hot drink, which she then consumed, causing her to vomit. The local 
public health department were not informed about the incident until the day after the 
water company received the initial customer complaints.
3.1.2.3 Drinking water contamination at a hospital following tank re-lining (CIRS,
1998a and Goodfellow et al, 2000b)
In February 1998, nurses at a large hospital noticed a strong smell from the tap water. 
No symptoms had been reported after drinking the water but there were some complaints 
of headaches following showering. Recent maintenance on water storage tanks in the 
hospital had involved draining a large divided cold-water tank and applying a resin on 
one side. Vapours passing from one side of the tank to the other caused contamination 
of water in the remaining full part of the tank. The resin contained a mixture of acetone 
and styrene with a peroxide catalyst. Analysis of water samples found levels of styrene 
up to 552.3 pg/1. The World Health Organization (WHO) drinking water quality 
guideline for styrene is 20 pg/1 (WHO, 1996).
Health checks were carried out on staff and patients and an incident group was set up 
within the hospital. The tanks and water system were flushed through and bottled water 
was used for drinking whilst levels were reduced. The incident raised enough interest 
for the local media, including television, to become involved.
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3.1.2.4 Permeation o f  solvents from  land through plastic water supply pipes (CIRS, 
1998c, Goodfellow et al, 1999 and Goodfellow e? al, in press 2001)
This incident occurred in May 1998 on an industrial estate comprising of several units 
conducting various activities. One of the companies carried out metal degreasing 
involving the use of solvent tanks. Just outside the industrial estate were a small number 
of residential properties. An iron public water supply pipe owned by the local water 
company supplied the industrial estate, but private plastic supply pipes branched off the 
main pipe to the individual units.
A consumer at one of the industrial units notified the local water company that the 
drinking water had a strong smell and was too unpleasant to drink. The local 
Environmental Health Officer (EHO) investigated the area, including the nearby 
industrial unit using solvents, and identified a ‘solventy’ smell from soil in a trench 
being dug by private contractors replacing the plastic water pipe. Chemical cans were 
found in the area around the trench. The cause of the incident was identified to be a 
recent localised acute spill of solvents just above a water supply pipe. There was some 
evidence that a spill had occurred when a 40-gallon drum of solvent was dropped and 
split.
The affected supply pipe branch was initially thought to supply just two of the industrial 
units, but further investigations identified a pipe continuing on to four additional 
industrial units, and a residential road with four houses. At a later date, it was found that 
a separate plastic pipe running through the contaminated soil also supplied an additional 
single house. Eleven adult residents were thought to be residing in the affected homes.
Both the water company and the local authority (LA) environmental health department 
took water samples at a number of locations, which were found to be contaminated with
1.1.1 trichloroethane and trichloroethene. There is no UK drinking water standard for
1.1.1 trichloroethane, however a provisional World Health Organization (WHO) 
drinking water guideline value has been set at 2000 pg/1, the highest recorded level from
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the sampling was 945 pg/1 (WHO, 1996). For trichloroethene, the UK drinking water 
standard is 30 pg/1 (Croner, 1996), and the provisional WHO drinking water guideline 
value is 70 pg/1 (WHO, 1996). Many of the sample results exceeded these standards 
with the highest reported concentration being 1435.7 mg/1. Contamination was not 
found in water samples from the main pipe or samples from other pipes branching off it.
On discovering that the pipe continued from the industrial estate to the residential street, 
the water company advised affected householders not to drink the water or use it for 
cooking. Water was initially still used for washing and toilet flushing, but people were 
later advised not to use it for showering, due to the possibility of inhalation of solvent 
fumes from the hot and agitated water. Bottled water for drinking was supplied by the 
local water company. One of the affected industrial units that was thought to be a 
bakery was actually used as a warehouse; baking products were delivered in sealed bags 
prior to distribution. None of the industrial units on the estate were found to be using 
water for food or drink production.
No adverse health effects were reported to the local public health doctor; however, a 
questionnaire survey of the residents in the potentially affected area was carried out. 
Residents were asked about tap water consumption over the relevant time period and 
current health symptoms that may have been related to solvent exposure. Blood tests 
were offered to the residents, although the half-life of these solvents within the body 
would mean that raised levels were unlikely to be detected in blood or urine samples. 
Blood test results showed that most of the parameters were within normal limits. Some 
abnormalities were detected but it was not thought that these were linked to the solvent 
exposure.
Replacement plastic coated copper piping was provided from the public supply pipe to 
the two initially affected industrial units. In the short term, the additional industrial units 
were then supplied through an overland plastic pipe from the iron pipe. This pipe re­
joined the original underground plastic pipe several metres from the area of confirmed
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land contamination, and continued on to the residential area, where copper water pipes 
already supplied the individual houses. By mid July 1998, the residential area was 
provided with a new plastic coated copper pipe that had been re-directed away from the 
contaminated area. The local water company laid the new supply pipe, which was paid 
for at cost by the LA. Subsequent water samples from the new pipes were clear, as were 
taste and odour samples.
3.1.2.5 Contamination o f  drinking water following a diesel spill on a building site 
(CIRS, 1998e and Goodfellow^ al, in press 2001)
This incident took place in October 1998 on a new housing estate that was under 
construction. The majority of the area was still an active building site, but some 
properties were already occupied. The trench for the water pipe was excavated and 
backfilled by the site developer, with the local water company laying the main water 
supply pipe and installing a pipe surround.
Following a burst on a polyvinyl chloride (PVC) public water supply pipe supplying 20 
properties, two customers living on the housing estate complained of taste and odour in 
the drinking water that was described as ‘turpentine’ or ‘petrol-like’. Samples of 
drinking water collected from the complainants’ houses showed contamination with 
diesel. Initial samples showed diesel concentrations of 100 pg/1. The UK drinking 
water standard for total hydrocarbons is 10 pg/1, and 0.2 pg/1 for total PAHs [sum of 
fluoranthene, benzo-3,4-fluoranthene, benzo-ll,12-fluoranthene benzo-3,4-pyrene, 
benzo-l,12-perylene and indeno(l,2,3-cd)pyrene] (Croner, 1996). The initial diesel 
concentration of 100 pg/1 exceeded the standard, and although subsequent analysis 
showed reduced levels of diesel, several PAH results were above the UK standard.
Diesel spills had occurred in the area of the burst pipe which it was thought had been 
caused due to a combination of inadequate backfilling, high stresses on the pipe created 
by heavy plant crossing above the pipe, and diesel attack leading to the damage of the 
pipe. The ingress of diesel most likely occurred during the repair work, when the pipe 
would have been exposed to ground water contaminated with diesel.
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After the initial water analysis identified diesel contamination, potentially affected 
customers were advised not to use water for drinking, food preparation and cooking, and 
bottled water was provided. The water pipe was isolated and a temporary overland 
connection was put in place to supply the affected customers. Water quality in the 
temporary overland pipe was also tested and found to be normal. Prior to installing the 
new public supply pipe it was recommended that the area should be remediated to 
remove all potentially contaminated material. The plastic pipes were to be replaced with 
galvanised steel for large pipes and plastic coated copper service pipes to the houses.
3.1.2.6Sewage/trade effluent flooding o f  residential properties (CIRS, 1998f and 
MacArthur et al, 2000)
In November 1998, there was an overflow of sewage in a residential area following a 
pumping station failure. The sewage contained a large proportion of trade effluent from 
several industrial facilities nearby and consequently there was a huge array of chemicals 
in the sewage discharge. The discharge collected in a low-lying area of a residential 
street and sewage flooded into several houses. After the initial clean up there were still 
remaining concerns about chemical contamination of foundations and floorboards and 
underlying soil, as well as furnishings and other property within the houses. There was 
also atmospheric contamination from the volatilisation of the chemicals.
The local water company released information on the chemicals that were consented for 
discharge and considerable analysis was undertaken of the effluent, soil, air, and nearby 
river to identify the chemicals involved and their concentrations. The multiple 
chemicals involved made the toxicological assessment very complex due to the possible 
interactions and synergy between the chemicals.
The residents from the affected houses were evacuated to hotels in the area and a very 
lengthy decontamination and remediation programme began. Some personal property 
such as clothing was cleaned and returned to residents but most contaminated property 
was replaced. There were difficulties in getting access to some of the houses as
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householders wanted to be present when the clean up staff went into their homes. 
However, there were concerns about the resulting increase in personal exposure of the 
residents if  they were present. There were also difficulties in establishing the levels of 
remediation required and its certification. Remediation consisted of decontamination or 
disposal of furnishing and belongings, removal of contaminated soil, floorboards and 
brickwork, and venting of houses.
A health questionnaire was distributed to affected residents and those involved in the 
clean-up operation. A General Practitioner (GP) was made available for consultation at 
the hotels to which the residents had been evacuated. Public health also informed the 
local accident and emergency (A&E) hospital and GP practices of the incident and asked 
to be informed of any associated cases. Health effects were reported in clean up 
workers, which were investigated by the relevant occupational health departments.
3.1.2.7 Drinking water contamination in fo u r  blocks o ffla ts  following tank re-lining
(CIRS 1999a, Crook and Finn, 1999 and Goodfellow et al, 2000b)
This incident occurred in February 1999, as a result of re-lining of water storage tanks in 
four blocks o f 10 storey local authority flats. The water supply to the blocks of flats was 
from the public water supply via three cold-water storage tanks, which fed all the 
drinking, bathing and toilet facilities. There was no direct connection to the public 
supply pipe. Renovation work had been carried out on the tanks over the previous 3-4 
weeks. This involved stripping out all the old bitumen linings and relining the tanks 
with a fibreglass gel containing curing chemicals. The product was approved by the 
Water Research Centre (WRc) for use in potable supplies. Two of the three tanks had 
been treated and put back into service when the incident was identified.
The incident began on a Monday when three residents from one of the blocks of flats 
reported to the LA that their domestic water supply had a strange smell and taste, an 
orange colour, and visible scum on the surface. Two of these residents also complained 
of feeling unwell with nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain and a burning sensation in the 
mouth. By late evening, as a result o f further enquiries, environmental health and
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housing staff had posted notices advising residents not to drink the water and the local 
water company provided alternative water supplies from bowsers.
The LA distributed a health questionnaire in the early stages of the incident in which 
around 12 residents reported symptoms including dry throat, funny taste, 'hangover' 
feeling, abdominal pain and diarrhoea. Only one resident had sought medical advice and 
none had been admitted to hospital. On the Tuesday, EHOs and housing officials 
continued their investigations, which included arranging for water samples to be tested 
and informing residents of events, but it was not until Wednesday evening that CIRS 
was advised of the incident and early Thursday afternoon before the HA was notified. A 
meeting was immediately arranged between the Consultant in Public Health Medicine 
(CPHM) and staff from environmental health and housing. Subsequently, an incident 
control group with representatives from the HA, CIRS, environmental health and the 
local water company was established. A major chemical incident was declared on the 
grounds that a large number of people were affected and there was significant media 
interest.
Once the HA became involved a second questionnaire was administered on health 
problems and water consumption to all residents of all four block of flats. The local GPs 
were informed of the incident and asked to notify public health of any related cases. The 
water supply was cut off to the flats to prevent further use and alternative bathing and 
laundry facilities were provided. Vulnerable residents were identified and provided with 
alternative accommodation and an explanatory letter was provided to all residents from 
the housing department. A press statement was also issued and an information aid 
advice centre with a help-line was set up at the local community centre.
Samples were taken from all four blocks of flats and analysis identified high levels of 
styrene and xylene in particular, however, a detailed breakdown of results was not made 
available to health professionals, and health advice was therefore based on incomplete 
analytical information. A wide range of styrene levels were reported (0.4 pg/1 to 650
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ja.g/1) and xylene levels were reported to be between 20.9 pg/1 and 160.3 pg/1. WHO 
drinking water quality guidelines for styrene and xylene are 20 pg/1 and 500 pg/1 
respectively (WHO, 1996).
Arrangements were made for urine sampling of all residents living in the block, together 
with blood sampling for those residents who had originally complained of symptoms. 
Sixteen samples of blood were taken from symptomatic people at the first block of flats 
and no indicator compounds were detected on testing. Urine samples were obtained 
from 310 residents as a precautionary measure, a total of 43 urine samples were tested 
and no indicator compounds were detected. Individual letters were sent advising those 
residents whose specimens had been tested of their results.
The contamination problem was resolved by making alternative connections to the 
public water supply to all four blocks of flats. The water piping systems were flushed 
and tested, then declared free from hydrocarbons.
3.1.2.8 Backflow incident resulting in drinking water contamination (CIRS, 2000a)
In February 2000, an LA environmental health department became aware of a drinking 
water quality problem in part of a Housing Trust estate. The local water company had 
been carrying out repairs in the area after a burst public supply pipe, and there had been 
complaints about ‘grit’ present in water. The local water company had been 
investigating these complaints and discovered pink water in one of the flats and 
contacted the local environmental health department. An EHO and a housing officer 
from the estate visited the flat and confirmed the water was pink and took samples. The 
EHO and housing officer knocked on doors at the flats near to the affected flat to try and 
establish the extent of contamination. A total of 36 flats were thought to be possibly 
affected and 8 were identified as definitely having a problem. There was no indication 
that any further blocks were affected. Bottled water was delivered by environmental 
health to the affected flats on the same evening, with written information explaining the 
problem. Residents were advised not to drink tap water but use bottled water or the 
standpipe that had also been provided.
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Investigation of the contamination concluded that the most likely cause was a cross 
connection between the central heating and drinking water systems leading to 
contamination of the drinking water with heating water containing an added chemical 
corrosion inhibitor. The work on the burst pipe may have caused a drop in water 
pressure causing water to be siphoned from the central heating system into the drinking 
water system at the cross connection point, probably a hot and cold water appliance such 
as a washing machine, shower, or combi-boiler, where pre-heated heating water had 
been used to supply the device. Maintenance staff tried to get access to the flats to 
identify and remove the cross connection, but they were unable to establish the precise 
cause. Water quality returned to normal and public water supplies were reinstated.
A comprehensive literature review of past backflow incidents resulting in chemical 
contamination of drinking water, backflow prevention practice and legislation, and 
current engineering theory on backflow has been completed. A copy can be found in 
draft form as Paper 4 in the Publications Section in Volume 2.
3.1.2.9 Chemical fire  and subsequent flooding leading to surface water and land 
contamination
Details cannot be provided, as there is currently an embargo on any publication of 
information regarding the incident, due to ongoing legal proceedings.
3.1.2.10 Secondary chemical contamination o f  a beach and seawater (CIRS, 1998b 
and Goodfellow et al, 2001)
This incident occurred at a beach on the south coast of England. The land immediately 
behind the beach was the site of a former gasworks. The beach was used as a naturist 
beach, and for line fishing and offshore commercial fishing for crab and lobster. The 
problem first came to the attention of the LA in April 1997, when a local resident 
reported that there were reduced numbers of bait for fishing on the beach. The 
fisherman also noticed a sulphurous smell and visible signs of oil whilst digging for bait. 
The information was passed on to the EA, who carried out initial sampling of sediment
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and seawater at the beach. Visual observation of the area showed the existence of 
patches of oily film on the sea, a phenolic smell in the area, and sightings of pieces of 
“prussian blue” (ferric ferrocyanide). An LA investigation was initiated, including 
preliminary sampling.
In August 1997, a meeting was held between the port authority, two LAs, and EA, 
following which the EA took sediment, seawater and seepage water (water runoff from 
the beach) samples, and conducted a biological survey. A report was produced by the 
EA in January 1998, which concluded that the beach was affected by pollution and the 
most likely source was the former gasworks. A very high concentration of PAHs (75 
550 mg/kg) was reported in one sediment sample, and also a high concentration of 
cyanide (1 g/1) in seepage water. When the EA report became available, the LA 
immediately alerted the HA of the potential risk to public health and the two HAs 
covering the area of concern became involved in the investigation. At this stage a 
detailed environmental investigation of the beach including sediment, seepage and 
seawater sampling was conducted, the results of which were used to determine whether 
there was risk to public health and if the beach should be closed to public access. 
Contaminants identified included ammonia, benzo(a)pyrene, phenol, cyanide, arsenic, 
manganese, and iron. Analytical results were compared with contaminated land and 
drinking water standards. It was concluded that the beach was contaminated, but at the 
concentrations found it was decided that the contamination did not pose a risk to the 
health of the beach users and no action was taken to close the beach. The high 
concentrations of PAHs and cyanide found in the initial analyses were not repeated. No 
complaints of adverse health effects associated with the beach had been reported.
Although closure of the beach was not necessary, a long-term routine monitoring 
programme was established to ensure that contaminant concentrations remained low, 
and to provide early warnings of any potentially hazardous changes. Also, it was 
suggested that effects on the food chain should be investigated. Mussels, crabs and 
lobsters were sampled from the beach and surrounding area and raised levels of PAHs 
were found in mussels. Signs were erected on an adjacent beach where the
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contaminated mussels were found, to warn the public against collecting mussels for 
consumption.
Further details of this incident and its management were published in the journal 
Occupational and Environmental Medicine and a copy of the paper can be found as 
Paper 5 in the Publications Section in Volume 2 (Goodfellow et al, 2001).
3.1.2.11 Long-term leakage o f  heating oil into soil leading to permeation o f  plastic 
water supply pipes (CIRS, 1998d, Goodfellow et al, 1999 and Goodfellow, 
2000)
The incident occurred on a small private estate of 17 houses, re-developed from a former 
stable block four years before this incident occurred. The houses were situated within a 
private estate of a stately home with adjacent lake and gardens. The housing estate had 
an oil tank that supplied all 17 houses; each house had a fuel oil meter. At the time of 
construction the builder laid 17 separate plastic water supply pipes to each house from 
the main iron water pipe, which ran past the estate.
The problem with oil contamination first arose about two years prior to any drinking 
water contamination. At this time it was found that the estate lake was contaminated 
with oil. The source was traced back to surface drains from the housing development. 
The meters for the domestic heating oil (light paraffin oil) supply to the lesidences had 
corroded, and two meters were found to be leaking, visible oil was seen below ground 
level. The piping from the fuel tank located behind the development was made of a 
suitable resilient material and ran to the edge of the development. Howe\er, the 
subsequent piping and meters were found to be unsuitable for an outside location. The 
meters and the piping were replaced with those manufactured from suitable material. 
The old meters were removed, but the old piping was left in the ground, although it was 
believed that it had been drained of any remaining oil and then sealed. The oil supply 
and meters had been replaced approximately a year before the reports of drinking water 
contamination, and since the replacement of the pipes and meters no further 
contamination of the lake had been observed.
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In July 1998, following a complaint to the local water company regarding taste and 
odour problems in drinking water, the public health doctor contacted CIRS. The water 
company took samples from drinking water when the complaint was reported. 
Subsequent samples were also taken after an overland supply had been connected. In 
addition, soil samples were taken from the soil around the excavated areas where the 
connections were made between the overland pipe and the household piping. The 
environmental health department of the district council did not take any samples. No 
sample results were made available to CIRS.
No adverse health effects were associated with the incident. Consumption of the water 
ceased once the problem had been reported to the water company and alternative 
supplies were provided. Some residents resumed consumption of tap water after the 
installation of the overland supply. The soil around the old meters was considered to be 
the most likely source of contamination. Although only two meters had originally been 
found to be obviously leaking, it was possible that leakage may have occurred at other 
houses. Any oil contamination at the site of the oil meters would also have been close to 
the water supply pipe as it entered the house and therefore contaminated soil might have 
been surrounding the water pipes at these points.
A site visit was organised with the participation of the local HA, LA environmental 
health, representatives from the site owners and management agency, a residents’ 
committee representative, and CIRS. Investigation of the excavated areas outside the 
affected houses confirmed a very strong oily/turpentine smell.
Initially, the water supply was cut off and bowsers and a standpipe for drinking water 
were provided. The water company then installed an overland pipe directly from the 
public water supply and the pipes were flushed through until no further smell was 
noticed. The use of plastic coated copper pipes was recommended for new water supply 
pipes to the houses, or alternatively, a ductile steel main pipe with copper connections to 
each house.
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The initial lake contamination occurred approximately two years prior to this reported 
problem, and concerns were raised about the possibility of long-term exposure. The 
inhabitants may have been exposed to low-level oil concentrations, below taste and 
odour thresholds, over a long period of time.
Although it was thought that this incident had been resolved in the summer of 1998, in 
July 1999, renewed concerns of taste and odour in drinking water in two houses were 
reported. Upon investigation, it was found that the connections from the water pipe 
outside the house to the internal plumbing were still plastic and that continued 
contamination of the soil had resulted in permeation of oil through the plastic 
connectors. These connectors were subsequently replaced and there was also extensive 
removal of contaminated soil beneath some houses. A questionnaire survey of the 
residents was conducted in order to obtain further information on taste/odour problems 
with drinking water, the length of time over which there was a problem, the amount of 
water consumed, and any associated health effects. Residents reported some adverse 
health effects.
3.1.2.12 Petrol station leak leading to drinking water contamination in a block o f  flats
(CIRS, 1999b and Goodfellow et al, in press 2001)
This incident was initially investigated in April 1999 when, following a petrochemical 
company’s audit of its petrol stations, a particular site was found to be losing petrol and 
a leak was found in the pipe leading from the tank to the pumps. The local water 
company became involved because they were concerned about the threat of pollution to 
a drinking water borehole near the petrol station. However, no contamination was 
detected at the borehole.
At the end of October 1999, a taste complaint was received by the local water company 
from a resident in a block of flats opposite the petrol station. Due to the knowledge that 
there had been a petrol leak from the filling station, water analyses were carried out for 
benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylenes (BTEX). On investigation of the water
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supply pipes, it was found that a plastic service connection branched off the cast iron 
pipe to supply the flats. On excavation it was found that the soil was ‘oil’ saturated and 
had a strong smell. To prevent any further contamination, the plastic pipe was replaced 
with a metal one and other pipes in the area were also checked and found to be of metal 
construction. Water sampling was carried out at the flats and also at some other nearby 
properties. Raised levels of hydrocarbons were found in tap water in the flats and were 
above the UK drinking water standards for total hydrocarbons (10 pg/1) (Croner, 1996). 
Residents at the flats were advised not to use the water for drinking and cooking until 
the levels were reduced to a satisfactory standard following pipe replacement. No health 
effects were reported.
3.1.2.13 Spill o f  engine degreaser permeating plastic water supply pipes (CIRS, 2000b)
A spill of an engine degreaser at a residential property resulted in permeation of organic 
chemicals through plastic water supply pipes leading to drinking water contamination in 
three houses. The problem was first noticed in early May 2000, but CIRS were only 
informed in June. On investigation, the soil in the area did not appear visually 
contaminated but there were taste and odour problems with drinking water. Sampling 
and analysis identified toluene, benzene, ethylbenzene and xylene. Unfortunately, only 
semi-quantitative data was made available. The EA was also involved in the investigation 
and soil analysis was conducted.
A questionnaire was sent to the affected houses to determine how much water had been 
consumed and note any adverse health effects. Residents included children and bottle fed 
infants. Symptoms reported in the questionnaire survey included, bleeding gums, dry 
skin, headaches and nausea. A letter was sent to the residents from the public health 
doctor after a survey. The letter addressed the concerns of the residents and provided 
reassurance that on the basis of the low level of exposure and short time scale of the event 
long-term health effects were not expected. In the long-term, the plastic pipes were 
replaced with copper ones.
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3.1.2.14 Bromate contamination o f drinking water aquifer (CIRS, 2000c)
In June 2000, bromate was found in raw water from an aquifer used for drinking water. 
The local water company had conducted a survey of its drinking water sources and 
included the analysis for bromate due to the fact that new legislation on drinking water 
quality will include a bromate standard for the first time in 2003. The aquifer had not 
previously been tested for bromate so the timescale of contamination was undetermined. 
In addition, the water was mostly mixed with water from other sources prior to its 
supply to consumers, so it was difficult to estimate the likely concentrations that would 
have been in supply. Also, it was not possible to determine the period of exposure. It 
was found that private boreholes from the aquifer were also contaminated. Mapping 
was conducted to identify the extent of groundwater contamination and the boreholes 
affected.
A joint press release was issued from the HA and local water company to advise 
consumers of the problem and a health surveillance study was initiated to monitor for 
excess cancers associated with bromate exposure in the area affected. There was an 
extensive investigation for the possible source of contamination of the aquifer and the 
most likely source was thought to be a contaminated land site some distance away from 
the point of abstraction. This site had been redeveloped for housing but there had 
previously been a chemical works situated on the site using bromate and other 
chemicals.
3.1.3 Classification of the Case Studies
Table 3.3 classifies the fourteen incidents studied in detail on the basis of:
• Acute or chronic effects;
• Type of water actually or potentially affected - drinking, surface, ground or marine;
• Drinking water contamination caused by permeation of organic chemicals through 
plastic water supply pipe; and
• Drinking water contamination caused by re-lining of tanks.
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3.1.4 Methodology for Learning from Incidents
In order to be able to extract information from the management of chemical incidents to 
assist in devising procedures to improve future management, proper documentation of 
the incidents being investigated is required. When reported to CIRS, brief summary 
details are recorded on an incident form, a copy of which can be found in Appendix 4. 
The information documented on this form is likely to be limited to whatever can be 
provided by the person making the initial request for advice. As the incident develops, 
additional information may be recorded on continuation sheets. It is unlikely that 
complete chronological logging of telephone calls, information received and provided, 
and decisions made will be carried out. Involvement of CIRS in the incident may 
include attending site visits or incident team meetings, and it is not usual procedure for 
these to be comprehensively documented. When the incident is over, it is unlikely that a 
post incident report summarising the incident and identifying lessons learnt will be 
provided to or prepared by CIRS. Occasionally, the HA or other organisation will 
prepare a post incident report which is made available to CIRS, and incidents are 
sometimes documented as articles for inclusion in the Chemical Incident Report (an in- 
house newsletter of CIRS, produced quarterly and distributed to all HAs with service 
level agreements with CIRS and to other interested parties).
Due to the very limited amount of information routinely documented on the 
management of incidents, it was impossible to analyse past incidents. Therefore, the 
research engineer was directly involved in the investigation of incidents, as described in 
Section 3.1.2. Full details of the circumstances of the incidents studied were recorded 
and any available sampling and analysis results were kept and in most cases summary 
tables were provided for easier interpretation. Minutes were recorded for any incident 
meetings attended and site visit reports were completed where applicable. By 
comprehensively documenting the incidents, it was then possible to perform an analysis 
at a later date and to identify any specific lessons that could be learnt and would be 
applicable to the management of future incidents. Some of these incidents were fully 
reported with the lessons learnt identified, and published in the Chemical Incident
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Report, in external journals and at conferences, or presented as a part of CIRS training 
days.
3.1.5 Summary of Lessons Learnt
A number of principles of best practice for the management of chemical incidents were 
identified, as well as common problematic issues, as specified in Section 3.1.5.1. Two 
specific types of chemical incident were also identified that seemed to occur on a 
reasonably frequent basis; lessons from these are addressed in Section 3.1.5.2.
3.1.5.1 General best practice and problematic issues
The incident management process is divided into three major aspects: risk assessment, 
communication and required management actions.
Risk assessment of the potential health impact on the population
• Identification of the chemical, exposure duration, and information on any reported 
concentrations in relevant environmental media are vital to assessing the possible 
impact on the health of the population.
• It is useful to identify the most likely source of contamination as this will assist in 
directing any sampling and analysis.
• Knowledge about the industry involved may help to identify chemicals; 
alternatively, if the chemical is known but the source location has not been 
identified, information on the types of industry using the chemical may assist in 
finding the source of contamination.
• In the case of land contamination, past site investigation reports may be available 
identifying chemicals present.
• The pathway or route of exposure must be identified; toxicity may be dependent on 
whether there is inhalation, ingestion or dermal exposure.
• Determining the toxicological effects of multiple chemicals can be particularly 
difficult, chemicals may react in the environment to produce secondary products and 
there may be enhanced toxicity from exposure to combinations of particular 
chemicals.
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• The total population definitely, probably and possibly exposed should be identified 
as soon and as accurately as possible, populations may be residential, work^elated 
or visitors.
• Standards and guidelines, for example, for drinking water or air quality or 
contaminated land, can be useful for comparison with environmental concentrations 
present. Care should be taken to ensure that units are comparable and the basis of 
the standard is understood. For example, occupational standards are aimed at adults 
in good health with exposure over a working lifetime. Standards may have to be 
adapted to take into consideration particularly susceptible populations.
Communication
• Chemical incident management involves a multi-agency response and there are a 
number of routes by which the public health doctor may be alerted to an incident.
• Early public health involvement is essential where there is a threat or potential threat 
to human health, in order for timely health investigations to be carried out. In many 
of the chemical incidents included in the study, public health doctors were not 
informed of the incident at the early stages. Development of working relationships 
on a local basis between organisations involved in chemical incident management is 
needed to ensure all relevant organisations are made aware of incidents.
• Communication between organisations during an incident is also important, public 
health doctors require regular inputs of new information on how the incident is 
developing in order to review risk assessments and action strategies.
• In many incidents, close collaboration is best achieved by setting up a formal 
incident control group, ideally with members located together near the incident 
scene. Incident control team members should have the necessary expertise and 
authority to make decisions.
• Due to the multi-agency nature of chemical incident management, it is important that 
the chain of command is determined in the early stages of an incident and that all 
those involved are aware of each others roles, responsibilities and resource 
limitations.
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• Responsibility for conducting and financing environmental sampling and analysis 
seems to be a particularly contentious issue and needs to be discussed in the early 
stages of the incident.
• The methods of communication between organisations should be made as simple as 
possible; there should be a limited number of contact persons within each 
organisation to avoid duplication of effort and confusion.
• Media management is an important aspect of chemical incident management, where 
a number of organisations are involved it is essential that a consistent joint message 
is presented to the media.
• The public should be kept well informed about the hazard and action being taken by 
the organisations involved and also any action they should be taking to protect 
themselves.
• All health advice issued to the public should come from the HA or a jointly issued 
statement with HA agreement.
• There may be difficulties in alerting and advising particular sections of the 
population, for example, the elderly, disabled, or ethnic minorities.
Action to prevent or minimise harm
• The area of contamination should be adequately secured to prevent public access.
• Careful consideration should be given to the option of evacuation, in many cases a 
more appropriate response is to shelter. If  evacuation is required, people need to 
take medications with them, and GP attendance may be required.
• In order to prevent further exposure, action should be taken to remove the 
contamination source and/or pathway.
• Remediation should be undertaken to established standards, if  samples are required 
to establish exposure levels these need to be taken prior to clean up.
• Any contaminated victims should be decontaminated at the earliest possible 
opportunity, ideally before transport to hospital, in order to minimise spread of 
contamination and exposure of additional people.
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• Those responding to, or involved in, the clean up of an incident should be provided 
with adequate personal protection equipment and decontamination facilities.
• Vulnerable populations should be identified and alerted, for example, dialysis 
patients, the elderly, and young children, especially bottle fed infants.
• Distribution of health questionnaires can be useful in identifying the population 
exposed, duration of exposure and associated health effects. A health questionnaire 
survey should be designed by public health professionals with epidemiological 
experience.
• When people have been exposed for a number of years, it may be possible to 
determine health impacts on the population from analysis of cancer register data, 
hospital admissions or other health statistics.
• Where level of exposure is not already known, it may be necessary to take 
environmental and/or biological samples.
• Biological sampling should be considered if confirmation of exposure is necessary 
and possible. It may be appropriate where treatments are available, particularly if 
they are based on exposure levels. Where there is no treatment available or if no 
meaningful parameter can be measured, biological sampling has little or no value.
• There may only be a short time frame in which it is possible to take blood and urine 
samples if the chemical has a short biological half-life.
• Problems may be encountered in linking abnormal biological test results to a specific 
exposure; patients are likely to have experienced a lifetime exposure to many 
chemicals.
• Several aspects should be determined in conducting a sampling programme:
o what is the aim of programme; 
o what is being sampled, air, water, soil, blood, urine; 
o who is going to take the samples and conduct the analysis; 
o where or who should samples be taken from; 
o when should samples be taken; and
o what are the required sampling, sample preservation and analytical 
techniques.
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• Precautions should be taken when collecting, storing and analysing both biological 
and environmental samples to ensure they are not contaminated, for example by 
containers or lids.
• Repeat environmental samples should be taken in order to identify peaks and troughs 
in concentrations.
• Duplicate samples should be obtained, particularly where those taking samples may 
be culpable, for example, in drinking water contamination.
Documentation
• Proper documentation of incidents is necessary, particularly where there has been 
controversy or there is the possibility of litigation.
• Accurate logs need to be maintained of events, telephone calls, and decisions made 
with justifications and details on the information basis.
• Registers should be compiled of the exposed population and in some cases it may be 
appropriate to tag patient notes to track long-term health outcomes from an incident.
• Publication of incidents is useful in passing on lessons learnt and drawing attention 
to common problems.
Issues related to drinking water
• Water companies conduct routine sampling of drinking water quality and may have 
immediate access to relevant analytical results in the event of contamination.
• In the event of drinking water contamination incident, early provision of alternative 
water supplies is required.
• If a ‘do not use’ notice is placed on public drinking water supplies, consideration 
should be given to the conditions at which the notice can be lifted.
• When issuing ‘do not use’ notices for water supplies, careful consideration should be 
given in specifying which uses are affected.
• Drinking water may be used for hot and cold drinks, jug water filters, food 
preparation, cooking, drinking water for pets, bathing, showering, clothes washing. 
In most cases it will still be safe to use water for toilet flushing.
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• Boiling water is not a satisfactory treatment for chemically contaminated water. It is 
not safe to assume that exposure will have been eliminated or reduced if only boiled 
water has been consumed, particularly as some chemicals have boiling points above 
that of water. In addition, there may be a risk of inhalation exposure if vaporisation of 
the chemical occurs.
• Public water supplies may also be used for other uses that could present a hazard, for 
example, crop irrigation, drinking by farm animals, food and drink processing or 
manufacturing, pharmaceutical products, swimming pools.
• In some cases it may be necessary to cut off water supplies to prevent use and 
consumption.
• When the water supply is resumed tanks and pipes should be flushed to remove any 
residual contamination and final sampling and analysis should be undertaken to 
ensure supplies are safe to drink.
• If contamination has occurred within customers’ premises, including the supply pipe 
linking the property to the water company pipe, responsibility lies with the property 
owner.
3.1.5.2 Specific types o f  incidents identified as problematic
From the study of a large range of water-related chemical incidents, attention was drawn 
to two particular types of incident that seemed to occur reasonably frequently and pose a 
threat to public health.
Permeation of organic chemicals through plastic water supply pipes
Throughout the investigation period, several incidents involving contamination of 
drinking water supplies as a result of permeation of organic chemicals from surrounding 
soil were reported. Five of these incidents are documented in Section 3.1.2. The issues 
surrounding this problem were presented at the EngD Annual Conference in 1999, and a 
paper has been accepted for publication in the Water and Environmental Management 
Journal. Copies of these papers can be found in the Publications Section in Volume 2 as 
Papers 6 and 7, where more details are provided on the number and circumstances of the 
incidents reported to CIRS and the nature of permeation (Goodfellow et al, 1999 and
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Goodfellow et al, in press 2001). The lessons learnt with respect to this specific type of
incident are detailed below:
• Some organic chemicals are able to permeate medium density polyethylene (MDPE)
without causing physical damage to the pipe. PVC pipes may be attacked by organic
chemicals creating a weakness in the pipe which may cause its fracture;
• Permeation should be considered as a possible cause of drinking water 
contamination, particularly where organic chemicals are involved and land 
contamination is suspected;
• The cases of permeation reported to CIRS were identified through taste and odour 
problems in drinking water. Many of the chemicals involved in this type of incident 
have low taste and odour thresholds and are therefore quite easily detected in 
drinking water. Some chemicals will not be detected by taste and/or odour or may 
still be of health concern at levels below taste and odour thresholds;
• The chemicals involved in this type of incident have the potential to lead to both
acute and chronic adverse health effects;
• The initial response to this type of incident should be to stop consumption of the 
contaminated water supply and possibly the use of water for washing. Alternative 
temporary supplies of water should then be provided and in some cases an overland 
pipe can be installed bypassing the area of soil contamination;
• The solution to preventing future contamination of water supplies is to replace 
plastic pipes with plastic coated copper for small pipes or steel for larger pipes;
• Where possible, remediation of the land contamination source should also be 
conducted;
• These incidents raise the issue of how building contractors and water companies 
should identify land that may be vulnerable to organic contamination and where the 
use of unprotected plastic pipes for drinking water supplies is therefore unsuitable. 
Such sites may include land contaminated from historic land uses or those 
susceptible to acute spills of organic chemicals, in particular petrol filling stations 
and other fuel depots.
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Contamination of drinking water from water tank and pipe linings
Another category of incidents identified and studied, involved the contamination of 
drinking water supplies following re-lining of pipes or water storage tanks, usually with 
styrene-based resins. Two instances of this type of incident are summarised in Section 
3.1.2, further examples are provided in the paper presented at the EngD Annual 
Conference in 2000, a copy of which can be found as Paper 8 in the Publications Section 
in Volume 2 (Goodfellow et al, 2000b). The lessons learnt regarding this type of 
incident are listed below:
• Water tank and pipe linings should be considered as a possible cause of drinking 
water contamination, particularly where it is known that recent maintenance work 
has been conducted. If the likely source of contamination is known, the type of 
chemical involved can then be determined and chemical analysis is simplified;
• This type of incident has the potential to cause adverse health effects and many of 
the cases reported to CIRS have involved associated reports of symptoms in 
consumers;
• As with other incidents of chemical contamination of water, it is important to collect 
information on water consumption and use and health effects over the period of 
concern;
• Sample collection and analysis is another important aspect common to most 
chemical incidents. In this case, samples should be collected of drinking water from 
the tanks and/or public water supply pipes, at taps and at other distribution points;
• Biological sampling can be used to confirm exposure. Styrene is often one of the 
contaminants in this type of incident. Styrene or its metabolites can be measured in 
blood and urine provided that sampling is undertaken shortly after exposure. As 
always, it is important that any samples are collected in appropriate containers with 
no other source of contamination.
With respect to precautions that should be taken when re-lining tanks or pipes, it would 
appear that in some instances poor curing techniques and/or early refilling can cause 
contamination of drinking water from otherwise safe lining products. WRc had
67
approved the types of chemicals used in the incidents reported to CIRS for use in potable 
supplies. However, there would appear to be issues around competency of application 
by contractors employed to carry out this type of work. It is clearly important that a 
recognised, well-respected company is used and that instructions on use are closely 
followed.
3.2 Chemical Incident Exercises and Training Sessions
3.2.1 Planning and Developing Training Sessions
In addition to the involvement in the management of actual chemical incidents as 
reported to CIRS, the project also included the planning and development of training 
sessions, primarily aimed at public health professionals, but also others involved in the 
management of chemical incidents.
Over the research period, fifteen CIRS training days were attended. Involvement has 
included presentation of results from the research project, facilitation of incident training 
exercises, and discussion with delegates about the most effective methods of providing 
guidance to public health professionals to improve performance in responding to 
chemical incidents. Two additional training days were organised by the research 
engineer, focusing specifically on water-related chemical incidents and associated 
issues. As part of these training days comprehensive documentation was provided 
including early versions of chemical incident management tools and also copies of 
papers and reports produced during the research period.
3.2.2 Development of Incident Training Exercises
During the training sessions, incident exercises devised from real incident scenarios are 
used to promote discussion and to provide delegates with the opportunity of exploring 
issues involved in the management of chemical incidents. These exercise sessions 
provided valuable input to the project on particularly problematic areas of chemical 
incident management.
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The exercises were devised in order to highlight general issues in the management of 
chemical incidents and also specific issues related to particular types of incidents, for 
example drinking water contamination. Four exercises based on water-related chemical 
incidents were devised by the research engineer. Groups of delegates and presenters at 
training sessions worked through the exercises together, which were presented on a 
stage-by-stage basis with new information being provided at each stage as the incident 
develops. The aim being for the group to discuss the role of public health professionals 
in managing the incident described and to assess the impact of the incident on the public 
health and identify the actions to be taken.
3.2.3 Development of Chemical Incident Management Tools
Involvement in the development of training sessions allowed chemical incident 
management tools developed during the research period to be tested on public health 
professionals and others involved in responding to chemical incidents. This enabled the 
tools to be further refined in light of the feedback and comments received during the 
training sessions. This aspect is commented on in Chapter 4 where the methodology for 
developing chemical incident management tools is discussed. Guidance manuals on the 
management of chemical incidents were provided as part of the training days organised 
by the research engineer on water-related chemical incidents.
3.2.4 External Exercises
During the research period the research engineer also took part in exercises organised by 
external organisations to test the multi-agency response to chemical incidents, including 
the role of public health professionals, these included:
• Joint drinking water incident training exercise organised by Severn Trent Water with 
North Derbyshire HA and the two LA environmental health departments, October 
1997;
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• Multi-agency chemical incident simulation exercise organised by South Essex HA,
and attended by representatives from the HA, LA, police, ambulance, EA, June
1998;
• National multi agency drinking water contamination incident exercise, ‘Boadicea’, 
October 1998;
• Chemical incident exercise based on a specific industrial site, May 2000;
• Training exercise organised by Yorkshire Water aimed at coordination and response 
of different company departments, May 2000;
• Multi-agency waterborne diseases seminar organised by Berkshire HA, May 2000;
• Multi-agency incident exercise, based on contamination of a drinking water supply
reservoir following a road traffic accident, organised by East Kent HA, June 2000;
• Incident exercise involving a chemical fire and subsequent contamination of a river 
used for drinking water abstraction, held in Southampton, June 2000.
3.2.5 General Best Practice and Problematic Issues Identified from 
Chemical Incident Training and Exercises
This section summarises the general best practice issues and particularly problematic 
areas in the management of chemical incidents as identified from the participation in 
training sessions and exercises. There is a degree of overlap with those issues identified 
from the management of actual incidents, as specified in Section 3.1.5.1. The incident 
management process is divided into three aspects: risk assessment, communication and 
required management actions.
Risk assessment of the potential health impact on the population
• Identification of chemical/s involved is of obvious importance, there may be 
multiple chemicals and more chemicals may come to light as the incident develops.
• Information is required about the properties of the chemicals involved, including 
environment persistence and degradation, reactivity with other chemicals and 
measures for control.
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• Taste and odour properties can be useful in identifying chemicals and predicting 
levels of exposure. However, taste and odour thresholds should not be taken to 
indicate levels of toxicity and may differ significantly between individuals and be 
dependent on length of exposure.
• The contamination source needs to be identified and also the pathways and routes of 
exposure.
• Predictions of the number of people affected and potentially affected is required as 
part of the risk assessment process.
• Modelling can be used to assess the area of contamination. A ‘Chemet’ can be 
requested by the Fire or Police Service from the Meteorological Office, which 
provides an estimate of the plume area in atmospheric incidents, based on current 
wind direction.
• Ordnance Survey maps or Geographical Information Systems (GIS) can be used to 
plot cases of exposure or adverse health effects.
• The actual amount of the chemical that the population is exposed to that is likely to 
be biologically absorbed needs to be estimated.
Communication
• Collaboration and communication between all the organisations involved is 
essential.
• Setting up an incident control team from the start o f the event will make a 
collaborative approach easier.
• In establishing an incident team, the membership needs to be considered and also 
terms of reference and the tasks and responsibilities assigned to each of the 
organisations represented on the team.
• In larger incidents, a dedicated incident room may be required, equipped with 
sufficient telephone lines. The designation of staff, back-up staff and relief staff will 
be necessary. Administrative as well as operational staff will be required.
• Each organisation involved may have its own incident team and also provide a 
representative for a multi-agency incident control team.
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• Liaison with relevant occupational health departments who will be responsible for 
the workers of an industrial facility and also for emergency and clean up responders 
is important. Occupational health may have biological monitoring results of workers 
that will be useful in predicting the likely impact on the general population. There 
may be difficulties in determining the limits of responsibility for occupational and 
public health.
• If  contamination of agricultural land or farm animals is possible, the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) should be alerted.
• The public should be made aware of the area affected, in order to minimise anxiety 
in the unexposed population.
• A help-line may be necessary to provide information to the public; NHS Direct may 
be able to provide this service. Telephone operators should all be provided with a 
briefing providing information that can be released.
• There should be at least one person to undertake a full time public relations/media 
role.
Action to prevent or minimise harm
• The area of contamination should be secured to prevent public access and the 
chemical contained or removed if possible.
• Evacuation may be appropriate but is a complex issue and full discussion between all 
parties involved is required before action is taken.
• If evacuation is required, ensure the safety of the evacuation route and destination, 
e.g. people should not have to pass through a smoke plume to reach the evacuation 
centre.
• Decide from the outset what criteria have to exist for any protective measures to be 
removed and for the area to be declared free of contamination.
• There should be early identification and alert of particularly vulnerable populations.
• In the event of river contamination, downstream abstractors should be alerted, for 
example agricultural users and manufacturers. Water resources may also be used for
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recreational uses such as swimming, fishing or water sports which could lead to 
exposure.
• The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) may be able to take action to close down 
dangerous operations or ensure action is taken to prevent a recurrence of the 
incident.
• The ambulance service and A&Es should be provided with information on the 
chemical in order to assist with treatment of any victims.
• Inform A&Es, GPs, dentists and opticians to look out for the specified symptoms.
• There should be careful management of contaminated victims to avoid secondary 
contamination of ambulance and medical staff, hospitals and patients.
• Wherever possible, victims should be decontaminated before leaving the site of the 
incident.
• People involved in response, taking samples, and clean up should be supplied with 
personal protective equipment and access to decontamination facilities.
• Environmental sampling may help to establish levels of exposure; the location and 
frequency of samples need to be carefully considered.
• Repeat environmental sampling should be conducted to ensure that concentrations 
are not fluctuating.
• Need to establish how long it will take for analysis to be carried out and have a list 
o f accredited laboratories. Laboratories undertaking analysis should also be 
independent.
• Biological sampling is only worthwhile if it is likely to provide useful information, if 
the chemicals have a short biological half-life samples need to be taken soon after 
exposure.
• When taking biological samples a control sample may be required to assess the 
parameters in a non-exposed individual.
• Determine a precise case definition based on symptoms reported.
• Consider possible long-term impacts on health and ensure adequate healthcare 
provision.
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Documentation
• A log should be kept of the names and addresses of those exposed and affected.
• Shortfalls in the logging of information and events are commonly identified in the 
management of chemical incidents.
Issues related to drinking water
• In some areas, separate companies may be responsible for water supply and 
sewerage; representatives from both companies may be necessary on any incident 
response team.
• The public health implications of closing water abstraction points, water or sewage 
treatment facilities or cutting off water supplies to homes should be considered.
• The water company or EA may be able to predict the time of travel of contamination 
in rivers to reach a drinking water abstraction point to assist in assessments of 
whether drinking water is likely to have been contaminated and how long water 
abstractions should be closed.
• Early provision of alternative water supplies is required in the event of drinking 
water contamination.
• A ‘do not use’ notice can be communicated to consumers by a personal letter/leaflet 
drop, radio broadcasts, or in some cases loud hailers in the street.
• Possible uses of water include drinking, food preparation and cooking, washing 
dishes, bathing or showering, laundry, watering crops and plants, feeding pets or 
livestock, swimming pools.
• The start of the contamination and the date and time of issuing a ‘do not use’ notice 
should be recorded in order to estimate exposure duration.
• The possibility of people not taking advice and still using the contaminated water 
should be considered.
• It may be possible to isolate the particular part of the water supply network that is 
contaminated and to continue supply in the remainder of the network area.
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• In providing alternative water supplies, bottled water may be supplied for drinking, 
or small bowsers or water tanks. It may be possible to provide alternative large 
supplies for critical users.
• Water from bowsers is likely to require boiling before it is safe to drink, 
contamination often occurs from unclean tanks and dispensing equipment.
• If bowser water supplies are being used, consideration most be given to people who 
are not mobile and will require deliveries of water direct to their home.
• Vandalism of bowsers and tanks on the streets may be a problem.
• In water contamination events the potential impact on food manufacturers and 
producers should be considered, EHOs may already have contacts for their area. It 
may be necessary to withdraw food containing or prepared using contaminated 
water.
• The fire service may need to know about contaminated water supplies or even more 
importantly if water supplies have been cut off.
• Other water users that may need to be alerted are dentists, pharmacists and opticians.
• Water from different sources may be blended before being distributed to consumers, 
which may make identification of the source of drinking water contamination more 
difficult.
• It may be possible to install temporary water treatment facilities, for example 
activated carbon filters to remove particular chemicals.
• All supply pipes, internal plumbing, tanks, etc. should be flushed through to remove 
residual contamination.
• Residents on water meters may be reluctant to flush their water systems.
• The flushing of water pipes may involve spilling water out over streets, it may be 
possible for water to be contained or flushed directly to foul sewers. If water is 
collecting in public areas there is a risk of children playing in contaminated water. 
Flushing to surface water drains or direct to watercourse may require a discharge 
consent from the EA.
• Extensive flushing may result in the contaminant being drawn through previously 
uncontaminated areas.
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3.3 Summary of the Investigation into Chemical Incident 
Management
The previous two sections of this chapter have detailed the information inputs to the 
project. These have enabled the research engineer to establish the current state of 
knowledge amongst public health professionals in the management of chemical 
incidents and also to identify areas of best practice and issues that seem to be 
particularly problematic. Over the research period, there have been 246 water^elated 
chemical incidents, 70 of which have involved significant management involvement by 
the research engineer. Fourteen have been studied and documented in depth. 
Involvement in the management of actual chemical incidents provided the main source 
of information for developing an understanding of the issues involved in the 
management of chemical incidents and identifying areas of best practice and those in 
need of improvement. Participation in CIRS training sessions and, in particular, the 
development and facilitation of incident training exercises added to the knowledge base 
on how chemical incidents are currently managed. It also provided the opportunity to 
obtain feedback on what resources would be useful to public health professionals to 
assist them in improving their response to chemical incidents.
The next chapter demonstrates how the knowledge gained from the study of chemical 
incident management has been applied to developing methods for improving the public 
health response to chemical incidents.
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4 Methodology for Development of Tools to Improve 
Chemical Incident Management by Public Health 
Professionals
This chapter describes the methodology used for developing the chemical incident 
management tools as detailed in the specific objectives laid out in Section 1.3, namely:
• A best practice model for the public health response to chemical incidents;
• A chemical incident management guidance manual to enable public health 
professionals to meet the best practice criteria; and
• An evaluation method in order to be able to assess level of performance in managing 
chemical incidents.
The final aspect of developing the tools was to devise a method for testing the 
effectiveness of the guidance manual. This involved comparing the management 
performance, in a simulated chemical incident, of a group of public health professionals 
using the manual, with another group with no manual.
4.1 Best Practice Model for Public Health Response to 
Chemical Incidents
4.1.1 Aims and Objectives
A best practice model was developed detailing the public health response to chemical 
incidents. The purpose of the model is to specify the general issues that need to be 
considered for the successful management of a chemical incident, with the aim of 
preventing or minimising damage to human health and the environment. The primary 
target audience for the model is the public health profession.
The model is intended to cover all types of chemical incident and to identify all 
possible issues that may need to be considered during the management of a chemical 
incident. For a specific incident, action will not necessarily be required with respect to
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all the issues raised in the model. The primary focus of the model is on minor chemical 
incidents, rather than incidents at the catastrophic or disaster level, as these are 
incredibly rare events and have already received greater attention in the published 
literature, for example, the Home Office publication ‘Dealing with Disaster’ (Home 
Office, 1997). The majority of chemical incidents managed by public health doctors are 
relatively small scale.
Previous authors have identified four stages of emergency management, for all types of 
incident (Home Office, 1997):
1. prevention
2. preparedness
3. response
4. recovery
The aim of the best practice model is to focus on the response and recovery stages of 
incident management; however, some aspects of the recovery stage should allow for 
improved prevention and preparedness for future chemical incidents. In addition, the 
provision of a best practice model prior to an incident allows for improved preparedness 
and may result in preventing the occurrence of some negative aspects of a chemical 
incident.
The specific objectives of the best practice model are therefore:
• Identification of all the issues/actions that should form part of the public health 
response to chemical incidents;
• Inclusion of all types of chemical incidents;
• Focus on the more frequently occurring minor incidents; and
• Focus on the response and recovery stages of incident management.
4.1.2 Initial Development Methodology
The initial stage of development of the best practice model was to compile a first draft of 
the model from personal experience of chemical incident management throughout the 
research period. Three sources of information were used:
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• Lessons learnt from the management of chemical incidents throughout the research 
period (as detailed in Section 3.1);
• Lessons learnt and comments from incident exercises and training days (as detailed 
in Section 3.2); and
• Lessons learnt and information extracted from relevant literature on chemical 
incident management (as detailed in Section 2.2).
As specified in the previous section, the focus of the best practice model is on the 
response and recovery stages of incident management. The approach used to develop 
the model was first to identify the key areas of the public health response to chemical 
incidents, as listed below, and then to detail the issues that need to be considered under 
each of these headings:
• Identification of the chemical(s);
• Identification of the contaminant source;
• Determination of movement of the contaminant;
• Identification of exposure pathway;
• Identification of the actual/potentially exposed population;
• Identification of level of exposure;
• Contact with relevant response organisations;
• Actions already taken by other relevant organisations;
• Incident control team formation;
• Acute health assessment (including biological monitoring);
• Actions to minimise human exposure;
• Actions to mitigate environmental harm and migration of contaminant;
• Environmental monitoring;
• Communications with the public and media;
• Remediation action (during the incident);
• Incident status and stand down;
• Long term health monitoring (post acute incident);
• Long term environmental monitoring (post acute incident);
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• Environmental remediation (post acute incident); and
• Incident documentation (throughout incident).
The purpose of the model is to provide a comprehensive specification o f the issues 
involved in the public health response to chemical incidents, but not to provide a 
detailed description of exactly how to handle each aspect o f the management. For 
example, the model introduces the issue of conducting human biological sampling, but 
does not provide details on when or how a human biological sampling programme 
should be instigated. It is the purpose of the chemical incident management guidance 
manual, which will be discussed in Section 4.2, to cover the details of each aspect of 
management highlighted in the model.
After compilation of the first draft o f the best practice model, the project supervisors and 
the permanent and seconded staff at CIRS reviewed the model. After incorporation of 
comments from this initial peer review the model was then revised and distributed for 
consultation with a number of experts in chemical incident management, as detailed in 
the next section. A copy of the model used for consultation can be found in Appendix 5.
4.1.3 Expert Consultation
The aim of the consultation process was to incorporate expert comments into the best 
practice model and also to assign a level of priority to the issues specified in the model, 
in terms of how early in the management process each issue needs to be considered. The 
experts who took part in the consultation process were from both the public health field 
and other organisations involved in chemical incident management.
For the purposes of the expert consultation the model was divided into four stages.
1. The first stage covered the initial identification that there had been a chemical 
incident that posed a threat to public health and establishing the basic facts 
surrounding the incident, this stage was referred to as identification.
2. The second stage was the preliminary investigation, which involved identifying all 
the aspects of the incident, with a particular focus on the resulting public health
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impact. This stage involved some overlap with stage one, with information being 
updated and expanded. This stage also encompassed the identification of the 
agencies already involved in the management of the incident and the actions that had 
been taken.
3. The third stage defined the management actions to be taken by public health 
professionals. The aim was to determine the actions that need to be taken in order to 
prevent or minimise any adverse health impact of a chemical incident. These actions 
formed the emergency response. In this stage there was still a need to ensure that the 
facts of the incident had been correctly established and that any changes in 
circumstances had been noted.
4. The fourth and final stage was the post incident review, this was expected to take 
place after the emergency response at a point when all actions had been taken to 
stabilise the situation and there would be time for reflection on how the incident was 
managed. Proper review and documentation o f an incident enables lessons to be 
learnt on how to manage future similar incidents more successfully, or how to avoid 
a recurrence of the situation.
A document was prepared to allow experts involved in the consultation process to 
provide a rating for each of the issues/actions specified, to comment on what was 
included in the model, to specify any additional issues that should be included, and to 
provide any further comments on the structure of the model or more general comments 
about the development of the best practice model. Participants were provided with 
instructions that reminded them that the aim was to identify generic issues covering all 
types of chemical incident and that the purpose behind the model was to prevent or 
minimise any adverse public health impact of a chemical incident. A copy of the 
document used for consultation on the model can be found in Appendix 5.
Participants in the consultation process were asked to provide a rating for each 
issue/action in terms of its importance in being considered/conducted at the immediate 
response stage or later in the management process. The aim of the rating exercise was to 
identify which issues should be considered in the initial emergency response period,
81
within the first few hours of being alerted to the incident. Although the format of the 
model used in the consultation process divided the issues covered into stages, within 
each stage the issues or actions were considered to have varying levels of importance in 
terms of whether they should be conducted immediately or form part of the extended 
management process. The rating scale used was 1 to 5, on the basis of how important it 
is that each of the stated issues/actions are considered/conducted in the initial emergency 
response period, where:
1 = essential action for initial emergency response in the first few hours
2 = action required in early hours of the incident, within the first 24 hours
3 = action is part of the management process in the first few days of the incident
4 = action forms part of the extended management process, within 1-2 weeks
5 = action can be delayed until the follow-up stage, after the initial management 
The higher the rating assigned, the longer the timescale available in which to carry out 
the specified action. It was identified that it may be difficult for those specifying ratings 
to use the timescales provided in the event of a chronic incident. The instructions 
provided with the model stated that if the rating provided would depend on whether the 
incident was acute or chronic, then it should be assumed that the model is for application 
in acute chemical incidents. The instructions also stressed that the aim was to provide 
ratings that would be applicable to most types of incidents, and that the primary focus of 
the model was on the more frequently occurring minor chemical incidents, rather than 
the rare events at a catastrophic or disaster level.
Although the model provided in the consultation process had been divided into four 
stages, it was not expected that the issues/actions included in the stages would 
necessarily follow in chronological order. The stages were intended to allow the actions 
to be classified in terms of their purpose, i.e. to identify that an incident has taken place, 
to ascertain the details of the incident, to take action to manage the effects of the incident 
and to review the management process, not the order in which they should be carried 
out. However, the classification of the stages did imply that the majority of the actions 
in stage one (identification) would be most likely to fall within the initial emergency 
response (i.e. rating of 1), and those in stage four (post incident review) would not be
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expected to form part of the emergency response (i.e. rating of 5). Issues and actions in 
the investigation and management stages were more likely to cover the range of possible 
ratings. Those taking part in the consultation were requested to carefully consider the 
priority of each issue/action across all the stages and rate accordingly, and not to assume 
that they had already been placed in chronological order. It should be noted that an 
element of bias might have inadvertently been introduced by classifying the actions 
within these stages. Participants may have been inclined to feel that as they worked 
through the model the ratings they were providing would move from 1 to 5. However, 
the results show that the full range of ratings was used throughout the model.
A copy of the model and instructions provided for the consultation process can be found 
in Appendix 5. Forms were sent out by post or email to 42 experts. A total of 16 
completed forms were returned by post or email and 10 additional face-to-face 
interviews were conducted. The interviews provided the opportunity to assess any 
difficulties participants were experiencing in providing the ratings and to conduct more 
detailed discussions about any issues raised whilst working through the model. Ratings 
and comments were received from a total of 26 experts from several organisations. The 
range of work areas and job titles of the experts who provided comments are detailed 
below:
• Public health
o Health Emergency Planning Advisors 
o Director of Chester Public Health Laboratory Service 
o Consultant/Regional Epidemiologists 
o Public Health Consultant
o Senior Medical Officer, Environmental Chemicals Unit, Department of 
Health
• Environmental health
o Principal Environmental Health Officers
o Environmental Health Advisor to a Chemical Incident Regional Service 
Provider Unit (RSPU)
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o Lecturer in Environmental Health
• Environment Agency
o Area Emergencies Coordinator
• Water industry
o Scientific Services Manager 
o Public Health Managers 
o Quality and Environmental Assurance Manager 
o Head of Drinking Water Regulation
• Fire Service
o Assistant Divisional Officers 
o Fire Station Officers (Hazardous Materials)
• Others
o Emergency Planning Lecturer 
o Senior Scientist, Department of Health 
o Toxicologist for a Chemical Incident RSPU 
o Chemical pathologist at the National Focus
4.1.4 Final Development Methodology
The comments and ratings obtained from the consultation process were compiled in a 
Microsoft Excel® spreadsheet. The detailed table of ratings provided through the 
consultation process can be found in Appendix 6. Where people had rated an 
issue/action as, for example, between 1 and 2, a rating of 1.5 was allocated. In some 
cases participants felt that an action would be ongoing throughout the management 
process and provided a range of ratings, for example 1-3, in this example the earliest 
point at which the action would be started was allocated, which in this case would be 1.
The final rating allocated to a specific issue/action was determined by the modal rating 
as calculated from the ratings provided by all the participants (i.e. the most frequently 
chosen rating). In a few cases, an action may have been rated, for example 2 by the 
same number of participants that rated it 3. In this case, if out of the other ratings 
provided more people rated the action as 1 than rated it 4, then the 2 rating would be
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selected. Table 4.1 is a summary table of the frequency with which each rating was 
specified for each issue/action in the model.
Table 4.1: Frequency o f Ratings fo r  Each Aspect Within the Model
Aspect Frequency of each rating Mode
1 2 3 4 5
STAGE ONE
record incident details 26
record 24 hour contact names and numbers 20 4 1 1
start logs 24 2 1
name, unique number, constituents 25 1 1
identify manufacturer of product involved 21 4 1 1
common uses of the chemical/product 9 12 4 2
physical properties 20 5 1
taste/odour properties 20 5 1 1
basic human toxicology 24 2 1
synergistic or antagonistic effects 17 7 2 1
current geographical location of contamination source 24 3 1
direction of movement of the contaminant 22 4 1
identify nearby vulnerable locations 24 2 1
try to establish the pathway/route of exposure 16 10 1
number of people already exposed 21 6 1
total potentially exposed population 14 12 1 1
nearby populations that may become exposed 12 12 2 1
ascertain if any health effects are reported 21 5
amount of the contaminant released 22 4 1
concentration of the contaminant in relevant media 18 6 2 1
time period of exposure 19 6 1 1
decide on incident status 25 1
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Aspect Frequency of each rating Mode
1 2 3 4 5
STAGE TWO
continue to record incident details 15 8 1 1 1
keep current 24 hour contact names and numbers 14 9 1 1 1
complete logs for incoming and outgoing calls and actions 
taken 9 14 2 1 2
ensure all chemicals involved have been correctly 
identified and relevant details on properties and toxicity 
are determined
12 11 2 2 2
confirm location of contamination source 10 13 2 1 2
where location of source is in doubt consider use ol 
modelling to predict possible sources 4 14 6 2 2
identify all environmental media affected 14 10 3 1
determine current weather conditions 23 3 1
predictions of future weather conditions 14 10 2 1
confirm direction of movement of the contaminant 14 8 4 1
when direction of movement of contaminant is in doubt 
consider use of modelling to predict possible areas at risk
4 14 8 2
confirm nearby vulnerable locations 16 9 1 1
confirm the pathway/route of exposure between source o; 
contamination and human receptors 9 14 4 2
confirm number of people already exposed or possibly 
exposed to the contamination 11 13 1 1 2
where possible obtain names and addresses, include 
visitors to the area 3 11 10 1 2
confirm type of health effects reported and number o: 
people affected 4 13 7 1 2
mark cases reported on a map or in GIS 5 10 10 1 2
confirm additional nearby populations that may become 
exposed
3 13 9 1 2
identify and alert particularly vulnerable populations 8 15 2 2
confirm amount of the contaminant released 11 10 7 2
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Aspect Frequency of each rating Mode
1 2 3 4 5
confirm concentrations of the contaminant in relevant 
media and at various locations and times 8 11 5 1 2
ensure most up-to-date analysis results have been received 4 12 10 1 2
estimate time period of exposure, differentiating between 
various populations if exposed for different time periods
4 10 12 1 3
alert health organisations 20 6 1 1
alert emergency services 21 4 1 1
alert local authority -  environmental health 19 5 1 1
alert local authority 15 12 1
alert water companies 16 7 1 1
alert enforcement agencies 16 9 2 1
alert government departments 10 13 2 1 2
alert occupational health professionals 11 11 3 2
alert environmental specialists, consultancies 5 13 6 1 2
identify contact personnel and record 24 hour contact 
details 12 9 6 1
detail actions taken by other organisations involved 9 11 8 2
confirm current incident status 14 12 1
assess whether the severity of the incident is likely tc 
escalate 12 13 1 1
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Aspect Frequency of each rating Mode
1 2 3 4 5
STAGE THREE
continue to record incident details 14 8 1 2 1
keep current 24 hour contact names/numbers 12 8 3 2 1
complete logs for incoming and outgoing calls and actions 
taken 14 7 2 2 1
consider forming an incident control team 16 9 1 1 1
identify incident control team members 12 9 2 1 1
find appropriate location for incident room 13 10 1 1 1
ensure necessary facilities are available 12 10 1 1 1
ensure contact numbers for the incident control team are 
provided to other relevant parties 13 9 2 1 1
determine frequency of meetings 10 9 3 2 1
record of health effects 4 10 7 3 2
patient identification 1 10 10 3 3
record patient details 3 9 10 2 3
compile register of exposed public 7 12 4 3
compile register of exposed emergency responders 4 6 9 4 3
ensure patients/exposed population are adequately 
decontaminated 11 9 2 2 1
ensure appropriate medical treatment is available for patients 12 9 2 1 1 1
toxicological evaluation of exposure data to determine 
possible and most likely impacts on health 8 8 6 2 2
determine a precise case definition 1 13 8 1 1 2
determine whether there are other possible causes of il 
health 2 7 9 5 3
consider conducting biological monitoring o f patients anc 
the exposed population 1 8 6 7 1 2
consider distributing a health questionnaire 2 6 8 5 3 3
alert affected general population and those potentially 
affected if movement of contaminant is expected 16 9 2 1
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Aspect Frequency of each rating Mode
1 2 3 4 5
provision of appropriate advice to prevent/minimise 
exposure 19 7 1 1
arrange for provision of alternative water supplies 7 19 1
alert other water users 15 8 5 1
ensure personnel do not become contaminated themselves, 
provide PPE and decontamination facilities 16 8 2 1
ensure relevant environmental organisations have been 
informed 15 10 2 1
ensure actions are being taken to remove or contain the 
source of contamination 11 10 4 1
protect vulnerable locations 16 8 3 1
determine if any routine results from environmental 
sampling are already available 8 10 7 1 2
establish what environmental samples need to be taken 6 12 7 2
identify laboratory for analysis 9 11 5 2
agree financing, establish timescales for reporting of results 4 8 10 3 3
initiate sampling, ensuring samples are collected and stored 
appropriately 9 11 5 1 2
ensure samples are sent for analysis, ensure appropriate 
analytical techniques are used and quality control procedures 
are adequate 4 10 7 1 2
establish method for interpreting data, define limits oJ 
detection, limitations from sampling procedure, accuracy o1 
analytical method, relevant standards for comparison, 
including taste and odour
' 4 5 11 2 1 3
conduct any repeat sampling and analysis to confirm results 
or to detect changes in concentrations 3 5 6 9 4
ensure awareness of the public and relevant organisations o; 
the situation, including residents groups 13 12 2 1
define population ‘at risk’ to avoid unnecessary concerr 
from unaffected individuals 12 12 2 1/2
provide clear and consistent information on the nature of the 
hazard and the level of risk 10 12 4 2
ensure affected populations understand what actions the> 
need to take 15 11 1 1
provision of press releases to alert the public 12 11 3 2
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Aspect Frequency of each rating Mode
1 2 3 4 5
provision of press releases with follow-up information or 
how the incident is being managed 5 9 10 2 2
consider setting up a telephone help-line for enquiries from 
the public 10 12 4 2
removal and disposal of the chemical(s), or removal oi 
exposure pathway 2 18 4 1 2
decontamination of property 1 8 9 7 3
prior determination of criteria for incident closure 4 11 10 1 2
ongoing assessment of progress towards specified criteria 2 9 10 3 1 3
recognition of when to close the incident 2 6 11 5 3
ensure all organisations involved in the management of the 
incident and the public are informed the incident is over 3 5 10 5 1 3
STAGE FOUR
summary of the incident 7 9 10 5
lessons learned regarding management of the incident 1 9 16 5
changes in procedures 1 6 19 5
identification of preventative action 1 8 17 5
identify specific actions to be taken and a named person 4 7 15 5
provision of information for official reports 1 7 18 5
continued treatment of casualties with long term health 
effects i 1 9 13 5
consider tagging of individual patient notes i 3 7 11 5
follow-up epidemiological studies 2 5 17 5
consider the necessity for long term monitoring of the 
affected environment/media if remediation is not possible 1 8 16 5
ensure remediation at site of contamination is complete anc 
meets required standards 2 6 15 5
where possible take steps to prevent recurrence of the 
situation i 2 6 15 5
where remediation is not possible and a significant risk tc 
health remains, consider permanent re-housing of people ir 
the area affected
2 5 16 5
follow-up information to reassure the public 1 1 10 15 5
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Four chronological categories of incident response were specified for the final model. 
These were:
1. First few hours;
2. Within 24 hours;
3. Remainder of management; and
4. Post incident.
The issues/actions specified in the first version of the best practice model were placed in 
each of the four categories based on the modal rating determined from the responses 
provided through the consultation process. Table 4.2 summarises the relationship 
between the modal ratings and these four categories.
Table 4.2: Relationship between Modal Rating and Chronological Category
Modal rating Chronological category
1 First few hours
2 Within 24 hours
3 Remainder of management
5 Post incident
Only one action had a modal rating of 4, this was put in the ‘remainder of management’ 
category. The wording of some issues/actions was changed in response to comments 
received from the consultation process and a few additional issues were added to the 
model.
The ratings provided were also used to assist in dividing each of the four categories into 
‘key’ actions and ‘remaining’ actions. ‘Key’ actions are those considered to be the most 
important, i.e. it is essential they form part of the response. ‘Remaining’ actions are of 
less importance. The basis of this classification varied for each category. For category 
one (first few hours), if the vast majority of the participants rated the action as 1, this 
was classified as a ‘key’ action. For category two (within 24 hours), if the vast majority 
of the participants rated the action as 2, or if the modal rating was 2 but a large number
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of participants rated the action as 1, this was classified as a ‘key’ action. For category 
three (remainder of the management), if  the vast majority of the participants rated the 
action as 3, or if the modal rating was 3 but a large number of participants rated the 
action as 2, this was classified as a ‘key’ action. ‘Key’ actions for the post incident 
category were selected on the basis of personal experience. A degree of judgement was 
used in classifying the ‘key’ actions and also the focus of ‘key’ actions was on the public 
health role.
4.1.5 Application
The final best practice model was developed from the initial model as a result o f the 
comments and ratings provided in the consultation process. The model has been 
presented as a summary checklist for use in the public health response to chemical 
incidents. The issues/actions to be considered are specified for each of the four 
chronological categories: first few hours; within 24 hours; remainder of management; 
and post incident. The three main aspects of the public health response to chemical 
incidents have been identified as: risk assessment of potential adverse impact on public 
health; communication with other organisations and the public; and action to 
prevent/mitigate adverse impact (these will be discussed in Section 4.2). The checklist 
was used in the chemical incident management guidance manual, which is described in 
Section 4.2, a copy of Version 1 of the checklist can be found in Appendix 7.
The same issues/actions and their associated chronological categories were used as the 
basis of the evaluation method for assessing the level of performance of public health 
professionals in managing chemical incidents. The division between ‘key’ actions and 
‘remaining’ actions was also used. The development of the evaluation method is 
described in detail in Section 4.3.
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4.2 Chemical incident Management Guidance Manual
4.2.1 Aims and Objectives
The aim of the chemical incident management guidance manual is to provide an
9
operational resource primarily for use in the public health response to chemical 
incidents, and therefore with the target audience being public health professionals. As 
determined from the review of literature on procedures for the management of chemical 
incidents, there is no generic guidance currently available that is specifically aimed at 
the public health management o f the emergency response to chemical incidents (see 
Section 2.2). The few publications that were identified either focused on specific 
aspects of chemical incident management or dealt with planning and preparation prior to 
an incident. The chemical incident management guidance manual therefore aims to 
fulfil the need to provide public health professionals with the necessary resources to 
satisfy their responsibilities in managing the health aspects of chemical incidents.
As chemical incident management is a multi-agency process, it is expected that much of 
the guidance provided will also be useful to other organisations involved in the response 
to chemical incidents. In addition, the manual will help to clarify the role that public 
health professionals and other organisations can be expected to take in the management 
of an incident.
As the aim is for the manual to be used as an operational tool during the actual 
emergency response to a chemical incident, the format is focused on concise checklists 
and summary diagrams for quick reference, rather than detailed text. References are 
made to any relevant publications covering particular aspects in greater detail, which 
could be followed up by the user if  required.
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The specific objectives o f the chemical incident management guidance manual are 
therefore:
• Provision of a resource for public health professionals in the management of 
chemical incidents;
• Focus on the emergency response (rather than planning and preparation); and
• Provision of a concise operational tool (rather than a lengthy reference text).
4.2.2 Development Methodology
Throughout the research period, tools were developed to assist public health 
professionals in responding to chemical incidents. As described in previous sections, 
information on best practice was collated from involvement in management of actual 
chemical incidents and exercises and also from relevant literature.
One of the resources developed throughout the research period was the detailed checklist 
concerned with water-related chemical incidents. The first version was produced in 
April 1998. This was extensively revised and updated in April 2000. Both versions 
were published in the Chemical Incident Report (the CIRS in-house newsletter} and 
were distributed to public health doctors as a part of CIRS training days and also in the 
event of a water-related chemical incident. Feedback was obtained on the use o f the 
checklist and used for further revisions. A summary table of standards for drinking 
water quality was also compiled at the beginning of the project as this was soon found to 
be a very useful resource. Other resources were developed for inclusion in the 
documentation provided at CIRS training days, which focused on the management of 
water-related chemical incidents specifically. These were:
• Roles and responsibilities of organisations involved in water-related chemical 
incidents;
• Guide to using drinking water quality standards;
• Issues involved in environmental monitoring;
• Guide to presenting and interpreting environmental analyses; and
• Questionnaire for use in a drinking water contamination incident;
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The introduction to the guidance manual identifies the primary objectives of the public 
health response to chemical incidents. These are specified as:
1. To conduct a risk assessment to determine the potential adverse impact of the 
incident on the health of the local population;
2. To communicate with other organisations involved in the management of the 
incident and with the public; and
3. To take action to prevent or minimise the adverse public health impact of the 
incident.
These three objectives provided the focus for the provision of resources to be included in 
the guidance manual. In addition, the development of the best practice model, as 
described in Section 4.1, identified all the issues and actions that form part of the public 
health response to chemical incidents and, where appropriate, guidance was developed 
to provide more detailed information on these aspects. The guidance materials produced 
in the manual were divided into four types: briefings (more detailed background 
information); checklists; flowcharts (diagrams); and forms. In addition, there was some 
introductory material at the start of the manual discussing the general framework of the 
public health response to chemical incidents and providing details on the information 
contained within the manual.
After compilation of the initial draft, the chemical incident guidance manual was 
reviewed by the project supervisors and the permanent and seconded staff at CIRS. 
Comments from this initial peer review were incorporated into Version 1 of the chemical 
incident management guidance manual. This version of the manual was used in the 
validation testing, as described in Section 4.3. Version 1 of the chemical incident 
guidance manual focused on issues that are common to all types of chemical incidents 
and some issues that are specific to water-related chemical incidents. Resources for 
issues related specifically to air or land-related incidents were not included at this stage 
as these were being developed by other research engineers as part of complementary 
research projects. The table of contents for Version 1 of the manual can be found in 
Appendix 8, the individual guidance materials are fundamentally the same as in
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Version 2, but are presented in a different order. A full copy of Version 2 of the manual 
can be found in Volume 2.
4.2.3 Expert Consultation
As part of the validation testing of the manual (described in Section 4.3), Version 1 of 
the chemical incident management guidance manual was distributed to 82 public health 
professionals, including Consultants in Communicable Disease Control (CsCDC), 
Consultants in Public Health Medicine (CsPHM), public health specialist registrars 
(SpRs), and public health nurses. Feedback was obtained during the validation testing 
process and an evaluation and comment form was also included in each of the manuals. 
A few weeks was allowed for those with the manual to have time to work through it and, 
if possible, to use it in an actual incident, then follow up letters were sent to all 82 
participants in the exercise sessions to request feedback on the content and use of the 
manual. Completed forms were received from 18 participants.
A total of 10 copies of the manual were also distributed to people who had been 
consulted with respect to the best practice model, this included representatives from 
public health, environmental health and the water industry. In addition, detailed 
discussions were conducted with Dr Kaetrin Camegie-Smith, an independent consultant 
in public health medicine and public health advisor to the Emergency Planning College. 
The comments received from both the participants in the validation testing and from 
consultation with experts in chemical incident management have been incorporated into 
Version 2 of the manual. The main changes between Versions 1 and 2 were:
• To improve the presentation of the manual in general and also the specific resources 
in order to make the manual easier to use;
• To detail more specifically the lead agency for each aspect of chemical incident 
management; and
• To provide more detailed explanations of the general application of the manual and 
the specific purpose of each guidance resource.
The comments received regarding the manual are detailed in Section 6.3 and the changes 
made to the manual following the validation testing are specified in Section 6.5.
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4.2.4 Application
As described in the aims and objectives in Section 4.2.1 the application of the chemical 
incident management guidance manual is for use as an operational resource for the 
public health response to chemical incidents. The aim is to provide information and 
guidance that will result in an improvement in the management o f chemical incidents by 
public health professionals.
Further development and consultation on the manual will have to be conducted before 
the contents are incorporated into a book on ‘Environmental Management of Chemical 
Incidents’ to be published by the Stationery Office (see Section 7.5.2).
4.3 Validation Testing of the Chemical Incident Management 
Guidance Manual
4.3.1 Aims and Objectives
The aim of the validation testing process was to conduct a quantitative assessment of the 
effectiveness of the chemical incident management guidance manual in improving the 
management of chemical incidents by public health professionals. In order to be able to 
assess the effectiveness of the manual, the following objectives had to be achieved:
• Development of a method for evaluating the performance of public health 
professionals in managing a chemical incident; and
• Production of an incident exercise in order to provide a realistic and consistent 
situation in which to the test the manual.
4.3.2 Development of Evaluation Method
4.3.2.1 Generic evaluation o f  performance
The basis of the evaluation method was the final output from the development of the 
best practice model. The same issues/actions and their associated chronological 
categories were specified and, in addition, the ‘key’ actions were identified. The aim is
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to assess the number of actions that have been achieved in the response to a chemical 
incident. Table 4.3 details the total number of actions that have been specified in the 
evaluation method for each stage of the response. The ‘key’ actions are those 
considered to be the most important actions for completion. These are also stated for 
each stage.
Table 4.3: Number o f Actions Specified in the Evaluation Method
Stage Number of ‘total’ 
actions specified
Number of ‘key’ actions 
specified
1. First few hours 57 30
2. Within 24 hours 46 24
3. Remainder of management 18 10
4. Post incident 15 5
Total incident 136 69
By assessing the response to a particular incident with regard to whether the specified 
actions were achieved, a percentage score for ‘total’ actions and ‘key’ actions can be 
provided for each stage and the incident as a whole. This provides a method of 
assessing performance that can then be used as the basis for comparing the performance 
of different people, for example, those with access to the guidance manual and those 
without. A detailed copy of the generic evaluation method can be found in Appendix 9.
4.3.2.2 Evaluation o f  performance in the incident exercise
To assess the effectiveness of the guidance manual, an exercise scenario was devised as 
described in Section 4.3.3. The generic evaluation method was adapted for use in the 
exercise by specifying exactly how each action would be achieved in the context of the 
exercise. For some actions to be entirely complete several aspects needed to be 
included. Therefore, in assessing the performance in the exercise, if the participant had 
included all these aspects in their response then they would have completely achieved 
that action. However, if only some of the aspects had been included then the action 
would only be partially achieved.
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In conducting the evaluation of the exercise responses, the actions achieved within the 
specified stages of the incident response were recorded. In addition, the actions that were 
being achieved in stages other than that in which they were specified were also 
documented. This included actions being achieved too early, for example, stage two 
actions being completed in stage one, and actions that were being identified too late. In 
some cases, issues were highlighted in the responses that had not been included in the 
evaluation method these were also documented. A copy of the exercise specific 
evaluation method can be found in Appendix 10. Further details concerning the 
evaluation of responses are presented in Chapter 5.
4.3.3 Devising the Incident Exercise
The aim of the incident exercise in this case was to devise an incident scenario that 
would test the effectiveness of the guidance manual using the evaluation method 
developed, as described in the previous section. A scenario involving contamination of 
drinking water was selected in order that all resources available in the manual could be 
fully exploited and tested. The general scenario in the exercise was based on one 
particular incident from the experience of the research engineer with additional aspects 
added in order to cover the majority of the aspects in the evaluation method. The 
exercise was divided into stages to simulate the development of the incident scenario 
over a few days, these stages matched the categories used in the evaluation method: first 
few hours; within 24 hours; remainder of management; and post incident. The time for 
completing each stage of the incident exercise was specified as 25 minutes for stage one, 
20 minutes for stage two, 25 minutes for stage three, and 10 minutes for the post 
incident stage.
In addition to devising the exercise itself, recording sheets were also developed in order 
to collect the responses to the incident exercise in a coherent and consistent manner. 
The information recorded by the participants had to allow for subsequent evaluation of 
which issues and actions had been considered and achieved in responding to the incident 
exercise. Forms were provided for each of the stages one to three, with sections for:
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issues to be considered; actions/decisions to take; people to contact; further information 
required; resources required; and miscellaneous. For the post incident stage the form 
was divided into documentation required and actions required.
The exercise was piloted on the permanent and seconded staff at CIRS to verily that the 
timings for completing each stage of the incident were achievable and that the recording 
sheets allowed enough information to be documented to conduct the evaluation. A copy 
of the exercise used in the validation testing can be found in Appendix 11.
4.3.4 Conducting the Incident Exercise Sessions
Before conducting the incident exercise sessions, the first stage was to ascertain how 
many people within the health authorities (HAs) might be required to be involved in the 
management of chemical incidents. All 73 of the HAs, with service level agreements 
with CIRS at the time, were contacted to establish the number of people that were 
included on the 24-hour public health department on-call rotas. Potentially, anyone on 
these rotas may be required to manage a chemical incident. Table 4.4 summarises the 
total number of people by job title for the 73 HAs.
Table 4.4: Total Number o f Public Health Professionals in HAs Contracted to CIRS, 
Categorised by Job Title
Job title Consultant in 
Public Health 
Medicine 
(CPHM)
Public Health 
Specialist 
Registrar 
(PH SpR)
Consultant in 
Communicable 
Disease Control 
(CCDC)
Director o f  
Public Health 
(DPH)
Public
Health
Nurse
Other
Number 
(total = 585) 217 173 87 51 40 17
It was proposed that an exercise and training session would be held within each of the 
six National Health Service Executive (NHSE) Regions covered by CIRS. Dates and 
locations were organised within each region and the CCDC was contacted at each HA to 
request participants for the sessions. A total of 82 public health professionals attended 
the exercise and training sessions, with 79 people fully completing the exercise. 
Information was collected on the job title of each participant, the number of chemical 
incidents they had been involved in, and the number of CIRS training days or other
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chemical incident training sessions each had attended. Tables 4.5, 4 .6and 4.7 show the 
spread of experience and training of the 79 participants in the exercise sessions and also 
their job titles.
Table 4.5: Number o f Chemical Incidents Exercise Participants had Managed (n=79)
Number of 
incidents 
managed
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10+
Number o f  
participants 44 10 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 9
Table 4.6: Number o f Chemical Incident Training Days Exercise Participants had 
Attended (n=79)
Number of 
training 
days 
attended
0 1 2 3 4 5
Num ber of 
participants 40 19 5 5 3 7
Table 4.7: Number o f Exercise Participants Under Each Job Category (n~79)
Job title Public 
Health 
Specialist 
Registrar 
(PH SpR)
Consultant in 
Communicable 
Disease 
Control 
(CCDC)
Public
Health
Nurse
Consultant 
in Public 
Health 
Medicine 
(CPHM)
Public 
Health 
Senior 
House 
Officer (PH 
SHO)
Public
Health
Assistant
Number of 
participants 30 19 12 4 3 2
Job title Public
Health
Advisor
Emergency
Planning
Officer
Lecturer Medical
Officer
Public
Health
Scientist
Deputy 
Director o f  
Public 
Health
Number of 
participants
2 2 2 1 1 1
The participants were categorised into four groups of: experienced and trained; 
experienced only; trained only; and inexperienced and untrained. Experience was 
defined as having being involved in five or more chemical incidents and trained as
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having attended at least one CIRS training day (or equivalent). At each regional session, 
approximately half the group were provided with a guidance manual for use during the 
exercise and the remaining people had no resources to assist them with the response to 
the exercise. A short introduction to the content and use of the manual was provided to 
the majority of the participants who used the manual (with the exception of nine people). 
This was provided at the start o f the day and therefore most o f the people who were 
selected to use the manual were those who were able to get to the training venue at the 
earlier time. Any remaining manuals were allocated on a first come first served basis. 
In addition, the aim was for those with and without the manual to be spread across the 
training and experience categories. Table 4.8 shows the number of participants in each 
of the four categories and also how many from each category used the manual during the 
exercise.
Table 4.8: Number o f Participants in Each Training and Experience Group and Use o f 
the Guidance Manual
Category Total number of 
participants
Number with the 
manual
Number without 
the manual
Experienced and 
trained 12 6 6
Experienced only 3 1 2
Trained only 28 13 15
Inexperienced and 
untrained 36 19 17
Total 79 39 40
At each session the same set of instructions was presented to the participants explaining 
the aims of the exercise, how the responses were going to be evaluated, and how their 
responses should be recorded. It was stressed that participants needed to write down 
everything they would consider, actions and decisions they would take, people they 
would contact and information and resources required in responding to the incident. The 
need to prioritise actions was also specified. Participants were explicitly requested not 
to discuss the incident with each other.
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Each participant completed the exercise on an individual basis with responses being 
recorded on the sheets provided. As explained in the previous section the exercise was 
divided into four stages, these were:
• First few hours;
• Within 24 hours;
• Remainder of the management; and
• Post incident.
Participants recorded their written response to each incident stage based on the 
information provided. New information was provided at each stage to show how the 
incident was developing. The same amount of time was allocated for completion of 
each stage at all 6 exercise sessions, as specified in Sectbn 4.3.3.
4.4 Conclusions
A best practice model for the public health response to chemical incidents was 
developed from:
• The lessons learnt through the actual management of chemical incidents;
• Involvement in chemical incident exercises and training sessions; and
• Relevant literature.
Consultation with a range of experts in chemical incident management was carried out 
during the development of the model.
The model was then used to direct the development of a chemical incident management 
guidance manual to be used in the emergency response to a chemical incident. The three 
broad issues covered by the manual are:
• Conducting a risk assessment to determine the potential adverse impact of an 
incident on the health of the population;
• Communicating with other organisations involved in the management of an incident 
and with the public; and
• Actions to be taken to prevent or minimise any adverse impact on the public health.
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The best practice model was also used as the basis for a quantitative evaluation method 
for assessing the performance of public health professionals in responding to a chemical 
incident. An incident exercise scenario and incident specific evaluation method were 
also developed to use in the validation testing of the guidance manual. The following 
chapter presents the results from this validation testing.
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5 Results and Statistical Analysis from Validation 
Testing of the Chemical Incident Management 
Guidance Manual
5.1 Hypotheses
The main aim of the validation testing of the chemical incident management guidance 
manual was to determine whether its use improves the level of performance in chemical 
incident management by public health professionals. The null hypothesis is therefore:
• There is no difference in the performance of public health professionals with and 
without the use of the guidance manual in managing a chemical incident.
In addition, the effects of training and experience were to be investigated, in particular:
• Is the use of the guidance manual of greater benefit to public health professionals 
with no previous experience and training in chemical incidents compared to those 
with previous experience and/or training?
• Irrespective of the use of the guidance manual, do public health professionals with 
experience and/or training in chemical management achieve a higher level of 
performance than those without?
5.2 Summary of Data from the Validation Testing
5.2.1 Performance Score
As explained in Section 4.3, the method for testing the effectiveness of the guidance 
manual was to evaluate the performance of a group of public health professionals by 
asking them to provide a written response to a chemical incident exercise (i.e. a 
simulated chemical incident). Performance was evaluated using the evaluation method 
described in Section 4.3.2, which specifies the actions that should be completed during a 
chemical incident. Using this method, assessment of the written responses allowed a
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score to be derived showing the percentage of the total number of required actions that 
had been successfully achieved. The measure of performance was therefore the 
percentage of actions completed for the specified incident exercise.
As the exercise was split into stages one to three and a post incident stage, percentage 
scores could also be calculated for each of these stages. In addition, a number of ‘key’ 
actions had been specified for each stage of the exercise, which were selected as having 
higher priority for completion. Therefore, for each stage, a percentage score could be 
provided for the ‘total’ actions completed and the ‘key’ actions completed. Finally, 
some of the actions specified in the generic evaluation method could only be achieved in 
the exercise by completing several sub tasks. For example, alerting relevant emergency 
services for this particular exercise would involve alerting the ambulance, fire and police 
services. Therefore the action would only be completely achieved if all three of the 
services had been alerted. In some cases, an action may be completely or partially 
achieved.
To summarise, for each participant the total percentage score can be subdivided as 
detailed below:
Total
actions
Key
actions
Completely
achieved
Partially
achieved
Completely
achieved
Partially
achieved
Total
percentage
score
Stage one 
Stage two 
Stage three 
Post incident
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5.2.2 Participant Variables
The participants in the validation testing were all public health professionals. For each 
participant three details were collected:
• Number of chemical incidents that the participant had been involved in managing;
• Number of CIRS training days (or equivalent) attended; and
• Occupational title.
The subdivision of the total group of 79 participants is described in Section 4.3.4 in 
Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. This information was used to categorise the participants as:
• Experienced and trained;
• Experienced only;
• Trained only; and
• Inexperienced and untrained
The number of participants in each group is shown in Table 4.8 in Section 4.3.4. The 
table also shows how many participants in each group used the manual in the exercise. 
The majority of the 39 participants using the manual also received introductory training 
on the content and use of the manual, only nine participants did not receive this training.
5.3 Methodology for Statistical Analysis of the Validation 
Testing Data
5.3.1 Aims of the Statistical Analysis
The aim of the statistical analysis of the results from the validation testing was to 
identify if any of the following variables had a significant influence on the performance 
of the participants in the incident exercise:
• Use of manual;
• Previous experience in managing chemical incidents;
• Previous training on management of chemical incidents; and
• Occupational status.
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5.3.2 Definition of Variables
Two dependent variables were used in the analysis; labels used are specified in brackets:
• Overall score for ‘total’ actions (over_tot); and
• Overall score for ‘key’ actions (over_key).
The more tests conducted, the greater the probability that an untrue significance will be 
encountered. In order to avoid this inherent problem in multiple testing, only the overall 
‘total’ and ‘key’ scores were used. The separate scores for the individual stages of the 
incident were not separately analysed and no distinction was made between partially and 
completely achieved actions. The overall score was the combined total of partially and 
completely achieved actions.
The four independent variables were defined as detailed in Table 5.1, which also 
specifies the number of participants falling under each definition.
Table 5.1: Independent Variables Used in Statistical Analysis
Independent
variable
Definition Label Number of 
participants
Manual Use of manual manual_l 39
No manual manual_0 40
Experienced Experienced -  involved in managing at least 
one chemical incident
experien_l 35
Inexperienced -  no previous involvement in 
managing chemical incidents
experien_0 44
Trained Trained -  attended at least one chemical 
incident training day.
trained_l 39
Untrained -  not attended any chemical 
incident training days.
trained_0 40
Occupation Consultant -  CCDC, CPHM, DPH, senior 
lecturer
consultant 25
Medic -  SpR, SHO, clinical lecturer, 
medical officer
med 35
Nurse -  public health nurse nurse 12
Other -  non medical public health roles other 7
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CCDC = Consultant in Communicable Disease Control 
CPHM = Consultant in Public Health Medicine 
DPH = Director of Public Health 
SpR = Specialist Registrar 
SHO = Senior House Officer
5.3.3 Selection of Statistical Methods
Consultation on the selection and use of statistical methods and output interpretation was 
obtained from Professor Paul Hunter, Professor of Health Protection, School of 
Medicine, Health Policy and Practice, University of East Anglia. The software package 
used to analyse the data was SPSS for Windows® (Release 10.0.7, 1/6/2000). Two types 
of analysis were used to assess the significance of the four independent variables, 
univariable and multivariable analysis.
The aim of the univariable analysis was to assess the independent variables in isolation 
to identify if any of them had a significant effect on the overall ‘total’ and ‘key’ scores 
for the exercise. A p value of 0.05 was used to establish significance. The t-test was 
used to determine if  there was a significant difference in the mean performance scores 
between different groups of participants. The unpaired t-test was conducted on the 
manual, experience and training variables, which are binary. The hypothesis that each 
group had equal variance was tested by the F-test. The results for a two-sided test were 
used due to the possibility that any o f the variables could cause an increase or decrease 
in the performance score. For the occupation variable, one-way analysis of variance was 
used to assess the effect on overall ‘total’ and ‘key’ scores. This variable is divided into 
four categories; therefore the t-test cannot be used.
Multivariable analysis was then conducted using the generalised linear model. The 
model was run initially with all four independent variables. If  any variable gave a p 
value >0.2, the least significant variable was removed and the model re-run. This step 
was then repeated until all variables in the model gave a p value of <0.2.
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5.4 Resuits from the Vaiidation Testing of the Manuai
5.4.1 Comparison of Mean Percentage Scores
The scores shown are all calculated from the mean average across the specified group of 
participants and are given as percentages. The complete set of scores achieved for each 
participant can be found in the tables in Appendix 12. Tables 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 
show the mean percentage scores calculated for the following groups of participants:
• those without a manual;
• those with a manual who received introductory training on its use;
• those with a manual who did not receive any introductory training; and
• all those with a manual, irrespective of whether they received training.
Mean percentage scores are shown for each stage of the incident exercise and also the 
combined total score for the complete exercise. The mean scores are given for the 
‘total’ actions and the ‘key’ actions (i.e. the most important actions). In addition, the 
percentage of actions completely and partially achieved are provided with a combined 
total.
Tables 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 show the mean percentage scores for each o f the groups 
of participants as specified by level of training and experience. For this section, 
‘experienced’ is defined as those who have been involved in the management of five or 
more chemical incidents and ‘trained’ as those who have attended at least one CIRS 
training day (or equivalent). Table 5.2 illustrates the mean scores for the total group, 
Table 5.3 for those with experience and training (group A), Table 5.4 for those with 
experience but no formal training (group B), Table 5.5 for those with training but limited 
experience (group C), and Table 5.6 for those who are inexperienced and untrained 
(group D). It should be noted that group B, those with experience but no formal 
training, only consisted of three participants and there were no participants with 
experience but no training who received the manual without the introductory training on 
its use.
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Table 5.2: Mean Percentage Scores for All Participants (n=79)
Manual
Exercise
Stage
% Actions achieved
Comp
achi
Total
tletely
eved
Key
Part
achi
Total
ially
eved
Key
Comi
toi
Total
bined
fal
Key
No manual 
(n=40)
Total 26.7 31.0 12.5 14.8 39.2 45.8
Stage 1 21.5 23.3 20.0 23.1 41.5 46.3
Stage 2 23.0 28.8 10.4 14.3 33.5 43.2
Stage 3 35.7 43.4 3.8 0.5 39.4 43.9
Post incident 47.1 68.3 0.4 0.0 47.5 68.3
Manual and 
training 
(n=30)
Total 33.6 39.2 11.3 13.5 44.9 52.7
Stage 1 26.5 30.0 18.8 22.2 45.3 52.2
Stage 2 29.8 39.3 8.8 12.0 38.6 51.3
Stage 3 43.5 49.7 3.1 0.0 46.7 49.7
Post incident 60.5 78.9 0.0 0.0 60.5 78.9
Manual
(n=9)
Total 34.8 38.1 13.2 16.6 48.1 54.7
Stage 1 27.7 29.1 21.4 25.2 49.1 54.3
Stage 2 31.2 39.6 11.7 16.9 42.8 56.5
Stage 3 51.2 49.5 2.5 0.0 53.7 49.5
Post incident 53.0 63.0 0.0 0.0 53.0 63.0
Combined
manual
(n=39)
Total 33.9 38.9 11.8 14.2 45.6 53.2
Stage 1 26.8 29.8 19.4 22.9 46.2 52.7
Stage 2 30.1 39.4 9.4 13.2 39.6 52.5
Stage 3 45.3 49.7 3.0 0.0 48.3 49.7
Post incident 58.8 75.2 0.0 0.0 58.8 75.2
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Table 5.3: Mean Percentage Scores for Participants with Experience and Training -
Group A (n=12)
Manual
Exercise
Stage
% Actions achieved
Comp
achi
Total
letely
eved
Key
Part
achi
Total
ially
eved
Key
Coml
tot
Total
nned
al
Key
No manual 
(n=6)
Total 26.3 29.4 12.3 14.8 38.5 44.2
Stage 1 20.8 23.7 19.8 23.1 40.6 46.8
Stage 2 22.0 23.2 10.6 14.5 32.5 37.7
Stage 3 38.9 47.0 2.8 0.0 41.7 47.0
Post incident 44.9 61.1 0.0 0.0 44.9 61.1
Manual and 
training 
(n=3)
Total 39.7 41.3 12.3 14.3 52.0 55.6
Stage 1 33.3 32.1 20.1 24.4 53.5 56.4
Stage 2 38.2 46.4 8.9 11.6 47.2 58.0
Stage 3 40.7 39.4 5.6 0.0 46.3 39.4
Post incident 69.2 88.9 0.0 0.0 69.2 88.9
Manual
(n=3)
Total 33.6 36.0 15.2 20.6 48.8 56.6
Stage 1 23.9 25.6 23.3 32.1 47.2 57.7
Stage 2 30.1 34.8 14.6 20.3 44.7 55.1
Stage 3 51.9 51.5 3.7 0.0 55.6 51.5
Post incident 59.0 77.8 0.0 0.0 59.0 77.8
Combined
manual
(n=6)
Total 36.7 38.6 13.7 17.5 50.4 56.1
Stage 1 28.6 28.8 21.7 28.2 50.3 57.1
Stage 2 34.1 40.6 11.8 15.9 45.9 56.5
Stage 3 46.3 45.5 4.6 0.0 50.9 45.5
Post incident 64.1 83.3 0.0 0.0 64.1 83.3
Table 5.4: Mean Percentage Scores for Participants with Experience (But No Training) 
— Group B (n=3)
M anual
Exercise
Stage
% Actions achieved
Comp
achi
Total
letely
eved
Key
Part
achi
Total
ially
eved
Key
Coml
toi
Total
bined
fal
Key
No manual 
(n=2)
Total 22.0 27.0 15.2 20.6 37.2 '47.6
Stage 1 19.8 21.2 22.6 28.8 42.5 50.0
Stage 2 14.6 19.6 14.6 23.9 29.3 43.5
Stage 3 33.3 45.5 5.6 0.0 38.9 45.5
Post incident 38.5 66.7 0.0 0.0 38.5 66.7
Manual and 
training 
(n=l)
Total 36.8 47.6 12.0 14.3 48.8 61.9
Stage 1 28.3 34.6 24.5 26.9 52.8 61.5
Stage 2 34.1 47.8 4.9 8.7 39.0 56.5
Stage 3 55.6 72.7 0.0 0.0 55.6 72.7
Post incident 53.8 66.7 0.0 0.0 53.8 66.7
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Table 5.5: Mean Percentage Scores for Participants with Training (But Limited
Experience) -  Group C (n=28)
M anual
Exercise
Stage
% Actions achieved
Comp
achi
Total
detely
eved
Key
Part
achi
Total
ially
eved
Key
Coml
toi
Total
bined
fal
Key
No manual 
(n=15)
Total 29.5 34.7 12.7 13.4 42.3 48.1
Stage 1 24.9 27.9 21.1 21.0 46.0 49.0
Stage 2 27.2 33.3 9.8 13.0 36.9 46.4
Stage 3 35.9 44.8 3.7 0.0 39.6 44.8
Post incident 47.2 66.7 0.5 0.0 47.7 66.7
Manual and 
training 
(n=10)
Total 36.2 40.6 11.6 13.7 47.8 54.3
Stage 1 27.5 30.8 20.0 23.5 47.5 54.2
Stage 2 35.6 43.0 8.0 10.9 43.7 53.9
Stage 3 43.3 49.1 3.3 0.0 46.7 49.1
Post incident 63.8 76.7 0.0 0.0 63.8 76.7
Manual
(n=3)
Total 40.0 42.9 13.9 16.4 53.9 59.3
Stage 1 28.9 26.9 23.3 25.6 52.2 52.6
Stage 2 37.4 49.3 10.6 15.9 48.0 65.2
Stage 3 64.8 63.6 3.7 0.0 68.5 63.6
Post incident 59.0 55.6 0.0 0.0 59.0 55.6
Combined
manual
(n=13)
Total 37.1 41.1 12.1 14.3 49.2 55.4
Stage 1 27.9 29.9 20.8 24.0 48.6 53.8
Stage 2 36.0 44.5 8.6 12.0 44.7 56.5
Stage 3 48.3 52.4 3.4 0.0 51.7 52.4
Post incident 62.7 71.8 0.0 0.0 62.7 71.8
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Table 5.6: Mean Percentage Scores for Inexperienced and Untrained Participants -
Group D (n=36)
Manual
Exercise
Stage
% Actions achieved
Comp
achi
Total
letely
eved
Key
Part
achi
Total
ially
eved
Key
Coml
toi
Total
bined
fal
Key
No manual 
(n=17)
Total 24.9 28.7 12.0 15.4 36.9 44.1
Stage 1 18.9 19.2 18.9 24.2 37.7 43.4
Stage 2 20.8 27.9 10.5 14.3 31.3 42.2
Stage 3 34.6 40.6 3.9 1.1 38.6 41.7
Post incident 48.9 72.5 0.5 0.0 49.3 72.5
Manual and 
training 
(n=16)
Total 30.6 37.3 10.9 13.3 41.5 50.6
Stage 1 24.5 28.8 17.5 20.7 42.0 49.5
Stage 2 24.4 35.1 9.5 13.0 33.8 48.1
Stage 3 43.4 50.6 2.8 0.0 46.2 50.6
Post incident 57.2 79.2 0.0 0.0 57.2 79.2
Manual
(n=3)
Total 30.9 35.4 10.7 12.7 41.6 48.1
Stage 1 30.2 34.6 17.6 17.9 47.8 52.6
Stage 2 26.0 34.8 9.8 14.5 35.8 49.3
Stage 3 37.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 37.0 33.3
Post incident 41.0 55.6 0.0 0.0 41.0 55.6
Combined
manual
(n=19)
Total 30.7 37.0 10.9 13.2 41.5 50.2
Stage 1 25.4 29.8 17.5 20.2 42.9 50.0
Stage 2 24.6 35.0 9.5 13.3 34.1 48.3
Stage 3 42.4 47.8 2.3 0.0 44.7 47.8
Post incident 54.7 75.4 0.0 0.0 54.7 75.4
The above results are summarised further in Table 5.7, which illustrates mean 
percentage ‘total’ and ‘key’ scores for those with and without the manual for the 
experience and training groups A, C and D and the total group. The mean scores for 
group B have not been shown in this table due to the fact that this group only consisted 
of three individuals. The scores for those with the manual have not been subdivided to 
show those with and without the introductory training on the manual, as only nine of the 
39 participants with the manual did not receive the training.
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From the individual scores for each participant it can be calculated that the total mean 
percentage scores for the whole exercise across the entire group of 79 participants are:
• ‘total’ actions = 42.4%
• ‘key’ actions = 49.4%
From Table 5.7 it can be seen that:
• Within each exercise stage and experience/training group, the mean percentage score 
for those with the manual is greater than it is for those without a manual for both 
‘total’ actions and ‘key’ actions (with the exception of the ‘key’ actions score for the 
experienced and trained group in stage 3 of the exercise).
• Within each experience/training group, and looking separately at those with and
without the manual, the mean percentage score for ‘key’ actions is higher than the
mean percentage score for ‘total’ actions for all stages of the exercise (with the 
exceptions of those with a manual in the experienced and trained group in stage 3 of 
the exercise and those with a manual in the trained group in stage 3 of the exercise).
These trends can also be seen in Figure 5.1, which illustrates the mean percentage scores 
for those with and without a manual. The ‘total’ actions and ‘key’ actions for each stage 
of the exercise and for the total exercise are given, and the division between actions that 
are completely and partially achieved can also be observed.
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From Table 5.7, there do not seem to be any clear trends between the three groups of 
experience/training. Scores are generally, but not exclusively lower for those in the 
inexperienced and untrained group than both the experienced and trained and the trained 
only groups. Comparisons of scores between the experienced and trained and the 
trained only groups do not seem to show any consistent differences. Figure 5.2 shows 
the mean percentage scores for the ‘total’ actions and ‘key’ actions for the exercise as a 
whole for each of the experience/training groups. Scores for participants with and 
without use of the manual are combined to show the effect of training and experience 
irrespective of the effect of using the manual. Figure 5.3 shows the same results but 
with the scores separated for those with and without use of the manual.
Figure 5.2: Mean Percentage Scores for Different Experience/Training Groups
60.0 ,--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50.0 5  . .--------------   = 3
"Oa>
© 40.0
D - No training or 
experience
C - Trained onlyA - Experienced and 
Trained
Total group
g  Completely achieved  □ Partially achieved
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The summary graphs in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show that the scores for the inexperienced 
and untrained group are lower than both the experienced and trained group and the 
trained only group. Comparison of scores between the experienced and trained and the 
trained only groups seem to show slightly lower ‘key’ and ‘total’ scores for the 
experienced and trained group when the scores of those with and without the manual are 
combined. However, looking at the separated scores, for those without the manual, both 
the ‘key’ and ‘total’ scores of those with training only are higher than for the 
experienced and trained group, but for those with the manual, there is the opposite 
effect.
From comparison of scores between participants with and without use of the manual for 
the exercise as a whole, the percentage improvement in ‘total’ and ‘key’ scores can be 
calculated for the total group and each of the training and experience groups, as shown 
in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8: Percentage Improvement in ‘Total’ and ‘Key’ Scores for Those Using the 
Manual
Experience/training group Total/key
actions
Improvement in score 
when using the manual
Total Total 16%
(n=79) Key 16%
Experienced and trained Total 31%
(n=12) Key 27%
Trained only Total 16%
(n=28) Key 15%
Inexperienced and untrained Total 12%
(n=36) Key 14%
For the total group, the percentage improvement in both ‘total’ and ‘key’ scores is 16%. 
The percentage improvement in score is greatest for the experienced and trained group, 
with a 31% increase in ‘total’ score and a 27% increase in ‘key’ score. The percentage 
improvement in scores for the trained group are lower at 16% for ‘total’ score and 15% 
for ‘key’ score and for the inexperienced and untrained group are even lower at 12% for 
‘total’ score and 14% for ‘key’ score.
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5.4.2 Statistical Analysis of the Significance of the Difference Between 
Mean Scores
As described in Section 5.3, the data collected from the incident exercise was assessed 
using univariable and multivariable analysis. Analysis was conducted for the overall 
scores for ‘total’ actions and ‘key’ actions and the significance of each of the four 
independent variables, use of manual, experience, training and occupational status was 
assessed. The detailed SPSS data output can be found in Appendix 13.
Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 show the results of the unpaired t test assuming equal 
variances, for ‘total’ score and ‘key’ score for the three binary independent variables, 
use of manual, experience and training. Tables 5.12 and 5.13 show the results o f the 
one-way analysis of variance for occupation.
Table 5.9: t-test for the Independent Variable, Manual
Param eter Total actions Key actions
Mean score with manual 45.6 53.2
Mean score without manual 39.2 45.8
Difference in means +6.4 +7.4
95% confidence interval for 
difference between means +2.8 to +10.1 +3.4 to +11.3
degrees of freedom 77 77
t 3.52 3.68
two sided p 0.0007 0.0004
Table 5.10: t-test for the Independent Variable, Experience
Param eter Total actions Key actions
Mean score with experience 44.5 51.6
Mean score without experience 40.7 47.7
Difference in means +3.8 +3.9
95% confidence interval for 
difference between means 0 to +7.7 -0.3 to +8.2
degrees of freedom 77 77
t 1.97 1.83
two sided p 0.0525 0.0709
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Table 5.11: t-test for the Independent Variable, Training
Parameter Total actions Key actions
Mean score with training 45.2 51.1
Mean score without training 39.5 47.7
Difference in means +5.7 +3.4
95% confidence interval for 
difference between means +2.0 to +9.4
■ p be o +
degrees of freedom 77 77
t 3.07 1.60
two sided p 0.0029 0.1145
Table 5.12: One-Way Analysis o f Variance for the Independent Variable, Occupation— 
‘Total ’ Score
F (variance 
ratio) for 
occupation
p for 
occupation
Type of 
occupation
Mean total 
score
95% confidence interval
Consultant 44.8 41.1 to 48.5
1.78 0.1587 Medic 43.3 39.9 to 46.7Nurse 40.0 35.3 to 44.8
Other 38.6 32.8 to 44.5
Table 5.13: One-Way Analysis o f Variance for the Independent Variable, Occupation — 
‘Key ’ Score
F (variance 
ratio) for 
occupation
p for 
occupation
Type of 
occupation
Mean key 
score
95% confidence interval
Consultant 49.0 45.3 to 52.7
0.76 0.5192 Medic 51.8 48.6 to 55.0Nurse 46.5 41.4 to 51.5
Other 47.6 40.9 to 54.3
In summary, the results of the univariable analysis show:
• The manual is a significant factor in affecting the ‘total’ score and ‘key’ score, with 
p values o f 0.0007 and 0.0004 respectively. The improvement in mean ‘total’ score 
for those with the manual is 6.4 percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval of 
2.8 to 10.1. The improvement in mean ‘key’ score for those with the manual is 7.4 
percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval of 3.4 to 11.3.
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• Experience shows some significance in affecting the ‘total’ score, wifn p=0.0525, 
but this is not very strong (i.e. statistical significance at p=0.050 has not been 
achieved) and the effect on ‘key’ score is not shown to be significant (p=0.0709).
• The effect of training on ‘total’ score is shown to be significant with p=0.0029 but 
no effect is shown on ‘key’ score (p=0.1145). The improvement in mean ‘total’ 
score for those with training is 5.7 percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval 
of 2.0 to 9.4.
• The occupational status of the participant does not appear to have a significant effect 
on ‘total’ or ‘key’ scores (p=0.1587 and p=0.5192, respectively).
Table 5.14 shows the results of the generalised linear model for the overall ‘total’ score.
The results of the final model are shown, variables with p>0.2 in the initial analyses
were eliminated.
Table 5.14: Results o f Tests o f Between-Subject Effects Using the Generalised Linear
Model for ‘Total ’ Score — Final Model
Parameter Regression
coefficient
Significance 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Intercept 49.8 0.000 46.4 53.1
Manual 6.7 0.000 3.3 10.1
Experienced 2.5 0.168 -1.1 6.1
Trained 5.3 0.004 1.8 8.8
Table 5.15 shows the results of the generalised linear model for the overall ‘key’ score. 
The results of the final model are shown, variables with p>0.2 in the initial analyses 
were eliminated.
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Table 5.15: Results o f Tests o f Between-Subject Effects Using the Generalised Linear 
Model for ‘Key ’ Score — Final Model
Parameter Regression
coefficient
Significance 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Intercept 56.4 0.000 52.6 60.3
Manual 7.5 0.000 3.6 11.4
Experience 3.3 0.114 -0.8 7.3
Trained 2.8 0.168 -1.2 6.9
In summary, the results of the multivariable analysis show:
• For ‘total’ score, use of the manual has the most significant effect (p=0.000);
• For ‘total’ score, training also has a significant effect (p=0.004);
• Experience is not shown to have a significant effect on ‘total’ score.
• For ‘key’ score, use of the manual again has the most significant effect (p=0.000);
• Neither experience nor training has been shown to affect the ‘key’ score.
5.4.3 Aspects of Chemical Incident Management Achieved by the Majority 
of Participants
Analysis was conducted over the total group of participants to identify which aspects of 
the response to the incident exercise were particularly well achieved, various aspects 
were identified as being achieved by at least 75% of the participants in the relevant 
stages.
Stage 1 - first few hours
• Estimations of the population actually and potentially exposed.
• Identification of all environmental media affected.
• Determination of current weather conditions.
• Consideration of direction of movement of the contaminant.
• Alerting relevant health organisations.
• Alerting emergency services.
• Alerting local authority environmental health department.
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Stage 2 - within 24 hours
• Confirmation of number of people actually or potentially exposed.
• Confirmation of pathway/route of exposure between source of contamination and
human receptors.
• Confirmation of contaminant concentrations in the relevant media and attainment of 
most up-to-date analytical results.
• Provision of press releases to alert the public and reassure those not affected.
Stage 3 -  remainder of management
• Confirmation of population within current area of contamination.
• Ensuring all people with health effects have been identified through the various
agencies.
• Confirmation of contaminant concentrations in relevant environmental media.
• Requesting any necessary repeat sampling and analysis to confirm results or detect 
changes in concentration.
• Provision of press releases with follow-up information on how the incident is being 
managed.
Post incident
• Writing a summary of the incident.
• Identifying the lessons learnt from the management of the incident.
• Recognition of possible long-term health effects in those exposed.
• Ensuring preventative action is taken to avoid any further problems at the particular 
site.
5.4.4 Aspects of Chemical Incident Management Not Achieved by the 
Majority of Participants
Analysis was conducted over the total group of participants to identify which aspects of
the response to the incident exercise were particularly poorly achieved, various aspects
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were identified as not being achieved by at least 75% of the participants in the relevant
stages.
Stage 1 - first few hours
• Identification of taste/odour and visual properties of the chemicals involved.
• Identification of any synergistic or antagonistic effects of multiple chemicals.
• Contact with the manager at the incident site with regard to the chemicals used and 
those likely to be involved in the incident -  some participants identified this at stages 
2 and 3.
• Identification of the type of contaminant source.
• Ensuring that symptoms are consistent with the toxicology of the chemical involved 
-  several participants identified this in stage 3.
• Recognition of whether the incident had been declared a ‘major incident’ by any of 
the agencies involved.
• Assessment of whether the severity of the incident is likely to escalate.
• Use of health authority (HA) emergency plan.
• Alerting other relevant department of the local authority, e.g. emergency planning.
• Ensuring an incident room is available for incident control team meetings -  some 
participants identified this at stage 2.
• Ensure contact numbers for the team are provided to operational staff not in the 
incident room.
• Scheduling of incident control team meetings.
• Documentation of incident details -  some participants identified this at the post 
incident stage.
• Recording of contact names and numbers of organisations involved -  a few 
participants identified this at the post incident stage.
• Logging calls and actions/decision taken -  several participants identified this at the 
post incident stage.
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Stage 2 - within 24 hours
• Identification of other chemicals used in the process involved in the incident.
• Confirmation of location of the incident.
• Use of a map or geographical information system to map reports of health effects.
• Determining a specific case definition -  a few participants identified this at stage 3
• Confirmation of the amount o f contaminant released.
• Considering the use of modelling to predict direction of movement of the 
contaminant and possible areas at risk.
• Determining availability of any routine environmental sampling results, e.g. 
regulatory drinking water analysis.
• Ensuring an appropriate analytical laboratory is identified for environmental samples 
and that samples are collected, stored and analysed appropriately with adequate 
quality control procedures.
• Confirmation of current incident status.
• Continued assessment of whether the severity of the incident is likely to escalate.
• Determination of criteria for incident closure -  several participants identified this at 
stage 3.
• Alerting relevant occupational health professionals.
• Alerting environmental specialists for clean-up and remediation.
• Confirmation that vulnerable populations had been identified and alerted -  a few 
participants identified this at stage 3.
• Recording incident details.
• Keeping a current list of contact numbers for organisations involved.
• Keeping logs of calls and actions/decisions taken.
• Recording minutes and agreed actions of incident control meetings -  several 
participants identified this at the post incident stage.
• Recording details of actions taken by other organisations.
• Recording details of health effects and exposure.
• Obtaining names and addresses of the exposed population.
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Stage 3 -  remainder of management
• Establishing methods for interpreting environmental analytical data, identifying 
relevant standards for comparison.
• Assessment of progress towards specified criteria for incident closure.
• Ensuring that all the organisations involved in the management and the public have 
been informed when the incident is over.
• Keeping patient records and contact details -  some participants identified this at the 
post incident stage.
• Compiling a register of the exposed population, public and emergency responders.
Post incident
• Consideration of the possibility of tagging patient notes of those exposed to identify
any future health problems that may be related to the exposure.
• Identification of specific actions to be taken as a result of the incident to prevent
future incidents and improved response, with a named person responsible for 
completion.
5.4.5 Actions Completed Outside the Specified Incident Stage
Some of the participants completed actions in stages earlier that those in which they
were specified. In this case they were carried forward and included in the score for the
relevant stage of the response. The actions that were completed early by quite a few of
the participants included:
• Provision of press releases to alert the public and reassure those not affected.
• Considering conducting biological monitoring of patients and the exposed 
population to identify level of exposure and adverse health effects.
• Estimation of the time period of exposure, differentiating between various 
populations if exposed for different time periods.
• Agreement of financing and establishing timescales for reporting of results where 
additional samples have been requested.
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® Considering distributing a health questionnaire to identify level of exposure and 
adverse health effects.
• Ensuring continued treatment of casualties with long-term health effects.
• Where remediation is not possible and a significant risk to health remains, 
considering permanent re-housing of people in the area affected.
• Considering the necessity for long term monitoring of the affected 
environment/media if  remediation is not possible.
• Considering conducting a follow-up epidemiological study (monitoring of relevant 
health data).
• Ensuring remediation at site of contamination is complete and meets required 
standards.
• Identifying preventative action to avoid the occurrence of similar incidents.
• Writing up a summary of the incident.
• Identifying and documenting the lessons learned regarding management of the 
incident.
Some of the participants completed actions in stages after the one in which they were
specified. Completion of actions later than required was not included in the score.
However, in Section 5.4.4 for those aspects that were badly achieved, indication has
been given if these particular aspects were identified at a later stage in the incident.
In addition to those actions highlighted in Section 5.4.4, the following actions were also
completed late by quite a few of the participants:
• Identification of physical and chemical properties o f the chemical involved.
• Finding out if any health effects have been reported to any agency.
• Alerting local authority environmental health department.
• Alerting local water companies, both water supply and sewage, where relevant.
• Alerting relevant enforcement agencies, e.g. Health and Safety Executive or
Environment Agency.
• Considering forming an incident control team.
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® Ensuring necessary facilities are available in the incident room, e.g. telephones, 
administrative support.
• Identifying vulnerable populations within current or potential area of exposure.
• Conducting a toxicological evaluation of exposure data to determine possible and 
most likely impacts on health.
• Confirming that alternative water supplies have been provided where regular 
supplies cannot be used.
• Considering conducting biological monitoring of patients and the exposed 
population to identify level of exposure and adverse health effects.
• Confirming action has been taken to remove and dispose of the chemical(s), or to 
remove the exposure pathway.
5.4.6 Additional Actions Completed to Those Specified in the Evaluation 
Method
A few additional actions were identified from the exercise responses that had not been
specifically included in the evaluation method for the exercise, these are specified
below:
• Alerting the HA press officer.
• Alerting the HA Director of Public Health and Chief Executive.
• Alerting the Health Emergency Planning Advisor (HEPA).
• Alerting the Regional Epidemiologist (RE).
• Contacting veterinary surgeons in the local area.
• Preventing access to the incident area.
• Stopping production of potentially contaminated soft drinks and recalling any 
contaminated product.
• Obtaining maps of the water supply network and private water supplies.
• Conducting a site visit.
• Holding a public meeting.
• Compiling a report on media and communications handling during the incident.
• Assessing training needs of public health professionals as a result of the incident.
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• Identifying other sites where similar industrial operations take place.
• Identifying sites where use of plastic pipes may be problematic.
5.5 Conclusions
Validation testing of the guidance manual was conducted in order to assess its 
effectiveness in improving the public health response to chemical incidents. The mean 
percentage scores illustrate an improvement in scores for those participants using the 
manual. Statistical analysis also confirms the significance of the manual in improving 
response. Statistical analysis also illustrated that previous training in chemical incident 
management improved the ‘total’ score of participants. However, it was not shown to 
improve ‘key’ scores. Experience in managing chemical incidents was not demonstrated 
to result in an improvement in response. The aspects of chemical incident management 
that were well and poorly achieved have also been identified.
In the following chapter an interpretation of the results is provided, the validity of the 
testing methodology is discussed, and the implications for further testing and 
development of the manual are identified.
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6 Interpretation and Discussion of the Results from 
Validation Testing of the Chemical Incident 
Management Guidance Manual
6.1 Introduction
The aim o f the validation testing was to evaluate the effectiveness o f the chemical 
incident management guidance manual in improving the public health response to 
chemical incidents. A group of 79 public health professionals from six National Health 
Service Executive (NHSE) Regions provided written responses to a chemical incident 
exercise. These responses were evaluated to derive a performance score for each 
participant. Performance scores were then compared between those with and without 
the guidance manual and comparisons were also made between participants with and 
without previous experience and training in chemical incident management.
The null hypothesis to be tested, as stated in Section 5.1, was therefore:
• There is no difference in the performance of public health professionals with and 
without the use of guidance manual in managing a chemical incident.
The additional questions to investigate were:
• Is the use of the guidance manual of greater benefit to public health professionals 
with no previous experience and training in chemical incidents compared to those 
with previous experience and/or training?
• Irrespective of the use of the guidance manual, do public health professionals with 
experience and/or training in chemical management achieve a higher level of 
performance than those without?
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The following sections provide discussion on:
• Interpretation of the results from the validation testing;
• Specific areas of the best practice model that were well or poorly achieved;
• Qualitative comments from participants on the testing process and the manual;
• Reliability of the validation testing methodology; and
• Implications of the testing results on the further development and use of the 
guidance manual.
6.2 Interpretation of the Results from the Validation Testing of 
the Guidance Manual
6.2.1 Comparison of Mean Percentage Scores
The overall mean percentage score for the total group for the exercise as a whole was 
found to be 42% for ‘total’ actions and 49% for ‘key’ actions. These results are 
disappointingly low and provide further evidence that public health professionals who 
are required to manage the health aspects of chemical incidents may not have the 
experience and training to respond effectively. Not only does this result indicate that 
more efforts are required in order to ensure that relevant training is made available to 
public health professionals, but it also supports the need for Chemical Incident Regional 
Service Provider Units (RSPUs). RSPUs can provide the specialised information and 
expertise, with respect to responding to chemical incidents, in their advice to health 
authorities (HAs), and can assist in ensuring that incidents are managed effectively. In 
general, there was greater achievement of the ‘key’ actions (those with highest priority 
for completion) than ‘total’ actions. The participants seemed to be able to identify and 
complete these most important actions more successfully than those of lower 
importance.
Comparisons of scores for participants with and without use of the chemical incident 
management guidance manual show an improvement in the mean percentage score for 
those with the manual for both ‘total’ and ‘key’ actions and across all stages of the
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incident exercise. Improvement in performance by using the manual was also 
demonstrated across the different groups of experience and training. The manual has 
therefore been shown to consistently improve the scores in the incident exercise for the 
participants included in the testing process. The percentage improvement in score for 
those using the manual was found to be 16% for both ‘total’ and ‘key’ actions for the 
incident exercise as a whole. The percentage improvement in score varied between the 
experience and training groups, with the experienced and trained group having the 
greatest improvement, 31% for ‘total’ score and 27% for ‘key’ score. The trained only 
group showed an improvement of 16% for ‘total’ score and 15% for ‘key’ score, and the 
inexperienced and untrained group a 12% improvement for ‘total’ score and 14% 
improvement for ‘key’ score. This is contrary to the hypothesis that ‘the use of the 
guidance manual will be of greater benefit to those with no previous experience and 
training in chemical incidents’. In retrospect, it would seem more logical that those 
participants who already have a framework in which to set the manual would find it 
easier to apply it to a particular exercise. With no previous experience or training in 
chemical incidents, it may be difficult to know how to use the information provided in 
the manual.
The effect of training and experience on actual performance scores was more difficult to 
assess. Those with no training and little or no experience definitely had lower scores in 
general, compared to those with training and/or experience. This confirms the value of 
gaining specific expertise in chemical incident management in order to improve 
response to incidents. The effect of training versus experience was not clear from the 
mean percentage scores, there seemed to be some indication that those with training but 
no experience actually scored better than those who had experience in addition to 
training. Only three of the participants had experience in managing chemical incidents 
but no training. The lack of clarity on the effect of experience on the individual scores 
seems to be inconsistent compared with the finding that a greater percentage 
improvement in score when using the manual was achieved by those with experience 
and training, as compared to those with training only. From Figure 5.3 in Chapter 5, it 
can be seen that part of the greater percentage improvement in score by the experienced
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and trained groups is brought about by a higher performance by those with the manual 
compared to the trained only group. In addition, those with experience and training 
without the manual had lower scores that the trained only group. As discussed later in 
Section 6.4.2, the sample sizes used in determining the percentage improvements were 
not very large. Further discussion on the effect of training and experience on 
performance can be found in the next section.
6.2.2 Statistical Analysis of the Significance of the Difference Between 
Mean Scores
The univariable analysis, using t-tests and analysis of variance, and the multivariable 
analysis, using the generalised linear model, again showed that the use of the manual 
resulted in an improved performance, for both ‘total’ and ‘key’ actions. The p values 
from the two-sided t-test for the effect of the manual were 0.0007 for ‘total’ score and 
0.0004 for ‘key’ score. The improvement in mean ‘total’ score for those with the 
manual was 6.4 percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval of 2.8 to 10.1. The 
improvement in mean ‘key’ score for those with the manual was 7.4 percentage points, 
with a 95% confidence interval of 3.4 to 11.3. The generalised linear model showed the 
p value for the manual to be 0.000 for ‘total’ and ‘key’ scores. The statistical analysis 
therefore confirms the importance of the manual in improving the performance of the 
participants in the incident exercise, thereby disproving the null hypothesis that there 
would be no difference in performance for those with and without the manual.
The t-test did not show that experience had a significant effect on performance. 
However, training was shown to be a significant factor with a p value of 0.0029 for 
‘total’ score, but had no significant effect on ‘key’ score. For ‘totd’ score, the effect of 
training was an improvement in mean ‘total’ score of 5.7 percentage points, with a 95% 
confidence interval of 2.0 to 9.4. In the generalised linear model, experience was again 
shown to be insignificant, however, training was shown to be a significant factor in 
improving ‘total’ score (p=0.004) but not for ‘key’ score. For the statistical analysis 
‘experienced’ was defined as anyone who had been involved in at least one chemical 
incident. The knowledge and expertise gained from involvement in only one incident
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would not be expected to have a large effect on the future performance of the individual, 
as the response required would differ significantly depending on the exact nature of the 
incident in question. For the groups used in comparing the mean performance scores, 
‘experienced’ was defined as being involved in five or more incidents, as this was 
intended to ensure participants would have had some breadth of experience. However, 
only 15 of the 79 participants had this level of experience and with this small sample it is 
difficult to show any clear trends. In conclusion, although experience appears not to 
improve the performance of individuals in managing an incident, this is most likely to be 
due to the fact that the majority of public health professionals will only have the 
opportunity to be involved with very few numbers of incidents.
Training was shown to have a positive effect on improving the ‘total’ score of the 
participants. This result could be due to the fact that specific CIRS training on chemical 
incident management would include providing a general framework for managing an 
incident that would not be gained through experience alone. Also, training would 
involve the dissemination of lessons learnt by CIRS through involvement in hundreds of 
incidents a year, i.e. a much larger information base than could be achieved by an 
individual public health professional.
A possible reason for why training is only shown to improve ‘total’ score and not ‘key’ 
score could be that ‘key’ actions are more obvious and could be identified using general 
common sense and do not require specific training. However, in order to be able to 
cover all the issues involved in the management of a chemical incident, the benefit of 
training to identify the less obvious issues is more apparent. As identified earlier, the 
‘key’ scores were found to be higher than the ‘total’ scores, which seems to reinforce the 
hypothesis that these actions are more obvious, even to the untrained. Another possible 
reason could be that the training provided does not emphasise the priorities of the 
different aspects of chemical incident management. This could result in those with 
training having an improved overall performance, but not being better at identifying and 
completing the high priority actions. Alternatively, by providing training covering all 
possible issues involved in chemical incident management, it may result in participants
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being concerned with ensuring their response is as complete as possible instead of 
making sure they have completed the most important actions first.
In the statistical analysis, the effect of occupational status was also assessed, but was not 
shown to be significant. This would seem to imply that status as consultant, registrar, 
nurse or other occupation is not important, compared to the benefit achieved from using 
the manual or from having training in chemical incident management.
6.2.3 Specific Aspects of Chemical Incident Management
In Section 5.4.3 the aspects of incident management, as specified in the evaluation 
method, that were particularly well achieved were identified. The areas of chemical 
incident response that were achieved by at least 75% of participants were:
• Identifying the population exposed and potentially at risk and those with actual 
health effects;
• Obtaining analytical results with the concentrations of the chemical in relevant 
environmental media and ensuring repeat samples are taken to monitor for any 
changes;
• Determining current weather conditions and assessing likely direction of movement 
of the contaminant;
• Determining the possible pathways/routes of exposure between the source of 
contamination and the population;
• Alerting health organisations, the emergency services and environmental health;
• Provision of press releases to alert and inform the public;
• Recognition of the possible requirement for long-term follow-up of those exposed;
• Ensuring preventative action is taken to avoid future problems from the company 
responsible for releasing the chemical; and
• Writing a post-incident report and identifying lessons learnt from the management of 
the incident.
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In Section 5.4.4 the aspects of incident management, as specified in the evaluation
method, that were particularly badly achieved were identified. The areas of chemical
incident response that were achieved by 25% or less of participants included:
• Identifying the taste/odour and visual properties of the chemical and any possible 
synergistic or antagonistic effects of multiple chemicals;
• Confirming details about the location of the incident and the industry involved and 
contacting someone at the site;
• Confirming the amount of the chemical involved and identifying other possible 
chemicals involved in the incident;
• Use of the health authority emergency plan;
• Alerting other relevant local authority departments;
• Organising an incident room and contact numbers for those in the room, scheduling
of incident meetings, and recording minutes and agreed actions;
• Confirming any particularly vulnerable populations in the area;
• Considering the use of modelling to predict movement of the chemical;
• Requesting results of any routine sampling that may be available, particularly for 
drinking water;
• Ensuring that appropriate laboratories are used for sampling and analysis with 
adequate quality control procedures, and determining methods of interpreting the 
results from analyses;
• Considering the current status of the incident and possible escalation of the problem 
and reassessment of status throughout the incident, specifying criteria for closure and 
assessing progress towards these;
• Documenting any incident, contact, and patient details, logs of calls/actions, etc. 
during the actual incident. Documentation was largely only mentioned at the post­
incident stage; and
• Compilation of registers of the exposed public and responders with contact details.
In Section 5.4.5 actions completed at stages other than those specified by the evaluation
method were identified. Of those that were completed consistently early, the majority
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were post incident actions that had been considered in the last stage o f the management. 
However, this was most likely to be due to the fact that the participants seemed to be 
unaware that they would have a separate opportunity to write down their post incident 
actions. Actions that were consistently completed late were also identified, of particular 
note were:
• Identifying the physical and chemical properties of the contaminant -  it is important 
these are established as soon as possible as they will influence how the chemical 
behaves in the environment and therefore the risk to the population. However, in 
many circumstances details of properties may not be available immediately.
• Conducting a toxicological evaluation of exposure data to determine possible and 
most likely impact on health -  ideally this should also be completed as soon as 
possible, in order to assess the risk to the population. However, toxicological data 
may not be immediately available, particularly if specific chemical details are 
unknown.
• Considering forming an incident control team -  if  appropriate, this should be 
convened as soon as possible to ensure a co-ordinated multi-agency response.
• Confirming action has been taken to remove and dispose of the chemical or exposure 
pathway -  although the actual clean up would not be the responsibility of the health 
authority, this is an essential part of the response in order to ensure that there is no 
continuing exposure of the population.
• Considering conducting biological monitoring -  if biological monitoring is to be 
conducted it is likely that samples will have to be taken as soon as possible after 
exposure, as the chemicals may have a short biological half-life.
Finally, a few additional actions were identified from the responses to the exercise that 
had not been specified in the evaluation method. These were incorporated into the 
revised best practice model and evaluation method, as discussed in Section 7.5.
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6.2.4 Summary
With respect to the original hypotheses, the validation testing has shown that from the 
performance scores derived from those taking part in the testing process:
• The chemical incident management guidance manual developed from the research 
project significantly improves the level of performance of public health professionals 
in responding to a chemical incident.
• The use of the manual is o f greater benefit to those with training and/or experience in 
chemical incident management, compared to those without, contrary to the 
hypothesis.
• Training is a significant factor in improving the level of performance for ‘total’ 
actions, but not for ‘key’ actions. However, experience was not found to be 
significant.
6.3 Comments Received on the Testing Process and 
Guidance Manual
Some comments were received during the exercise and training sessions concerning the 
exercise and the guidance manual. Additional comments were also added to the 
evaluation forms completed for each of the six training sessions. Positive comments 
were received about the exercise scenario and how realistic it was, some minor 
comments were made on missing details within the scenario. Some participants felt it 
was helpful to complete the exercise individually, in order to find out the limits of their 
knowledge and expertise. However, several participants felt that acting alone was 
unrealistic and that group exercises are more beneficial. Participants also commented 
that, in reality, managing an incident would come in addition to conducting routine work 
activities. With regard to the manual itself, general comments were made that the 
manual approach was helpful and the content seemed very useful. It was felt that 
training on how to use the manual was necessary to enable its full benefit to be attained. 
The main problem with the manual was the layout and ‘sign posting’ to different 
resources within the manual. Another general comment was that the manual, covered
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areas of incident management that are not within the responsibilities of the public health 
function.
A comment form was attached to the front of each guidance manual and participants 
were asked to return the completed form when they had had an opportunity to look 
through the manual in more detail and to use it during an actual incident. Unfortunately, 
over the period of several weeks, only 18 comment forms were returned completed. The 
results from the following specific questions asked were:
• Do you find the manual approach useful?
o yes-100%
• How easy did you find it to use the manual? -  on a scale of l(very difficult) to 5 
(very easy)
o 3.75 (75%)
• How easy do the contents page and summary diagrams make it to find the required 
guidance note? -  on a scale of l(very difficult) to 5 (very easy)
o 3.70(74%)
• Did the checklist of actions for chemical incident management provide a useful 
summary of issues and actions? - on a scale of l(not useful) to 5 (very useful)
o 4.40(89%)
Qualitative comments were provided about each aspect of the manual and the manual in 
general these are specified below:
• Briefings:
o informative and comprehensive 
o useful
o clear and easy to follow
o information needs to be ‘localised’ and kept up to date 
o content does not reflect the role of public health doctors, some aspects 
fall within the remit of other agencies
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o more detail required on levels of command and what specifically they 
involve
• Checklists
o useful 
o comprehensive
o content needs to reflect the role of the Consultant in Communicable 
Disease Control (CCDC) 
o format could be improved, need to reduce density of text to make them 
easier to go through quickly 
o need provision to record completed items during an incident
• Flowcharts/diagrams
o clear and easy to use 
o some do not flow very well
• Forms
o very useful
o need more space to complete details 
o some need to be tailored to local needs 
o need to be available electronically
General comments included:
• Manual is a good resource/tool;
• Excellent overview of the issues;
• Practical and useful;
• Detailed and comprehensive;
• Need to provide more instructions on how to use the manual and a detailed contents 
list and better indexing for easier location of relevant material; and
• Could organise manual by topic, rather than type of guidance.
Copies of the manual were also sent to some of the people who took part in the expert 
consultation for the best practice model. A limited number of comments were returned.
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Most of the comments were with respect to the presentation of the manual, rather than 
the specific content, and the need for clearer specification of the purpose of each 
resource and the limits of the public health role. Detailed discussions on the content and 
presentation of the manual were conducted with Dr Kaetrin Camegie-Smith, 
independent consultant in public health medicine and public health advisor to the 
Emergency Planning College.
6.4 Discussion of the Validation Testing Methodology
6.4.1 Sample Selection
The results obtained indicate the performance of a particular group of public health 
professionals in responding to a specific incident exercise. The provision of confidence 
levels enables predictions to be made about the probable range of the improvement in 
score resulting from use of the manual, or previous chemical incident training, that 
would be achieved across the population of public health professionals as a whole. The 
sample of public health professionals used in the testing exercise was biased towards the 
untrained and inexperienced. This could be due to the fact that attendance of the 
exercise and training sessions was considered to be of more value to those with no 
previous training or experience. The total population of public health professionals that 
may be required to cover the management of chemical incidents as part of an on-call rota 
is also likely to largely consist of people who have no or little previous training or 
experience in chemical incidents. The number of chemical incidents handled by each 
health authority is relatively low and CIRS training events are only attended by a 
fraction of the total possible number of public health professionals. Invariably, only 
those who take the HA lead in responding to chemical incidents attend these training 
events.
The sample group was self-selected; the exercise and training sessions were advertised 
to all public health staff in health authorities, largely through the CsCDC. Individuals 
then attended the sessions on a voluntary basis. A possible area of bias is that only
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public health professionals from HAs with service level agreements with CIRS were 
asked to take part in the exercise sessions. The general experience and training of public 
health professionals would not be any different for the remaining HAs in England, but 
specific training on chemical incident management may vary between Chemical Incident 
RSPUs.
The selection of those using the manual was largely related to those who were able to 
arrive at the session early enough to receive preliminary training on the use of the 
manual. A few participants received the manual without the introductory training; these 
manuals were allocated on a first-come-first-served basis. Venues were chosen within 
each of the six NHSE Regions on the basis of availability of a suitable room and with 
the aim of having a reasonably central location for participants to travel to. In addition, 
in allocating the manual to the participants, the aim was to ensure that manuals were 
used by participants across the range of experience and training. This was largely 
achieved by default, but some selection of participants with appropriate 
experience/training was required for the last two training sessions to ensure an adequate 
balance.
In summary, it is considered that the sample of public health professionals taking part 
was representative and that although allocation of the manual was not random, there 
would appear to be no reason why the method used would have created any bias in the 
results. The most likely cause of any distortion in performance scores of the 
participants, compared to the general population of public health professionals, is 
considered to be the fact that the participants all volunteered to take part and therefore 
are likely to have had a greater interest in chemical incident management.
6.4.2 Sample Size
The total sample size for the validation testing exercises was 79 participants, 39 of these 
used the manual. These samples sizes are considered to be large enough for the results 
to be applicable to the total population. With respect to the sample sizes for the different 
groups of experience and training used in comparing the mean percentage scores, the
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inexperienced and untrained group consisted of 36 participants and the trained only 
group of 28 participants, which again are acceptable sample sizes. However, the 
experienced only group consisted of just three participants and the experienced and 
trained group of 12 participants. Due to these small sample sizes, the inferences drawn 
about the effect of experience and training on performance, and particularly about 
experience may be less robust. Percentage improvements in scores achieved by those 
with and without the manual were calculated for the different experience and training 
groups, this would involve even smaller sample sizes.
In the statistical analysis, each participant was given separate ‘experienced’ and ‘trained’ 
designations and the effect of experience and training on the performance scores was 
assessed separately. ‘Experienced’ was defined as being involved in one or more 
chemical incident and included 35 of the participants. ‘Trained’ was defined as being 
involved in at least one training day and included 39 participants. These sample sizes 
therefore allow for more confidence in the results from the statistical analysis.
6.4.3 Categorisation of Participants
The experience and training categorisations are an area of potential bias within the 
process of interpreting the results. A definition of what could be considered 
‘experienced’ is debateable. For the comparison of mean performance scores, the 
groups of experienced and trained; experienced only; trained only; and inexperienced 
and untrained were allocated by defining those with past involvement in five or more 
chemical incidents as ‘experienced’ and those who had attended at least one CIRS 
training day as ‘trained’. Attendance of the CIRS training day on ‘how to respond to 
chemical incidents’ is considered to be the basic requirement for those taking the HA 
lead in responding to chemical incidents. A definition of experience is more difficult to 
justify and a limit of five incidents was selected as providing some breadth of experience 
of different types o f events without restricting the size o f the sample too much. For the 
statistical analysis, the significance of any experience (i.e. involvement in at least one 
chemical incident) was assessed; this provided a more equal division of the group and
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gave clear definition between experienced and not experienced rather than between 
degrees of experience.
As the positive effect of training was determined from the results, the use of attendance 
at only one training day would seem to have been vindicated. A possible cause of the 
unclear interpretation of the effect of experience is thought to have been the definition of 
‘experienced’ used. If a cut off point had been used at a higher level of experience, for 
example involvement in 10 or more chemical incidents, a clearer result may have been 
achieved. However, only nine participants had this level of experience, and this small a 
sample would not have provided conclusive results.
The provision of information by the participants on their previous experience and 
training may also have introduced an element of bias as participants could have used 
different definitions. Participants were asked to specify the number of chemical 
incidents they had had significant involvement in. This could have been interpreted 
differently depending on how much involvement participants considered to be 
‘significant’ and there may have been confusion over what constituted a chemical 
incident. However, the majority of public health professionals seem to be aware of the 
definition of an incident used by CIRS. Another factor is the reliance on participants to 
accurately remember the number of incidents they have been involved in, which may 
have occurred infrequently over a long time period. Participants were asked specifically 
how many CIRS training days they had attended, but were also asked to provide any 
additional details of relevant experience or training which was taken into account when 
deciding whether participants were ‘trained’. Some confusion may have arisen if 
participants had only included CIRS training obtained in London and not regionally 
based training which has also been provided.
6.4.4 Length of Service
An additional factor affecting performance, which was not accounted for in the analysis, 
is the length of service of the participant. Someone who has worked as a public health 
professional for several years may be able to apply general public health principles to
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the management of chemical incidents more successfully without any specific training 
and experience in this area. Statistical analysis was conducted to assess the effect of 
occupational status on performance. It would be expected that there would be some 
association between length of service and whether the participant was a consultant or 
specialist registrar. Occupational status was not shown to have a significant effect on 
performance, and therefore, length of service would also not be expected to improve 
performance.
6.4.5 Training On and Use of the Manual
It was initially planned that introductory training on the manual would be provided to 
half the group using the manual and the rest would use the manual without any prior 
knowledge on its content or intended application. However, due to the complication of 
adding another variable to the analysis, and also participant’s reluctance to use the 
manual without any introduction, the majority (30) of the 39 participants using the 
manual did receive training. This meant it was not really possible to assess the effect of 
training. The group of nine participants with the manual but no training were also not 
spread across the experience and training groups in the same proportions as those who 
did receive specific training. The comments received from the participants verified that 
the success of the manual would partially depend on specific training being provided on 
its use. In addition, it was not possible to assess how often the participants did actually 
refer to the manual. From personal observations some participants did appear to use the 
manual more than others.
6.4.6 Chemical Incident Exercise
Applicability of the results from the testing process to chemical incident management in 
general would depend on the incident scenario devised. The aim was clearly to simulate 
the events and the corresponding response that would occur in the management of an 
actual incident. The incident exercise was based on actual chemical incidents and 
participants commented on the scenario being realistic. It is possible that performance 
may vary depending on the type of incident and the specific details.
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Differences in response between the exercise and an actual incident may also occur due 
to the fact that the exercise was conducted in isolation to any other work activities. It 
would be expected that distractions by other tasks would result in a further reduction in 
effectiveness of the response. Set time periods were used for completion of each stage 
of the exercise by the participants, and were kept the same for all six training sessions. 
The majority of participants seemed to have adequate time to complete their responses. 
Comments received from the participants confirmed that the timings allowed fa* the 
exercise were appropriate.
Another factor that may have affected the applicability of the exercise results, compared 
to the management of an actual incident, was that the exercise was completed on an 
individual basis in order that participant specific performance scores could be obtained. 
Several comments were received from participants that suggested that working on their 
own was unrealistic and would prevent them from discussing their response with 
colleagues within the health authority. As part of a multi-agency response they would 
also be collaborating with other organisations and obtaining advice and information 
directly from them. Although working in groups on the exercise may have been more 
realistic, it would have been difficult to evaluate the response. In addition, public health 
professionals, particularly those working on-call, may have to conduct some of their 
response on an individual basis and it was considered that evaluation of individual 
competencies was useful.
Care was taken to ensure that the instructions provided to the participants were the same 
for each of the six exercise sessions, and the same information was provided to those 
with the manual in each case. The only information about the incident available to the 
participants was that which had been stated on the exercise scenario.
During the actual conduction of the incident exercise, biases may have occurred due to 
participants conferring during the exercise and at breaks between stages. Participants 
were encouraged not to discuss the incident until it was completed but it was not 
possible to completely enforce this.
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6.4.7 Provision of a Written incident Response
The requirement to provide written details on how the incident would be responded to 
may have led to inconsistencies between the response provided for the exercise and that 
which would occur in an actual incident. Writing a response in a specified time frame 
and with no other distractions may have resulted in an ‘ideal’ response being provided, 
which may not reflect what actually happens in practice. It was necessary for a written 
response to be documented in order to provide a record that could be subsequently 
evaluated.
Although the need to record everything that would be included in the response was 
impressed upon the participants at the start of the exercise, it is possible that some 
aspects that were seen as obvious were not recorded. In addition, information provided 
to the participants as part of the exercise scenario may not have been documented again 
as part of the response. The area of incident management that is most likely to have 
suffered from the method used to record the response is documentation. Participants 
may have easily forgotten to write down that they would be recording their actions and 
incident details, even if they would do so in an actual incident.
Finally, the section headings on the forms provided to the participants, may have guided 
them to a particular response. However, the same forms were used for all the exercise 
sessions and only general headings were provided, with the aim of giving the 
participants somewhere to start and to make it easier to find information when assessing 
the responses.
6.4.8 Evaluation Method
The evaluation method was based on the best practice model, which was devised from 
extensive experience in the management of chemical incidents and from consultation 
with experts in the field of chemical incident management. Development of the best 
practice model and evaluation method is described in detail in Chapter 4.
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The evaluation method for the incident exercise specified the required response in detail, 
ensuring that responses would be consistently assessed. In evaluating the responses a 
positive bias was adhered to, and partially completed actions were included which would 
result in a generous score being assigned.
The categorisation of the actions within the evaluation method as ‘key’ and ‘total’ was 
aimed at separating actions that must be completed, from those that could be excluded 
without causing as much detriment on the overall management of the incident. The 
‘key’ actions were also selected to focus on the public health role, so actions that would 
be very important as part of the total response, but are primarily the role of another 
agency were not specified as ‘key’.
6.4 Implications of the Validation Testing Results and 
Comments on Further Development and Use of the 
Guidance Manual
In summary, the implications of the validation testing with respect to the further 
development of the chemical incident guidance manual itself were:
• Two additional resources were required, a more detailed introduction on the 
application of the manual, and a glossary of terms.
• From the expert comments, and in particular, consultation with Dr Kaetrin Camegie- 
Smith (an independent consultant in public health medicine and public health advisor 
to the Emergency Planning College), some minor changes were required to the 
content of some of the guidance materials within the manual.
• The format of the individual resources needed to be clearer with an introductory 
paragraph for some materials, followed by more succinct information for quick 
reference during an incident.
• The order of the resources needed to be revised to make it easier to work through 
them during an incident.
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® There needed to be clearer demarcation of the public health role in managing a 
chemical incident.
The above changes were incorporated into the manual after the validation testing. 
Version 2 of the manual is reproduced at the back of Volume 2 after the Publications 
Section.
Further testing of the effectiveness of the manual and the independent effect of 
experience in chemical incident management could be conducted. A study 
encompassing more CsCDC who are likely to have greater experience in managing 
previous chemical incidents may provide more conclusive evidence on whether 
experience affects level of performance and the degree of experience required before a 
positive effect is attained. It would also be useful to present various resources in 
different formats and/or colours and test their relative effectiveness. This would enable 
the best presentation method to be determined. Further testing of the manual in real 
incident situations would also provide more information on its practical application. The 
benefits of using the manual may be cumulative over time as familiarity of using the 
manual is gained. It would be interesting to repeat performance evaluations on the same 
set of individuals over time, although, obviously the level of experience and training is 
also likely to increase over the same period.
Finally, the validation testing also confirmed the value of chemical incident management 
training in general and its beneficial impact on performance. Areas that are particularly 
poorly achieved in responding to chemical incidents were identified from the 
evaluations. Training could be targeted to these areas and also on the prioritisation of 
actions during an incident. It would be advised that in providing the manual to public 
health professionals, specific training should also be made available on how it should be 
applied in an actual incident.
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7 Discussion
7.1 Specification of the Project Aims and Objectives
At the commencement of the project, it had already been identified that there was a gap 
in the knowledge base of CIRS and public health professionals in managing chemical 
incidents. The focus of the advice provided by CIRS was toxicological/medical and a 
need was identified to broaden the management process of chemical incidents. In 1993, 
clear responsibilities, with respect to the management of the health aspects of 
environmental hazards and chemical incidents specifically, were designated to health 
authorities (HAs) in National Health Service (NHS) Guidelines (DH et al, 1993 and 
NHSME, 1993). These were further strengthened by later NHS Executive guidance on 
planning for major incidents (NHSE, 1998). These responsibilities were delegated to 
public health departments within HAs, and in particular to Consultants in 
Communicable Disease Control (CsCDC). However, there is a lack of training and 
experience of public health professionals in the management of chemical incidents.
Further evidence for the need to investigate and document the management of chemical 
incidents, and specifically to provide guidance for public health professionals, was 
identified through two literature reviews and a questionnaire survey. A review of water- 
related chemical incidents in the published literature found only eight reports of 
incidents in Britain between 1994 and 1997, indicating that there is incomplete learning 
and dissemination of lessons from the management of chemical incidents. A review of 
chemical incident management procedures found no generic guidance for the emergency 
response to chemical incidents aimed at public health professionals. A questionnaire 
survey aimed at Consultants in Communicable Disease Control or Public Health 
Medicine (CsCDC/CsPHM) found a varied and generally limited level of training and 
experience in chemical incident management and identified a need for chemical incident 
management tools and procedures.
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For public health doctors, the management of chemical incidents is only a small part of 
their work responsibilities. The need to be involved in the management of a chemical 
incident is infrequent, and the background training of public health professionals has 
very little input on the management of this type of event. The nature o f a chemical 
incident is such that it could occur out of normal office hours, so responsibility for 
responding forms part of the on-call public health rota within HAs. The designated lead 
person for managing the health aspects of environmental hazards within each health 
authority will have had the opportunity for specialist training and may have had a few 
experiences of involvement in the management of chemical incidents. However, this is 
not necessarily the person who will be required to provide the first response to a 
chemical incident. A source of expert guidance in both the process and the specific 
details o f managing a chemical incident is therefore required for public health 
professionals who may be required to provide a response without any, or at best with 
minimal, previous training or experience in this specific area. It will not always be 
possible for the appropriate Chemical Incident Regional Service Provider Unit (RSPU) 
to guide the public health doctor through every detail of their response to an incident, 
therefore, the provision of guidance materials to provide the necessary knowledge base 
is required.
The aim of the research project was to draw lessons from the management of chemical 
incidents and any relevant literature, and to use this information to devise a best practice 
model for the public health response to chemical incidents. The subsequent objectives 
were:
• To develop a chemical incident management guidance manual with specific 
information and tools to direct public health professionals to meeting the criteria set 
out in the best practice model;
• To develop a quantitative evaluation method to assess the performance of public 
health professionals in managing a chemical incident; and
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• To assess the effectiveness of the chemical incident management manual (using the 
above evaluation method) in improving the management of chemical incidents by 
public health professionals.
7.2 Collection of Information on Chemical Incident 
Management
In order to be able to extract information from the management of chemical incidents to 
assist in devising procedures to improve future management, proper documentation is 
required of the incidents being investigated. Normal incident documentation at CIRS is 
not sufficient to conduct a detailed investigation of past incidents. Direct involvement 
of the research engineer in the examination of the incidents described in Section 3.1.2 
allowed full details of the circumstances of the incident to be recorded. By 
comprehensively documenting these incidents it was then possible to analyse them at a 
later date to identify any specific lessons that could be learnt from the incident that 
would be applicable to future incidents and could be included in incident management 
guidance materials.
The investigations detailed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 provided the main information inputs 
to the project. This enabled the research engineer to establish the current state of 
knowledge amongst public health professionals in the management of chemical 
incidents, and also to identify areas of best practice and issues that seem to be 
particularly problematic. Over the research period, there were 246 water-related 
chemical incidents. The research engineer had direct involvement in the management of 
70 incidents; fourteen have been studied and documented in depth. In Section 3.1.5.1, a 
number of principles of best practice derived from the management of actual incidents 
are specified. Two specific types of chemical incident were also identified that seemed 
to occur on a reasonably frequent basis; lessons from these are addressed in Section 
3.1.5.2. The incidents studied as part of the research project were primarily taken from 
those reported to CIRS and therefore locations were largely restricted to the area covered 
by HAs with service level agreements with CIRS. Participation in CIRS training
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sessions, and in particular in the development and facilitation of incident training 
exercises, added to the knowledge base of how chemical incidents are currently 
managed. They also provided the opportunity to obtain feedback on what resources 
would be useful to public health professionals to assist them in improving their response 
to chemical incidents. Lessons learnt from the training and exercise aspects of the 
project are described in Section 3.2.5.
The lessons learnt as identified from the involvement in chemical incidents and incident 
exercises combined with the information obtained from relevant publications on aspects 
of chemical incident management, enabled the development o f chemical incident 
management tools, as described in the next section.
7.3 Development of the Chemical Incident Management Tools
7.3.1 Introduction
Leading on from the objectives of the project, the chemical incident management tools 
developed were:
• A best practice model for the public health response to chemical incidents;
• A chemical incident management guidance manual providing detailed guidance to 
enable public health professionals to meet the criteria set out in the best practice 
model; and
• A quantitative evaluation method to allow the performance of public health 
professionals in managing a chemical incident to be assessed.
In addition, the effectiveness of the chemical incident management manual in improving 
the management of chemical incidents by public health professionals was tested. This 
was achieved by using the evaluation method, as specified above, to assign performance 
scores to the responses provided by a group of public health professionals to a chemical 
incident exercise. The performance of those who used the manual was then compared 
with those that did not.
155
As described in Section 7.2, the main information input for the development of the 
chemical incident management tools was the involvement in the management of 
chemical incidents and exercises. The focus of this involvement was on water-related 
chemical incidents, and generally those affecting drinking water or surface waters. 
However, in developing the chemical incident management tools a broader approach 
was taken. The best practice model and associated evaluation method are intended to 
cover all types of chemical incident, the guidance manual currently covers issues that are 
common to all types of chemical incidents and also some issues that are specific to 
water-related chemical incidents. However, the final version of the manual will cover 
all types of chemical incident as discussed in Section 7.5.2. The main focus of the 
chemical incident exercise used in the validation testing process for the guidance manual 
was drinking water contamination. However, the aim of the exercise was to cover as 
much of the evaluation method as possible, and secondary air and land contamination 
aspects were also included in the scenario.
7.3.2 Best Practice Model for the Public Health Response to Chemical 
Incidents
The methodology for developing the best practice model is explained in detail in Section 
4.1, the aim of this section is to discuss any possible sources of bias or error associated 
with the methodology and any consequent limitations to the model.
All the issues and actions incorporated into the best practice model were determined 
from involvement in actual chemical incidents and also from relevant literature. As 
discussed above, the focus of the involvement in chemical incidents was on water- 
related chemical incidents, and therefore there could possibly be difficulties associated 
with air or land contamination issues not being addressed. This potential problem was 
tackled by consulting the wider literature on management of all types of chemical 
incident, and by conducting consultation with experts across the field o f chemical 
incident management. In addition, many of the incidents studied that resulted in water 
pollution, also affected other environmental media, particularly land. Also, by being
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based at CIRS, the research engineer was able to experience exposure to other types of 
incidents and in some cases was directly involved in their management. Two further 
research engineers have specifically covered the investigation of air and land-related 
incidents.
After identifying the issues for inclusion in the best practice model, a group of experts in 
chemical incident management from the public health field and also other organisations 
involved in responding to chemical incidents were consulted. They were asked to rate 
the issues in order to identify which should be included in the initial emergency response 
period, within the first few hours of being alerted. As identified in Section 4.1.3, the 
format of the model for the consultation process may have resulted in directing those 
providing ratings to give a rating of 1 to the issues at the beginning of the model and 5 to 
those at the end, rather than obtaining an unbiased opinion of the rating. In addition, 
although comments and ratings were received from 26 experts across a range of 
organisations, ideally a larger group should have been surveyed and also some key 
responders were not included in the consultation, most notably, the ambulance and 
police services and accident and emergency hospital departments.
The final best practice model, with the issues and actions categorised into chronological 
stages, was devised as a result of the ratings provided from the consultation process. 
However, the ratings from public health specialists and other organisations were 
combined. If there had been a larger group of experts it may have been useful to 
separately analyse the ratings provided by the different organisations. In particular, as 
the model is aimed at the public health response, by incorporating the ratings of the 
other organisations the final model may not truly reflect the priorities of public health 
professionals, although those involved in the consultation process were specifically 
instructed to consider the public health angle. In addition, the consultation only 
involved one stage, time permitting, it would have been useful to have sent out the 
model again after categorising the issues/actions and to obtain a consensus on whether 
issues had been categorised appropriately.
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With respect to the scope o f the best practice model, it is intended to cover all types of 
chemical incident, although the primary aim is to cover minor incidents. It is felt that a 
major disaster or catastrophic incident would have significantly different priorities and 
involve different management processes. However, it may be argued that it would be 
more useful to have one model that applies to all levels o f incident. The timescales used 
for the chronological categories are more applicable to acute incidents. Again, it may be 
preferable to develop a completely generic model. However, even in a chronic incident, 
the issues involved are likely to be similar, particularly where chronic contamination has 
led to acute health effects or there is a public and/or media reaction that requires a rapid 
response.
7.3.3 Chemical Incident Management Guidance Manual
The methodology for developing the guidance manual is described in Section 4.2. In 
summary, the aim of the manual was to provide more detailed information in order to 
guide public health professionals towards meeting the criteria specified in the best 
practice model. The information basis for the guidance materials devised for inclusion 
in the manual was again the involvement in actual chemical incidents and also published 
literature on aspects of chemical incident management. As described in the previous 
section, the majority of the research engineer experience was in water-related chemical 
incidents, but the aim of Version 1 of the guidance manual was to cover issues that are 
common to all types of chemical incident, as well as some issues that are specific to 
water-related chemical incidents. As the manual currently stands (Version 2) there is 
still a water bias due to the nature of the research investigation on which it is based. 
However, the final version of the manual will cover all types of chemical incident as 
discussed in Section 7.5.2. Additional materials, as devised by the researchers 
investigating air and land-related chemical incidents and by other staff and students at 
CIRS, were not included in the manual used in the validation testing. This was because 
the aim of the validation testing was to assess the effectiveness of tools developed 
specifically from this research project.
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Some consultation was conducted on Version 1 of the manual and changes were 
incorporated into Version 2. As described in Section 6.5, these changes focused on the 
format and order of the materials. Some comments were received from those people 
who took part in the exercise sessions and also from a few of the experts who 
commented on the best practice model. Specific feedback on the content and ease of use 
of the manual was rather limited, although the general impression was that the manual 
was very useful.
Attempts were made to investigate previous research in the area of devising operational 
procedures and also on the format and presentation of management tools. Informal 
discussions were conducted with Professor Neville Moray, Professor of Applied 
Cognitive Psychology (Department of Psychology, University of Surrey), Andrew 
Brazier of Human Reliability Associates (an international consulting company 
specialising in improving human performance and minimising human error in industry) 
and Jonathan Berman of Greenstreet Berman (a strategic risk management consultancy).
A copy of Version 2 of the manual can be found at the back of Volume 2 following the 
Publications Section.
7.3.4 Evaluation Method and Validation Testing Process
The generic evaluation method was devised directly from the best practice model, using 
the same issues/actions and chronological categories. In addition, a number of ‘key’ 
actions were identified, which were those actions that are considered essential for the 
successful management of a chemical incident. The designation of ‘key’ actions was 
based on the ratings provided during the consultation on the best practice model, the 
rating process used is described in Section 4.1.4. Those who took part in the 
consultation process were not, however, explicitly asked what are the most essential 
actions; the importance of actions was inferred by the consistency of ratings. In 
addition, the designation of ‘key’ actions would be dependent on the target responder; 
the essential public health actions will clearly differ from the essential actions for the 
fire service, for example. Therefore it may have been preferable to focus on the
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comments and ratings provided by the public health experts in assigning the ‘key’ 
actions.
By providing a tailored evaluation method for the specific exercise used in the validation 
testing process, it is believed that consistent assessment of the response was achieved. 
Although the generic evaluation method provides general guidance to assess 
performance, it would be necessary to explicitly state the appropriate details for a 
specific incident if consistent evaluation of several people was required. The main area 
of difficulty in using the evaluation method was deciding how to score for actions that 
were completed outside the stages specified. For example, a stage one action being 
completed, but not until stage three of the response. For the validation testing of the 
manual, participants were given marks for actions completed early but not for those 
completed late. Actions completed outside the stages specified were also documented 
and these are reported on in Section 5.4.
As described in Section 6.4.6, care was taken to ensure that each o f the six exercise 
sessions in the validation testing of the manual were conducted in the same way. The 
possible areas of bias and error in the validation testing method used are covered in 
detail in Section 6.4. In summary, care was taken to ensure the sample was 
representative of the population and of an adequate size, and that a realistic incident 
scenario was devised so that the performance scores would be applicable to the 
management of a real incident. It may have been more accurate to compare performance 
with and without the manual for the same participants. However, this would have 
required a second scenario, which would create difficulties in making sure that the two 
scenarios were comparable and required the same type of response.
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7.4 Effectiveness of the Guidance Manuai in Improving 
Management of Chemical Incidents
Chapter 6 provides detailed interpretation and discussion of the results from the 
validation testing of the guidance manual. The overall conclusion is that the manual did 
improve performance for the group tested and statistical analysis indicates that an 
improvement would also be seen in the population as a whole. Although the 
improvement in performance relates to a specific incident exercise, it is expected that the 
manual would also be shown to be effective in improving response in ‘real’ chemical 
incidents and for a range of scenarios. In addition, the validation testing also identified 
that training in chemical incident management improves overall performance (although 
not for the ‘key’ actions). The effect of previous experience was not found to be 
conclusive.
Another point of particular note from the validation testing, is that the performance 
scores achieved were generally low, although slightly higher scores were achieved for 
‘key’ actions, which are considered to be the most important part of the response. The 
low levels of achievement in the exercise sessions seem to further confirm the lack of 
knowledge and expertise in the management o f chemical incidents by public health 
professionals. This strengthens the need for the expert information and skills provided 
to HAs through the Chemical Incident RSPUs, and also the value of specialised training 
and the provision of guidance materials. Evaluation of the responses to the exercise 
enabled the identification of aspects of chemical incident management that were 
particularly poorly achieved,, which will assist in directing training programmes. More 
information on prioritisation of actions during an incident would also seem to be 
required.
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7.5 Further improvements in the Chemical Incident 
Management Tools and Validation Testing Method
From the results and comments obtained during the exercise sessions, further 
developments and improvements that could be made to the chemical incident 
management tools and the validation testing method can be suggested, as detailed in the 
following sections.
7.5.1 Best Practice Model for the Public Health Response to Chemical 
Incidents
Some minor changes were made to the best practice model as a consequence of the 
comments received from the exercise sessions and also in light of the responses provided 
to the exercise. The revised checklist of actions for chemical incident management is 
included as Appendix 14. The main changes are:
• An introduction to the purpose and application of the checklist with a list of 
abbreviations.
• Division of the actions into three categories to enable communication issues to be 
listed separately.
• Addition of a column to state the lead agency for each action.
• Promotion of initial contact with the media to stage one of the response.
• Promotion of the estimation of the time period of exposure from stage three to stage 
two.
• Addition of extra actions:
o ‘ensure population are prevented from accessing the incident site’ 
o ‘consider conducting a site visit’ 
o ‘consider alerting volunteer organisations’ 
o ‘consider holding a public meeting’ 
o ‘identify similar hazards in the area’
• Also, due to changes in the layout of the manual, the references in the checklist to 
further guidance materials have been updated.
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The key area for future development of the best practice model is the need to conduct 
further consultation, both within the public health field and also with other organisations 
involved in the management of chemical incidents. In particular, further work is 
required on assigning ‘key’ actions in the model as used in the evaluation method for the 
validation testing. These ‘key’ actions should focus on the public health role 
specifically, rather than actions that form part of the public health considerations but are 
primarily the responsibility of another organisation. For each time period used in the 
model, the ‘key’ actions should be identified. This would be best achieved by 
consulting with public health professionals with experience in managing chemical 
incidents and determining the consensus of opinion. As well as sending out the model to 
collect individual opinions, it would also be useful to conduct group discussions. It may 
also be possible to further prioritise the actions in each time period, effectively, 
providing a checklist in the order that actions should be completed. However, this 
would require considerably more work and it is likely to be difficult to obtain a 
consensus.
One of the main criticisms of the best practice model from the exercise sessions and the 
expert consultation was that public health professionals are not necessarily the lead 
agency for all the issues/actions included in the model. It was felt that there was a 
crossover with other people’s responsibilities and there could be duplication of effort 
where actions are outside public health responders’ responsibilities. HA staff need to 
have an awareness of the actions taken by other organisations in an incident, however, 
they should not be trying to conduct the entire response independently. To clarify which 
actions are primarily the role of public health professionals and those that have another 
lead agency, a column has been added to the best practice model specifying the lead 
agency for each issue/action raised. Further consultation would be useful in respect to 
this aspect of the model in order to ensure clarification of the roles of each responding 
organisations.
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7.5.2 Chemical incident Management Guidance Manua!
As already discussed, some changes were made to the manual subsequent to the exercise 
sessions; these are detailed in Section 6.5. The main changes made were to the format, 
separation of background information from operational tools, provision of further 
guidance on how the manual should be used, and specification o f the responsibilities of 
each organisation. Further development of the manual is required and will be carried out 
prior to its inclusion as part of a book to be published by the Stationery Office on 
‘Environmental Management of Chemical Incidents’. The final version will have a 
broader coverage and the current bias towards water-related chemical incidents will be 
removed as guidance materials devised as part of complementary research projects and 
also by permanent and seconded to CIRS are added. In particular, the following 
additional resources have been developed by other researchers: a public health 
evacuation checklist and public information leaflet, detailed information on public health 
surveillance, specific checklists on land contamination incidents and non-domestic fires, 
and a site visit report form. Before the final publication of the manual, further 
consultation is also required because only a small number of experts were able to return 
comments within the timescale of this project. There was also a low level of response 
with respect to the comment forms returned by participants in the exercise sessions. 
From the validation testing of the manual, it was concluded that specific training on the 
application of the manual is useful and it is recommended that it should be offered.
Various comments were received at the exercise sessions on the most useful format of 
presenting the manual. Some felt that a loose-leaf binder would be best so that extra 
information can be added. However, the danger is that the manual will become 
incomplete as pages are removed and not returned. The use o f ‘spiral binding’ was also 
suggested to facilitate photocopying of forms and key checklists. Availability of the 
information in an electronic format, either as a CD-ROM or via the web was also 
considered to be very useful. Access to a restricted website will be easier to update than 
a book or a CD-ROM and will enable users to print off additional copies of materials. A 
paper version of the book is considered to be important as access to the internet may not
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always be possible in an incident, for example, if the person is on-call or if there are 
electricity supply disruptions.
Further development of the manual is also required to make it applicable across the UK 
in general. At the moment it is more applicable to HAs in England and, in particular, to 
those with service level agreements with CIRS. The difficulty in making a UK-wide 
publication is that there may be local differences in response and the manual needs to be 
flexible enough to accommodate these differences. The manual should also fit into 
procedures already used within HAs, for example general incident emergency plans 
and/or chemical specific plans. Public health departments are experienced in managing 
outbreaks of communicable diseases and ideally, a similar framework should be adopted 
for chemical incident management. A generic incident/outbreak plan was produced a 
few years ago by the Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (CDSC) at the Public 
Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) and is currently being revised. The incorporation of 
chemical incidents within this plan should be considered.
Although the manual was found to be effective in improving response to the chemical 
incident exercise provided, it would be interesting to measure the effect on performance 
in managing actual incidents. If performance was monitored over time it may be 
possible to assess if there is an increased improvement with continued use of the manual.
7.5.3 Evaluation Method and Validation Testing Process
The evaluation method is derived directly from the best practice model. Therefore the 
minor changes and additions required for the best practice model after the validation 
testing, as mentioned in Section 7.5.1 are also applicable to the evaluation method. A 
copy of the revised generic evaluation method is provided in Appendix 15. The exercise 
itself may also benefit from the addition of more information on the scenario, if  it is to 
be used again.
The evaluation method worked well for the validation testing but it should also be tested 
for its applicability in other types of scenarios and also for measuring performance in an
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actual incident. One of the main comments of the validation testing process was that 
completing the exercise on an individual basis was unrealistic. The evaluation method 
could be used as it stands for assessing group performance, but this would really only be 
useful if it was applied to a group of people that would actually be working together in 
an incident.
To improve the validity o f the results there should be random selection o f the 
participants and also random assignment of the manual. In interpreting the results there 
were some difficulties with respect to the categorisation of participants by experience 
and training. The impact of different definitions could be investigated, but a bigger 
group would be required, and in a particular a wider range of experiences.
If further degrees of prioritisation were added to the best practice model, as described in 
Section 7.5.1, then a more complex evaluation method could be devised where the 
completion of particular actions are weighted depending on their importance.
7.6 Difficulties in Conducting Research into Chemical Incident 
Management
This final section aims to identify some of the difficulties in conducting research into 
chemical incident management. The first problem is the breadth of the subject and 
difficulties in selecting a discrete aspect for detailed research. In providing guidance for 
chemical incident management there is a conflict between providing generic guidance 
and providing sufficient detail to cover all types of chemical incident. It may be easier 
to provide comprehensive guidance by looking at a specific type of incident. However, 
provision of information then becomes unwieldy as different guidance is provided for 
further types. Practitioners would prefer to use one source of information rather than 
having to decide which guidance they should adhere to.
As raised in the previous sections, public health professionals seem to be confused about 
their role in the management of chemical incidents and this is not likely to improve in
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the near future as the changes to NHS structures are brought in. Even where public 
health professionals are aware of their specific remit, they seem unwilling to accept the 
multi-disciplinary nature of chemical incident management and the need to have some 
awareness of the other aspects involved, in order that they can effectively manage their 
response.
During the project, a need was identified for providing assistance to public health 
professionals to enable them to meet their responsibilities. Specific requests were also 
received for the development of management tools. However, due to the fact that 
chemical incident management is only a small part of the overall job of the public health 
doctor, it was difficult to obtain comments on what areas of research would be of 
particular use, and constructive feedback on guidance materials developed during the 
project and how they could be improved to be of greater assistance.
Another area of complication, with respect to chemical incident management in the UK, 
is the current existence of five Chemical Incident RSPUs covering different 
geographical areas and advising different HAs. The approach used in the management 
of chemical incidents varies between units and can result in inconsistencies in advice 
provided to HAs. Inconsistencies in advice are particularly problematic in incidents 
involving cross-regional contamination. In addition, in some areas, the local authorities 
and health authority are obtaining their advice from different RSPUs. There also seems 
to be a lack of co-ordination regarding research and development in chemical incident 
management between the units.
Finally, the dissemination of results and information from investigations into chemical 
incidents is made difficult by the lack of a dedicated peer reviewed journal. Although 
there are several public health journals, chemical incident management is not a major 
aspect of public health medicine and papers on chemical incident management do not fit 
comfortably within the normal subject area of public health journals. Also, the lessons 
learnt need to be disseminated to all those involved in chemical incident management, 
not just to public health professionals.
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8 Conclusions and Contributions to Knowledge
8.1 Conclusions
The review of the current state of knowledge in chemical incident management, which
involved two literature reviews and a questionnaire survey, concluded that:
• The published literature yields few accounts of water-related chemical incidents that 
have occurred in the past few years. Even those that are reported, show that most 
research is concentrated on analysing the actual effect of the incident, rather than in 
devising procedures for managing incidents in such a way as to protect human health 
and the environment.
• No generic guidance is currently available specifically aimed at the public health 
management of the emergency response to chemical incidents. From the review of 
the published literature, only one publication providing general guidance on 
chemical incident management aimed at public health professionals was found and 
its primary focus was on preparation prior to a chemical incident.
• Levels of training and experience in chemical incident management by public health 
professionals are variable and generally quite limited and the development of 
comprehensive guidance for the public health response to chemical incidents is 
required.
The research project involved the development of chemical incident management tools
to improve the public health response to chemical incidents. A best practice model was
devised based on:
• Lessons learnt from the management of chemical incidents throughout the research 
period;
• Lessons learnt and comments from incident exercises and training days; and
• Lessons learnt and information extracted from relevant literature on chemical 
incident management.
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This model was then used to direct the development of two further management tools:
1. A comprehensive chemical incident management guidance manual for use by public 
health professionals during the emergency response to chemical incidents;
2. A quantitative evaluation method to assess the performance of public health 
professionals in responding to a chemical incident.
The evaluation method was used in the validation testing of the guidance manual. The 
assessment, conducted on a group of 79 participants, concluded that the manual was 
effective in improving performance in the response to a chemical incident exercise. 
Statistical analysis further demonstrated that this improvement would be expected across 
the general public health population.
8.2 Satisfaction of Project Objectives
The overall objectives, as identified prior to the commencement of the project, were to:
• Evaluate the management of water-related chemical incidents reported to CIRS and 
establish how a chemical incident evolves and what lessons can be learnt from these 
events; and
• Develop procedures for managing chemical incidents to improve and provide a 
consistent response from public health professionals, with the main focus being the 
protection of the public health.
The general aim of investigating water-related chemical incidents has clearly been 
achieved, with significant involvement in 70 incidents over the research period. These 
incidents have also been comprehensively documented and lessons learnt identified, as 
detailed in Section 3.1. The involvement of the research engineer in the management of 
chemical incidents at CIRS has focused on providing an environmental technology input 
to supplement the toxicological approach already developed. In managing water-related 
chemical incidents, the focus has been on environmental management, this has 
specifically involved advising on environmental monitoring and data interpretation, 
interpretation of water quality standards, and advice on water and wastewater treatment.
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The research engineer has also assisted in improving liaison between water utilities and 
health authorities, including attending incident team meetings.
From the assessment of the current state of knowledge and further defining and focusing 
of the research needs, it was possible to develop more specific project objectives. These 
were:
• Specify the criteria of a best practice model for the public health response to 
chemical incidents;
• Develop a chemical incident management guidance manual to direct those involved 
in managing a chemical incident towards the best practice model;
• Develop a quantitative evaluation method to assess the level of performance 
achieved by public health professionals in managing a chemical incident;
• Assess the performance levels achieved by public health professionals with the use 
of the chemical incident management guidance manual; and
• Modify the guidance manual in response to the evaluation results and consultation 
comments, and provide recommendations for future improvements in the 
management tools.
Chapter 4 describes the methodology in developing the best practice model and 
chemical incident management guidance manual, and also the process for validation 
testing of the manual, including devising an evaluation method to measure the 
performance of public health professionals in managing chemical incidents. Chapters 5 
and 6 provide the results and interpretation of the results of the validation testing which 
demonstrate that the manual successfully improved the response to a chemical incident 
exercise. Chapter 6 also provides comments on the modifications made to the manual as 
a result of the testing process and from consultation comm aits. In Chapter 7, further 
developments of the manual are discussed.
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8.3 Achievements and Contributions to Knowledge
The investigation of the environmental management of chemical incidents, and the 
public health response in particular, has resulted in comprehensive documentation of 
several incidents and also the lessons that can be learnt from the management of actual 
incidents and from chemical incident training and exercises. The analysis of these 
lessons has resulted in the production o f a best practice model for the public health 
response to chemical incidents, which has been used to develop a chemical incident 
management guidance manual and a method for evaluating the performance of public 
health professionals in responding to a chemical incident. Subsequent validation testing 
of the guidance manual by a group of public health professionals, with a range of 
previous experience and training, demonstrated a significant improvement in 
performance in responding to a chemical incident exercise when using the manual.
The specific contributions to knowledge achieved have been:
• Development of a best practice model for the public health response to chemical 
incidents, based on the lessons learnt from the management of actual chemical 
incidents. The best practice model sets out in one document all the issues and 
actions required in the response to a chemical incident. This constitutes original 
work as no similar model currently exists.
• Development of an evaluation method to quantitatively assess the performance 
in responding to chemical incidents. This is a novel tool that could be useful for 
both assessing effectiveness of chemical incident training and in ensuring an 
adequate level of competency in those professionals required to manage the health 
aspects of environmental hazards.
• Creation of a chemical incident management guidance manual providing a 
framework and detailed guidance on: the risk assessment of the potential impact of a 
chemical incident on the public health; communication with other organisations 
involved in the management of chemical incidents and with the public; management 
actions to prevent or mitigate the adverse health impacts; and documentation of 
incidents. The effectiveness of this manual in improving response of public health
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professionals was also demonstrated. Generic guidance aimed at the emergency 
response to chemical incidents by public health professionals is not currently 
available and the publication of this manual will provide a valuable and unique 
resource for the public health profession. A copy of the guidance manual can be 
found in Volume 2.
• Dissemination of lessons learnt in the management of chemical incidents through 
conferences and training sessions and also the publication of journal papers, 
including:
>  ‘Water-Related Chemical Incidents: A National Survey’ - in the journal 
Health and Hygiene (Goodfellow et al 2000a);
>  ‘The Public Health Response to an Incident of Secondary Chemical 
Contamination at a UK Beach’ - in the BMJ journal Occupational and 
Environmental Medicine (Goodfellow et al, 2001);
> ‘Permeation of Organic Chemicals Through Plastic Water Supply Pipes’ - 
accepted for publication in the CIWEM journal Water and Environmental 
Management Journal (Goodfellow et al, in press 2001).
Copies of all papers produced during the research period can be found in the 
Publications Section in Volume 2.
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9. Future research in Chemical Incident Management
9.1 Further Dissemination of Research Outputs
In addition to the publications detailed in Chapter 8, further papers are to be submitted 
for publication:
1. A paper on the results of the validation testing of the chemical incident guidance 
manual is planned for a peer-reviewed public health medicine journal. This will also 
include the outcome of the literature review of existing chemical incident 
management procedures for public health.
2. An additional paper is planned for an emergency planning journal, detailing the 
evaluation method for the assessment o f performance in the management of 
chemical incidents
Following further consultation and revision of the chemical incident management 
guidance manual, the final version will be published by the Stationery Office as part of a 
book on ‘Environmental Management of Chemical Incidents’.
9.2 Further Development of the Chemical Incident 
Management Tools
A detailed discussion on the further development of the chemical incident management 
tools that have been devised as part of this project is provided in Section 7.5, a summary 
of the issues raised is provided below.
Best practice model
• There is a need to conduct further consultation on the actions to be included in the 
best practice model, in particular, the designation of ‘key’ actions. Further 
consultation should include both the public health field and also other organisations 
involved in the management of chemical incidents.
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• Further clarification is required of which actions are primarily within the role of 
public health professionals and of the roles of the other responding organisations.
Chemical incident management guidance manual
• Broadening the coverage of the manual to include all types of environmental 
chemical incidents and for application across the UK is required.
• Further consultation needs to be conducted prior to final publication of the manual as 
part of a Stationery Office Book ‘Environmental Management of Chemical 
Incidents’
Evaluation method and validation testing process
• Testing the applicability of the evaluation method in other types of scenarios and 
also for measuring performance in an actual incident is needed.
• If further validation testing of the manual was conducted it should follow more 
extensive training and familiarisation with the manual.
• Further investigation into the effect of experience on performance in managing 
chemical incidents should be conducted.
9.3 Further Research in Chemical Incident Management
Areas where further research would be particularly useful for the continued development
and improvement of chemical incident management by public health professionals
include:
• Detailed specification of the role of public health professionals in chemical incident 
management. Despite NHS guidance this still seems to be unclear and with the 
reorganisation of health authorities across the UK, roles may change. Due to the 
multi-agency response to chemical incidents, clarification of roles is important. 
However, it is also difficult, as public health professionals may need to be aware of 
what other organisations are doing and collaborate with them without taking over 
their role.
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• Further research should be conducted to ascertain how well the best practice model 
reflects actual management practice and whether any differences are due to 
inadequacies of the model or the response. The problem with developing a best 
practice model is that an unachievable standard may be set based on a theoretical 
response.
• The development of geographical information systems (GIS) as a chemical incident 
management tool. GIS could be used for a number of applications, for example:
o To identify vulnerable populations or environmental locations; 
o To provide maps to indicate areas and populations at risk based on the 
output from plume modelling; 
o To improve surveillance by assisting with the assessment of the 
geographical spread of particular types of incident, and by mapping 
locations of hazardous sites, particularly those near population centres.
• Further research into the provision of training would also be extremely useful. The 
results from the validation testing show the importance of training, but more detailed 
information is required on the most effective techniques and the frequency and 
duration of training required in order to ensure competency of those required to 
manage chemical incidents. Some information was gained from the validation 
testing on areas of management that are particularly poorly understood, but further 
specification of these areas would enable more directed training programmes to be 
developed.
• Improved methods for chemical incident surveillance are also required, in particular:
o Valuable information on environmental exposures is gathered through the 
Chemical Incident RSPUs that could be used to a much greater extert to 
provide evidence for causal links between particular exposures and 
disease outcomes. For this to be successful, more long-term follow-up of 
chemical exposure victims would be required, which would entail 
substantial associated financial burdens, 
o The methods for collecting data for surveillance require further 
development. At CIRS, although a wealth of data are collected during an
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incident, due to the unsystematic manner in which it is recorded, the full 
value of the lessons learnt cannot be achieved, 
o By improving surveillance of chemical incidents, it would be easier to 
identity common types and causes of chemical incidents, which may 
allow for prevention strategies to be employed.
It should be noted that the Department of Health has contracted national surveillance 
of chemical incidents to the ‘National Focus’.
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1. Introduction
This assignment takes the form of a proposal for a small scale social research study related to my 
industrial placement. The initial sections comprise o f a description of the background to the 
proposal with an explanation o f why the research is necessary, and a statement of the research 
question. The bulk of the assignment consists of a description of the social research methods 
available, and the rationale for the method selected for this research, with a discussion o f the 
advantages and disadvantages involved in the use of different methods. Sections five and six 
contain a short discussion of potential sources of error and brief details on the sampling procedure 
to be used in the proposed research. The final sections outline the stages o f the research, with a 
timetable, and a summary of the costs involved.
2. Background
The sponsoring organisation for my Engineering Doctorate is the Medical Toxicology Unit 
(MTU), at New Cross, London, which is part o f the Guy’s and St Thomas’ Hospital Trust. The 
MTU was established to provide information to medical practitioners on the toxicology in man of 
chemical and pharmaceutical products, and advise on the diagnosis and treatment o f those 
poisoned.
The Unit has a number of specialised sections, including the area where I am employed, which is 
the Chemical Incident Response Service (CIRS). The CIRS developed from the basic toxicology 
service in response to increasing reports of exposure to toxic substances as a result o f ‘chemical
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incidents’. The CIRS is funded by contracts with 73 Health Authorities across the country, and 
also by several Environmental Health departments.
My Engineering Doctorate research project involves researching the management o f chemical 
incidents that have resulted in water pollution. As explained, the majority o f funding for the CIRS 
is currently provided by Health Authorities. Part of the responsibilities o f the Public Health 
Departments, within Health Authorities, is to minimise the impact on public health of chemical 
incidents. Such incidents may be acute, for example a fire at an industrial plant, or chronic, such 
as the long term exposure o f the public to lead in drinking water, and could involve any one of a 
large number of chemicals currently used in industrial, agricultural or domestic situations.
The current scope of the project is very wide, covering all chemical incidents that affect water, 
and in order for the project to reach the required standard for a doctorate degree it will have to be 
focused on particular chemicals and water events. For this reason I propose to carry out a piece of 
social research involving the “customers” of the CIRS, in order to find out what particular 
problems occur more frequently, or are especially severe. In addition to the research satisfying 
this need to identify areas of particular concern on which to focus my project, it will also help to 
identify areas for future research. I also aim to find out how public health professionals already 
respond to chemical incidents involving water, and especially what collaboration exists between 
water companies and health authorities, and whether the CIRS is providing the appropriate 
assistance. This information will help the CIRS to gain a better understanding of the process 
public health professionals use in managing chemical incidents, and will highlight any problems 
with communication between the different organisations involved in incident response. The CIRS 
will then be able to target its efforts for providing assistance to health authorities in responding to 
chemical incidents.
Searches on the Sociofile CD-ROM revealed no previous research in this area. As public health 
have only recently been given the obligation by the Department of Health to respond to chemical 
incidents, it is unlikely that any previous social research has been done. A study has been carried 
out for the CIRS by Jarlath Hynes (1997) regarding the management of land contamination 
incidents. Although the issues of land and water contamination are quite different, this study will 
help in the general design of research that aims to obtain information from those involved in 
incident response, including public health departments.
3. Research Question
The initial aim of the research is to gather information to answer the question:
What chemicals and situations occur most often in water related chemical 
incidents?
However, social research is different from mere data collection, as discussed by Gilbert (1993), it 
has to be concerned with understanding, not just description. There are two approaches to a social 
research study, deduction and induction. In deduction theorising comes before research, research 
then functions to produce empirical evidence to test or refute theories. Conversely with induction, 
research comes before theory and the aim is to generate theoretical propositions on social life 
from collected data (May, 1993). The research proposed here aims to gather data first, in order to 
obtain the information to generate theories on the factors affecting incident management 
behaviour, i.e. it will follow the induction process. Theories may be developed that explain the
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distribution o f different types o f incidents. The initial research question is not a theory statement 
to be tested by the research, but provides a focus for the data collection process.
Theories must be capable of being tested, or falsified. For the purposes o f research a theory will 
be broken down into theoretical propositions or testable hypotheses. As concepts often cannot be 
measured directly they need to be operationalised, for this purpose indicators are derived, which 
are a way o f linking concepts to observable facts. Indicators must be both valid, i.e. accurately 
measuring the concept; and reliable, i.e. consistent from one measurement to the next 
(Bumingham, 1998; Gilbert, 1993).
This research proposal does not involve testing a theory, but the research question still contains a 
number of subjective concepts which need to be defined more rigorously as part of the initial 
research design.
4. Research Method
This section will consist o f a very brief general introduction to the research methods available to 
social researchers, with comments on their applicability to this research. This is followed by a 
more detailed discussion of the more appropriate methods, and their advantages and 
disadvantages, and finally a statement of the selected research method to be used.
4.1 Techniques available
The major techniques used in social research are listed in May (1993) as:
• questionnaires;
• interviewing;
• participant observation;
• documentary research;
• secondary analysis;
• comparative research.
Survey methods are not listed as a discrete technique, this is because as defined by Paul Lavrakas 
(1993, p i):
Survey methods are a collection o f  techniques for which the most typical purpose is to 
provide precise estimates (i.e. measures that are stable with relatively low variance) o f  the 
prevalence o f  some variable o f interest.
Questionnaires are a method of conducting surveys. Quantitative and factual information can be 
obtained using closed questions. Qualitative data can also be collected through the use o f open 
questions (Newell, 1993). The design of questionnaires is pivotal, for the quality o f the data 
produced depends upon their design (May, 1993). A questionnaire with largely closed questions 
will be the most effective way of collecting the data for this study, administering questionnaires 
will be discussed further in the next section.
Interviews can take a number o f forms (May, 1993):
• structured interview - standardised, associated with survey research;
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• semi-structured - questions specified, but interviewer may probe beyond answers for 
clarification and elaboration;
• focused interview - open-ended, qualitative, aims to challenge preconceptions of the 
researcher, also referred to as informal, unstandardised, or unstructured interviews.
For this research unstructured interviewing would be very time consuming, but a structured 
survey interview could be used as a method of administering a questionnaire. More detailed 
unstructured interviews in the format of a group discussion, or focus group scenario, would be 
helpful in the initial stages of the research to aid in designing the questionnaire and ensuring 
appropriate phraseology is used, and that all possible options are included for answers to closed 
questions.
Participant observation or ethnography involves listening, observation and experience. It is about 
engaging in a social scene, experiencing and seeking to understand and explain it. It does not 
involve developing ideas and testing them. In participant observation no firm assumptions are 
made about what is important (May, 1993). This is not a suitable method for gathering the 
information required for this research as it is not possible to spend time with a group o f public 
health consultants who deal with chemical incidents, as they all work in different health 
authorities. It would take a great deal of time to shadow every consultant individually, or even a 
selection of consultants, and the majority of their time is not spent on dealing with chemical 
incidents.
Documentary research comprises of using content analysis, involving quantitative or qualitative 
techniques, to analyse documentary sources. Sources o f documentary research include:
•  historical documents: laws; statutes; people’s accounts o f incidents or periods in which they 
were involved.
• mass media.
• novels and plays.
•  maps.
• drawings.
• biographies, diaries, oral histories.
• photographs (May, 1993).
As there are very few reports on chemical incidents, particularly their handling by public health, 
this method is not appropriate for this research.
Secondary analysis involves devising ways of testing hypotheses against data originally collected 
for other purposes (May, 1993). It includes any further analysis of an existing dataset which 
presents interpretation, conclusions, or knowledge, additional to, or different from, those 
presented in the first report. Data available includes both government data and academic sources 
(Procter, 1993). Information on demographic characteristics of the population, their opinions and 
lifestyles from official statistics is considerable. Possible useful sources as suggested by May 
(1993) are: the 10-year census; criminal statistics; the family expenditure survey; register of 
births and deaths; General Household Survey (GHS); and British Social Attitudes Survey 
(BSAS). A drawback with secondary analysis is that the appropriate data may not have been 
collected, also it is important that the researcher understands how the data were constructed, 
before carrying out secondary studies (May, 1993). Again this method would not be appropriate 
for the proposed research because the data available for secondary analysis will not cover the area 
to be investigated.
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Comparative research is a pluralist approach to methods and theories centred mainly, but not 
exclusively, around the theme o f comparing countries under the umbrella term ‘cross national’ 
study. It involves studying the ways in which different cultures and societies organise their social 
and political affairs and everyday life in order to enhance insight into our own lives (May, 1993). 
Comparative research would make an interesting follow up study to this research to find out 
about the differences in incident response in different countries.
4.2 Selected technique
The most appropriate method for carrying out the proposed research, which involves collecting 
factual and attitudinal data, has been selected as a questionnaire survey. Even deciding on this 
method there are still a number o f different techniques that can be used to conduct a survey, these 
are: mail questionnaires (self completion), telephone survey, or face-to-face interviews (May 
1993). The following sections deal with some of the issues involved in each of these techniques.
Mail - Self completion surveys are efficient in time and money, and a large sample can be 
covered relatively quickly and cheaply. Also people can take time to think about answers and 
there is no problem of interviewer bias. However, questions must be clear and unambiguous as 
the researcher has no control over interpretation, also there can be no probing. In addition, there is 
no control over who answers the questionnaire, and response rates are also typically low (May, 
1993). In addition, a drawback o f using self-administered questionnaires is the reliance on a self­
selected sample. Although the sample may be systematically determined, only those respondents 
personally motivated to complete and return the questionnaire will be heard from. Consequently, 
such samples often do not meet criterion of representativeness (Frey and Oishi, 1995).
Telephone - A major advantage to telephone surveying is its cost efficiency. They are typically 
more expensive than mail surveys, but the potential advantages for reducing total survey error 
often outweigh this disadvantage. Another major advantage is speed at which data can be 
gathered, and thus processed. In a week or less, one can gather survey data via the telephone that 
might take a month or more using in-person interviews. An even longer period could be 
anticipated using a mail survey, with the necessity of follow-up mailings to increase typically low 
response rates. Disadvantages may include limitations on complexity and length of the interview 
(Lavrakas, 1993). Also a result obtained in many experimental comparisons of face-to-face and 
telephone interviewing is that a lower level of co-operation is obtained on the telephone (Groves, 
1990).
Face-to-face - Interviews may be chosen in preference to self-administered questionnaires, 
because clarification and probes can be used most effectively in the in-person mode. If  direct 
observation is required, obviously in-person interviewing will be necessary. However, the 
interviewer may affect the way a respondent answers a question, negative effects may be reduced 
on the telephone because of the lack of visual cues. Both telephone and in-person interviews 
suffer from socially desirable response, but it is more prominent with in-person. Practical issues 
that may preclude the use of in-person as opposed to telephone interviewing are: funds; 
personnel; time; and facilities (Frey and Oishi, 1995).
In making the final selection o f the research method to be used it is important that practical 
constraints are considered as well as methodology. After consideration o f the above research 
methods and their pros and cons, as well as the practical issues, I have decided to use a
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questionnaire survey to collect the information. As commented by Lavrakas (1993, p7) there has 
recently been significant growth in use o f multiple frame or mixed mode surveys. He also adds 
that telephone surveys and other modes o f surveying should not be viewed as if  they were in 
competition with each other, for example, telephoning can be used to encourage compliance to 
mail surveys, or to screen for rare groups who are then interviewed in-person.
In view of this I intend to carry out initial unstructured discussions in groups as part of the 
questionnaire design process. A pilot questionnaire will also be tested out on a limited sample. 
The final questionnaire will be initially administered by post for self completion. The time 
required to conduct each interview precludes the completion of all questionnaires via telephone 
interview, but as I require a good response rate, and the response period is limited, non­
responders will be followed up with the offer o f a telephone interview, or if  appropriate sending 
out another postal questionnaire. If  necessary an in-person interview could be offered for a small 
number of respondents.
5. Errors
This section contains a brief discussion of the sources of error in surveys in particular, and their 
significance in this research. As detailed in Lavrakas (1993), there are four potential sources of 
imprecision and bias, which together constitute ‘total survey error’. The most commonly 
considered error is sampling error, but non sampling errors also occur, as detailed below.
Sampling error - a function of the heterogeneity of what is being measured, the size o f the 
sample, and the size of the population. This source of imprecision in a survey is associated with 
the fact that only a sample of all elements in a population is studied, rather than a census in which 
all elements would be studied. As explained in the following sampling section, this will not be 
significant in this research as the population under study will effectively constitute a census.
Coverage error - do all elements in the population have at least some probability of being 
sampled, e.g. in a telephone survey, those without a telephone and the homeless have zero 
probability of being sampled. If  the people you cannot reach are different from those you can 
reach in a way that is relevant to the survey objectives, your results will be biased (Frey and 
Oishi, 1995). As the population defined in this research are those that have contracts with the 
CIRS, then all the elements are defined and can be contacted by mail or telephone.
Non-response error - elements that are sampled but for which no data are gathered 
systematically, may differ from those sampled of which data are gathered. If data gathered are not 
correlated with whether or not a given type o f person responded, then error due to non response 
would not exist. It is hoped that non-responders will be kept to the bare minimum in this study, 
also as the main focus is improving the service provided by the CIRS, by seeking the opinions o f 
contract holders, then if there is no response then this would seem to indicate that the contract 
holder is satisfied with the current service. Also, as non-responders will be contacted by 
telephone following an initial mail out, there should be no problem of non response due to the 
intended respondent not receiving a questionnaire. Regarding response rates, no particular rate is 
accepted as standard, but Frey and Oishi (1995, p30) state that for telephone interviews if rates o f 
70%-80% are achieved, one can feel comfortable with analyses based on the data.
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Measurement error - not all data that are recorded on a survey questionnaire are accurate 
measures o f the phenomenon of interest. These errors may be due to errors associated with the 
questionnaire, the interviewers, the respondents and/or the mode via which this data are gathered. 
One o f the most effective ways o f minimising measurement errors will be to carry out a 
comprehensive pilot study. With regard to measurement error in telephone interviews (as 
compared to in-person), it has been documented that the quantity o f response is reduced on open 
questions (Groves 1978; Sykes and Collins 1988), this is often attributed to the faster pace of 
telephone interviews.
6. Sampling
A sample is a portion or subset of the population the surveyor is interested in interviewing and is 
drawn when it is impractical to survey everyone in the population. Researching a sample can 
yield more accurate results than using the complete population. For instance, in survey research, 
if  fewer people are studied, more resources can be spent on each interview, permitting better 
quality interviewers, more supervision and better coders (Arber, 1993a).
Most surveys of sub-populations use some kind of population list or sampling frame, from which 
to draw a sample of potential respondents (Frey and Oishi, 1995, p. 14). A number o f methods can 
be used to select the sample (May, 1993). The two broad types are probability (which requires a 
random sample selection) and purposive. Non-probability, or purposive sampling methods 
include quota sampling and snowball sampling. Random methods of selection include: 
simple random sampling - where each element has equal chance of being selected; 
systematic sampling - if  the population number is known every nth case can be selected; 
stratified random sample - first a particular group is identified, then each group is sampled; 
cluster or multi-stage sample - a cluster is selected, then a sub-sample within it.
For this research study it is intended that one questionnaire will be sent to each of the health 
authorities. Usually there is only one person with the main responsibility o f dealing with chemical 
incidents within each health authority, which is the Consultant in Communicable Disease Control 
(CCDC). Some further investigation is required before sending out the questionnaires to 
determine the most appropriate person to send the questionnaires to. In effect the questionnaire 
will be forming a census, as opposed to a survey, as the whole sampling population will be sent a 
questionnaire, and I will endeavour to ensure that a questionnaire is completed by every 
contracted health authority. In this case the population is small enough for a census to be 
practical, and also it is too heterogeneous to be able to generalise accurately from a selected 
sample. Only health authorities (as opposed to local authorities and other incident response 
bodies) will be included in this study as the differences between the groups will probably 
necessitate a different questionnaire for each, and the health authorities are the largest customer 
group.
7. Outline of the research
The main stages in the research process (Bumingham, 1998) are:
• research design;
• sampling and access;
• design of research instrument/negotiating access;
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• data collection;
• coding;
• data interpretation and writing up.
The research method chosen is to send out a questionnaire, o f largely closed or semi-structured 
questions. The process of collecting information through questionnaires can be spilt up into a 
number o f stages.
Administrative plan - the very first stage is to comprehensively plan the research study and to 
create a flow chart of major tasks in sequence, with the most important properly designated and 
singled out.
Compile the sample: before even designing a questionnaire the sample they are to be sent to 
should be determined. Section six above details the sampling strategy for this study.
Devise draft questionnaire: a large portion of the work will be devising the questionnaire, and it 
is important to take sufficient time and care over this stage as the value and validity of the results 
will be greatly influenced by the quality of questionnaire. It is important that the questionnaire is 
clear and questions appropriately worded. As part o f this stage I expect to consult with a selection 
of CCDCs to ensure that the correct terminology is used, and to make sure that the right 
categories are identified for particular questions, and that the wording o f questions is 
understandable to those with a public health background, as opposed to science or engineering. It 
is important that any technical terms used, including the term incident, are clearly defined in 
order to get a consistent response. In devising the questionnaire the analysis stage should also be 
accounted for, the coding system should be devised as part of compiling the questionnaire, and a 
codebook should be put together. A covering letter also needs to be devised introducing the 
research, establishing legitimacy of the work, and highlighting the benefits o f completion. 
Approval for the research can be obtained from the Public Health Medicine Environment Group, 
which adds prestige to the work.
Piloting the questionnaire: before sending out the questionnaire to the full sample, the final 
draft will be tested on a smaller sample, probably aiming at about 10% of the total population. 
The aim will be to test the questionnaire at a range of locations throughout the UK as the 
chemicals and types of incident situation are likely to vary across the country, depending on local 
conditions such as geology and topology, and also industrial and agricultural activities. In sending 
out a questionnaire it will be possible to identify categories that should be included within 
questions, particularly where tick lists are provided, in order to include as many options as 
possible. The pilot stage will also highlight if  there are any problems with comprehending the 
questions and ensuring that the answers you expected to receive are being provided. The 
completed pilot questionnaires will also be analysed to ensure that the coding system is working 
correctly.
Develop final questionnaire: after receiving feedback from the pilot questionnaire, changes will 
be incorporated to ensure that the questions are correctly worded to achieve the answers required, 
and that the final analysis of the questionnaires will run smoothly.
Distribute questionnaires: The final questionnaire will be printed and initially one questionnaire 
will be sent to a named individual at each of the 73 contracted health authorities. A 3 week period 
will be stated for completion of the questionnaire. After 2 weeks non responders will be contacted
by telephone and offered a telephone interview, or a second copy o f the questionnaire will be sent 
out where necessary. A reminder letter will be sent after the 3 weeks has elapsed to those who 
have still not responded. With respect to the telephone follow-ups a call sheet should be devised 
(see Lavrakas 1993), and the questions most likely to be asked by respondents should have 
prepared standardised responses, these are sometimes referred to as called “fallback statements” 
(Frey and Oishi, 1995).
Collating and analysing data: as soon as the completed questionnaires start to be returned the 
answers will be collated and analysed, using the coding system devised in the initial stage. The 
data will be converted to a computer readable form and analysis will most likely be carried out 
using the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet package.
Presenting data and preparing reports: when all the completed questionnaires have been 
received and the information extracted and analysed, the final results will be presented in a clear 
understandable way, probably using graphical representation. It has been held that the most 
important part of a research project is not collecting data, but publishing it in a form which will 
transmit the research results to interested parties (Arber, 1993b).
8. Timetable
As the information to be gathered from this survey is fundamental to the development of my 
Engineering Doctorate project, and I need to be able to focus my research as soon as possible, this 
piece of social research is already underway. An additional practical constraint is that from mid 
July to September it is likely that a large number o f CCDCs will not be available and response 
rates are likely to be very low.
First stage, 11/5/98 - 5/6/98: put together the sample, initial group discussions and devising draft 
questionnaire.
Second stage, 8/6/98 - 3/7/98: pilot questionnaire, refining questionnaire into final format.
Third stage, 6/7/98 - 31/7/98: distribution of initial questionnaire, followed by follow-up 
questionnaires and telephone interviews where necessary.
Fourth stage - bring together the data, collate, analyse and put in a format that can be easily 
understood. This stage will start as soon as questionnaires start to be returned, from mid July. The 
aim is to complete the final report by the end of August.
9. Costs
This is not expected to be a hugely expensive research project, the main items that will incur cost 
are: postage;
telephone calls; 
stationery;
printing questionnaires and letters; 
production and dissemination of final report.
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Seventy three questionnaires will have to be sent initially and a significant number are likely to 
be sent out for a second time. Some questionnaires will be completed by telephone interview and 
the costs for repeat telephone calls to those who fail to respond must be included in cost 
estimations.
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Appendix 2
Water related chemical incidents questionnaire Questionnaire no:
Water Related Chemical Incidents Questionnaire
This survey w ill focus only on WATER related CHEMICAL INCIDENTS. Please do not include information 
concerning other media (such as air or land), or microbiological or any other infectious hazards.
When answering the questions please bear in mind the CIRS definition o f  an incident:
An unforeseen event leading to exposure o f two or more individuals to any 
non-radioactive substance resulting in illness or a potentially toxic threat to health 
Water incidents include those involving both primary or secondary contamination (including fire water run-off) o f  any 
water medium (drinking water, surface water, ground water, recreational waters). Both acute and chronic incidents 
should be included.
Please answer the following short questionnaire as instructed, if  possible avoid using ‘not sure’ options. Feel free to add 
any additional comments on the last page.
Section 1 -personal details
Please check and complete any missing details below
1. Name:
2. Position:
3. Health Authority:
4. Address:
5. Contact telephone number:_______________________________________
6. How long have you been employed in your current position?_______
7. Please state your educational and previous professional background: 
(e.g. clinical, public health, microbiology)
Section 2 - chem ical incident m anagem ent
1. Do you consider that non-infectious environmental hazards, and specifically chemical incidents related to water, are 
included in your work responsibilities? (please tick)
I I Yes □  N o UZ1 Not sure
2. a) Approximately how many chemical incidents in total, acute and chronic, have you been involved in managing, 
over the last five years (or since you have been in your current position)? (please tick)
□  none - go to Section 3, page 3
□  1 - 4
□  5-10
| | greater than 10 (please state number)______________
b) O f these, what percentage would you consider to be water related, involving either primary or secondary 
contamination (including fire water run-off) o f  any water medium (drinking water, surface water, groundwater, 
recreational waters)? (please tick)
| | zero - go to Section 3, page 3
□  less than 25%
| | between 25 and 50%
| | between 50 and 75%
| | greater than 75%
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3. When managing w ater related chemical incidents, which 
o f  information or advice? (tick all appropriate options) 
LO CAL/ R EG IO N AL O RGANISATIONS
Poisons Centres 1 1 Belfast
□  Cardiff
1 1 Edinburgh
1 1 London
Chem ical Incident Response Providers
1 I CCI, Birmingham
1 1 CIRS, London
1 1 SCIEH, Glasgow
Others 1 1 Fire Service
1 1 local water company
1 1 others (please list)
NATIONAL O RGANISATIONS
I I Environment A gency □
I I National Focus □
I I Health and Safety Executive I I
PERSO NAL CONTACTS
o f  the following resources have you used as sources
□ Birmingham
□ Dublin
□ Leeds
□ Newcastle
□ CIMSU, Cardiff
□ Newcastle
□ Environmental Health at district council
National Chemical Emergency Centre, AEA, Culham
Water Research Centre, Medmenham
other (please lis t)______________________________
local/regional □ Regional Epidemiologist
□ Environmental Health Officers
□ County Scientific Officer
□ Environment Agency Personnel
□ others (please list)
national □ CCDCs in other Health Authorities
□ others (please list)
LITERATURE SOURCES
I I WHO drinking water quality guidelines
□  Croner's manual o f  Substances Hazardous to the Environment 
I I computer based CD-ROM and internet searches
□  others (please lis t)________________________________________
4. O f the incidents that you have managed, which types o f  situations occur most frequently? (tick all appropriate
1 1 Drinking water contamination options)
1 1 Recreational water contamination 1 1 Fires, including water runoff
1 1 Water distribution pipes 1 1 Contamination within water treatment plant
1 1 Permitted industrial discharges 1 1 Agricultural runoff
1 1 Transport 1 1 Marine pollution
1 1 Chemical spills 1 1 other (please list)
5. In connection with WATER ONLY, have you been involved in incidents, or had enquiries, concerning any o f  the
following chemicals? (tick all appropriate options)
1 1 Aluminium □ Arsenic
1 1 Cadmium n Copper
1 1 Iron □ Lead
1 1 Manganese n Mercury
1 1 Zinc □ Ammonia
1 1 Asbestos □ Cyanide
1 1 Fluoride □ Nitrate
1 1 Pesticides □ Polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs)
1 1 Benzene □ Other hydrocarbons (including oil, petrol and diesel)
1 1 Algal toxins □ Solvents
1 1 others (please list)
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Section 3 - W ater Supply
This section o f  water supply is split into questions specifically about water companies, followed by questions on: 
private water supplies; effluents and sewage; and recreational use.
Water companies
1. Which water companies are within your health authority? (tick all appropriate options)
□ Anglian Water pic □ Bournemouth and West Hampshire Water pic
□ Bristol Water Holdings pic □ Cambridge Water pic
□ Essex and Suffolk Water □ Folkestone and Dover Water Services Ltd
□ Hartlepool Water pic □ Mid Kent Water pic
□ Mid Southern Water pic □ North Surrey Water Ltd
□ Northumbrian Water Ltd □ North West Water
□ Portsmouth Water pic □ Severn Trent pic
□ South East Water Ltd □ Southern Water
□ South Staffordshire Water pic □ South West Water pic
□ Sutton and East Surrey Water pic □ Thames Water pic
□ Three Valleys Water pic □ Tendring Hundred Water Services Ltd
□ Welsh Water □ W essex Water
□ Wrexham Water pic □ Yorkshire Water
Scotland
□ East o f  Scotland Water Authority □ North o f  Scotland Water Authority
□ West o f  Scotland Water Authority
2. Do your emergency plans include collaboration with the relevant water companies in the event o f  an incident 
affecting water? (please tick)
I I Yes □  N o d ]  N ot sure
3. Are meetings held between your health authority and the local water companies at least once a year? (please tick) 
I I Yes N o Not sure
4. a) Do your local water companies inform you about incidents o f  chemical contamination? (please tick)
I I Yes, always □  Yes, sometimes N o I I Not sure
b) In the event o f  an incident what information do they supply? (tick all appropriate options)
□  time o f  incident □  location o f  incident
I I type o f  chemical sample results with levels o f  contaminant
I I population exposed □  details on what action they are taking to remedy the situation
□  maps □  not sure
□  other (please lis t)_______________________________________________________________
c) If  environmental samples are being provided, do you obtain independent duplicate samples provided by 
someone other than the water company? (please tick)
I I Yes, always □  Yes, sometimes □  N o
5. a) With respect to locations o f  the drinking water abstraction points in your health authority, do you. 
(please tick)
I I know the locations o f  all abstraction points
I I know locations o f  some abstraction points
I I have access to information on abstraction points i f  necessary
I I have no information on abstraction points
I I not sure
b) If locations are known, do you have maps, either paper or digital, showing these?
I I Yes □  N o [ ^ |  Not sure
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Private water supplies
6. a) Are there any private water supplies in your area? (please tick)
I I Yes □  N o □ ]  Not sure
b) I f  yes, approximately how many are there?
□  0 - 9
□  1 0 - 4 9
□  5 0 - 1 0 0
I I greater than 100 (please state number)______________
I I not sure
7. Are you aware o f  any chemical problems associated with these? (please tick)
I 1 Yes □  N o [ □  Not sure
If yes please state the nature o f  these problems. _______________________________________________
8. Do you receive details o f  the monitoring o f  chemical water quality from any private supplies? (please tick) 
I I Routinely [ □  If  there is a chemical problem
I I N o □  Not sure
If yes, who do you receive this information from? {please state)
If you only receive information i f  there is a potential health problem, what is the trigger for you being informed?
Effluents and sewage
9. Do you know the locations o f  permitted discharges in your health authority area? (please tick) 
I I Yes, all o f  them □  Yes, some o f  them
I I N o □  Not sure
10. Have hazard characterisation studies been carried out for the discharges in your health authority area? 
(please tick)
I 1 Yes □  N o [ □  Not sure
11. What sewage sludge disposal techniques are used in your health authority area? (please tick)
I I Landfill □  Incineration □ )  Disposal at sea
I I Application to agricultural land ! □  Not sure
□  others (please sta te)______________________________________ _____________________________
Recreational use
12. Do you know which water resources in your health authority area are used for recreational purposes? 
(please tick)
1 1 Yes, all o f  them 1 1 Yes, some o f  them
□  No 1 1 Not sure
13. What types o f  recreational waters do you have in your health authority area? (tick all appropriate options)
1 1 estuarine 1 1 coastal
1 1 rivers 1 1 lakes
1 1 artificial lakes n  water storage reservoirs
1 1 canals 1 1 not sure
I 1 others (vlease state)
14. What are the recreational waters in your areas used for? (tick all appropriate options)
1 1 swimming 1 1 fishing
1 1 non-contact water sports, e.g. sailing 1 1 contact water sports, e.g. canoeing, wind-surfing
1 1 not sure 1 1 others (please state)
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Section 4 - Evaluation o f  the CIRS
Questionnaire no:
1. a) Have you used CIRS when managing chemical incidents? (please tick) 
I I Yes □  N o
b) I f  no, please indicate reasons why not. (please state)
2. How would you rate the usefulness o f  the current response from CIRS?
(please rank in order of usefulness, with 1 being most useful)
I I chemical information sheets □  analytical resources
□  site visits □  telephone advice
I I provision o f  legislative standards on particular chemicals
□  other (please state)___________________________________________________
3. What additional information would be o f  particular help to you in the event o f  a water related chemical incident?
4. a) Have you attended one o f  the CIRS training days for chemical incident response? (please tick)
□  Yes - answer question b) | | N o - answer question c)
b) i) If  yes, would you agree with the statement:
“the training day was o f  significant benefit in improving my skills in responding to chemical incidents" 
(please ring the most appropriate option)
strongly agree 1 2 3 4 5 strongly disagree,
ii) Do you have any suggestions for improvements with respect to training days?
c) If  no, why have you not attended a CIRS training day? (tick all appropriate options)
□  lack o f  time □  did not know training courses were provided
□  too far to travel □  no places available
n  other (please state)_________________________________________________________________
Section 5 - Future Research
1. Which journals do you read? (tick all appropriate options)
I I Chemical Incident Report (CIRS)
□  Chemical Incident (Centre for Chemical Incidents)
□  Focus on Chemical Incidents (National Focus)
I I Communicable Disease Control and Public Health (PHLS and SCIEH)
I I Occupational and Environmental Medicine (BMJ)
I I Journal o f  Public Health Medicine
I I N ew  England Journal o f  Medicine
I I British Medical Journal
I I Lancet
□  Others (please sta te)______________________________________________
2. Would you find the publication o f  more water related chemical incident reports helpful? (please tick) 
I I Yes \Z3 No 1 I Not sure
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3. What, in your opinion, are the obstacles to publishing incident reports? (tick all appropriate options)
□  N o obvious journal to publish in 
I I Lack o f  time
I I Confidentiality issues
I I Only a minor incident
□  Others (please sta te)  ____________________________________________________________
4. Which o f  the research areas below would you be interested in receiving information about?
(tick all appropriate options)
Particular chem icals
I I Nitrates in drinking water □ ]
I I O ff shore oil spills [ □
I I Algal toxins | ~ ]
I I Oestrogen mimicking chemicals I I
Incident scenarios
□  Contamination o f  recreational waters 
I I Tidal areas and pollutant dispersal
□  Private water supplies and contamination problems 
I I Transport related water contamination incidents
I I Diffuse pollution from agricultural activities, including pesticides, nitrates, phosphates
I I Sewage sludge on agricultural land and potential chemical contamination o f  water sources
□  Chemical leachates from landfill sites, mines and other contaminated land sites
W ater distribution and treatm ent
I I Polyaromatic hydrocarbons from water mains linings
□  Water recycling and the use o f  grey water 
I I Lead pipes and lead solder
□  Water distribution pipes through contaminated land
I I Chemical treatment o f  water supplies to reduce plumbosolvency
I I Identification o f  chemicals used in the treatment o f  water and provision o f  toxicological information
Incident m anagem ent
I I Compilation o f  organisations involved in incident management, their roles and the services they
provide
I I Expanding collaborations between public health and other organisations to aid incident management
I I Investigation o f  incident response procedures used internationally
I I A geographical information system (GIS) which w ill allow easy identification o f  vulnerable sites
following a water incident
I I Dispersion modelling used in conjunction with GIS to show the probable extent o f  contamination from a 
water incident, and changes over time 
I I Manual o f  common sources o f  contamination e.g. gas works sites, and the typical contaminants that
are found
I I Compilation o f  available water standards and their meanings and context
□  Risk assessment and characterisation o f  hazards from industrial discharges
Health effects
I I Lead and pregnancy, investigation o f  exposure to lead in drinking water and lead in babies
I I Epidemiological studies related to point sources o f  pollution
5. Are there any other topics related to chemical contamination o f  water that are o f  particular interest to you?
Chlorine products from drinking water disinfection
On-shore oil spills
Pesticides
others (please lis t)______________________________
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6. a) As part o f  a toolkit for responding to water related chemical incidents, which specific outputs would be useful? 
(tick all appropriate options)
I I CD-ROM
I I dispersion modelling
I I geographical information systems (GIS)
I I others (please lis t)________________________________________________________________
b) Does your health authority already use or expect to purchase a GIS system in the near future? (please tick)
□  Yes, please state which package____________________________________________________
I I N o Not sure
c) Does your health authority already use the computer statistical package SPSS (please tick)
I I Yes N o I I Not sure
d) Would your health authority have funds available to implement such outputs as a GIS system or computer 
modelling package?
I I Yes N o I I Not sure
If you would like to make any additional suggestions about water related chemical incidents, or have any comments 
about the questionnaire, please use the space provided below.
H&cuik you f a  (fowt time and coefaenatioti itt comfetetirtfy t&ie queatiowtaine
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Appendix 3
Water-Reiated Chemical Incidents Reported to CIRS from 
October 1997 -  April 2001
CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
L/97/10/030 13/10/97 nformation Tanker heading for the coast in a force 5 gale, 
turned back by two tugs
NA NA Coal tar naphtha
L/97/10/109 01/10/97 Water High levels found in water NA NA Cadmium oxide
L/97/11/005 03/11/97 Water Contaminated water supply to industrial unit NA NA Xylene
L/97/11/014 07/11/97 Water Contaminated water supply NA NA NaOH
L/97/11/016 07/11/97 Water Lead pipes in home NA NA Lead
L/97/11/027 17/11/97 Water Several hundred gallons spilled into a river NA NA Grenadine
L/97/11/030 21/11/97 Water Found in drinking water supplies, 4 times 
permitted level
NA NA
Barium
L/97/11/050 13/11/97 Water Suspected toxic levels in water supply (200 
mcg/L)
NA NA
Aluminium
L/97/11/074 17/11/97 Land PhD students testing air and water levels found 
high concentrations of mercury
NA NA
Mercury
L/97/11/109 28/11/97 Water Elevated levels in drinking water in surgery, 4 
times legal limit
NA NA
Copper
L/97/11/110 26/11/97 Spill Spill at work of 200-300 litres NA NA Wood preservative
L/97/11/117 24/11/97 Water Possible over chlorination of water NA NA Chlorinated water
L/97/11/137 27/11/97 Spill Spilt at timber yard NA NA Timber treating 
substance
L/97/12/042 10/12/97 Information Deliberately contaminated water supply NA NA Hydrocarbons 
Ammonium phosphate
L/97/12/047 09/12/97 Malicious Added to water supply and individuals bathed in 
it
NA NA Methylated spirits 
White spirit
L/97/12/049 10/12/97 Waste Suspected spill into water supply NA NA Diesel
Polyaromatic
hydrocarbons
L/97/12/050 16/12/97 Water Concern about water contamination on river and 
effect on river users
NA NA Polyaromatic
hydrocarbons
L/98/02/055 24/02/98 Water Concern about nitrate in drinking water N Y Nitrates
L/98/02/057 28/02/98 Leak Cold water tanks in hospital were drained 
for resin application, vapour tainted water
N Y Acetone
Styrene
L/98/02/084 01/08/97 Water Concern that chemicals from an old gas 
works are seeping onto a beach and 
subsequently contaminating water
Y N Cyanide
PAH
Ammonia
Phenol
L/98/03/003 01/12/97 Water High lead levels in water N Y Lead
CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
L/98/03/010 03/03/98 Not Known Fish kill in canal-unknown source of chemical Y N Unknown chemical
L/98/03/061 03/03/98 Not Known Barrels of chemicals washed up on beach, 
confusion as to their contents. Potential PH risk.
Y N
Aniline
L/98/03/102 28/02/98 Water High levels in water supply Y Y Manganese
L/98/04/024 27/04/98 Water Concern about the health implications of 
levels of chemicals in drinking water in several 
farmhouses and cottages
N Y Iron
Potassium
L/98/04/089 26/04/98 Spill 10 gallons of petrol washed down drain; 
complaints of odour from occupants of houses
Y N
Petrol
L/98/04/127 Water Concern about raised water levels and 
links with Parkinsons disease
Y Y Iron
Manganese
Nitrates
Arsenic
L/98/05/030 01/01/98 Leak 2 Hospitals supplied by same bore hole that has 
found to have raised levels of chemical
Y Y
Atrazine
U98/05/032 01/01/01 Leak Lead battery factories have contaminated 
irrigation water with lead; water goes to salac 
and crop vegetables
Y Y
Lead
L/98/05/078 19/05/98 Water Raised levels found in water supply, concern over 
levels
Y Y
Potassium solution
U98/05/094 20/05/98 Spill Truck spilt contents into lake Y Y Sodium cyanide
L/98/05/119 18/05/98 Leak Fuel pipe broke in soil resulting in approximately 
500-900 litres of kerosene being absorbed
U U
Kerosene
U98/06/005 01/01/96 Leak Contaminated stream running out of 
Colliery
Y u Phenols
Degreasing agent 
Cyanide
L/98/06/018 29/05/98 Water Water accidentally contaminated with chemica 
after plumbing mix up
N Y
Monoethylene glycol
U 98/06/122 11/05/98 Water Chemical seeped through land and through 
water supply pipes and contaminated water
U Y
Trichloroethane
L/98/07/031 09/07/98 Leak Concern about potential petrol leak from petro 
station into residential water supply
u U
Petrol
L/98/07/032 30/06/98 Food & 
Drink
Concern over levels in water used to wash 
vegetables
N Y
Sulphate magnesium
L/98/07/041 02/07/98 Leak Water came in contact with piece of treated wood 
after plumber/builder carried out repairs
U Y Copper
Chromium
Arsenic
CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
1798/07/055 16/07/98 Malicious Threat of contamination at reservoir, found by 
police on internet
U Y Aluminium 
Magnesium 
Magnesium sulphide
L798/07/059 28/07/98 Water Epoxy resin used for road works contaminated 
water supply
N Y Styrene 
Epoxy resin
L798/07/094 24/07/98 Leak Accidental spill into river Cyanide
L798/07/123 Leak Fuel oil tank broke several years previously, 
substance contaminated water supply through 
pipes
Y Y
Kerosene
L798/08/014 31/07/98 Water Spill of cyanide in water Y U Cyanide
L798/08/019 10/08/98 Water Patient drank water from domestic supply that 
appeared to be contaminated
Y Y
Chlorine
L798/08/042 12/08/98 Air Two people exposed to hydrogen sulphide at 
sewage works
Y Y
Hydrogen sulphide
L/98/08/088 27/08/98 Leak 200I leaked down street drain U N Ethyl mercaptan
L798/08/092 28/08/98 Water Cyanide found in stream after fish kill observed. Y U Cyanide
L798/08/104 04/08/98 Water Request for information about high levels o 
nitrates in drinking water supplies
U U
Nitrates
L798/09/004 01/09/98 Spill Ammonia spilt by dry cleaning company- 
contaminated water supply and swimming pools
Y Y
Ammonia
L798/09/035 11/09/98 Water Concerns about contamination of drinking 
water supplies
N Y Cadmium
Chromium
Lead
Mercury
L798/09/060 22/09/98 Water Levels in spa 0.2, as opposed to 0.1. Members 
of public can get water from spa
U U
Nitrates
L798/09/074 03/09/98 Leak Leak of fuel reported on 3/9/98 but extent of 
pollution not realised until EA had sampled on 
24/9
U U Kerosene
Diesel
L798/10/021 30/09/98 Water Increased levels found in stream Y u Cyanide
L/98/10/048 15/10/98 Spill Possible phenol contamination of stream near 
electronics workshop
U u
Phenol
L798/10/060 14/10/98 Water Excess chlorine detected in drinking water for 
several months
N Y
Chlorine
L/98/10/068 20/10/98 Water Household tap water contaminated with iron and 
Manganese
N Y Iron
Manganese
L/98/10/075 Food & 
Drink
Lead found in water supply U Y
Lead
CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
L/98/10/088 19/09/98 Leak Accidentally entered hot water supply instead of 
heating system
N Y
Fernox
L/98/10/119 28/10/98 Water Pesticide leak into private water supply on a 
holiday caravan park
U Y
Atrazine
L/98/10/132 27/10/98 Water Contaminated water supply U Y Diesel
L/98/10/139 31/10/98 Water Contaminated water supply u Y Chlorine
L/98/10/142 10/10/98 Water Squirrel killed with substance fell into domestic 
water supply
N Y
Pesticide
L/98/11/029 12/11/98 Land Chemicals penetrated land and affected 
drinking water supplies
N Y Xylene
1-methyl-4-tert-
butylbenzene
L/98/11/056 30/10/98 Water Family has long standing health problems, 
concern about water quality
U U Cadmium
Mercury
L/98/11/066 21/11/98 Water Contaminated water supply Y Y Heating oil 
Monoethylene glycol
L/98/11/093 23/11/98 Water Entered water supply N N Hydrogen peroxide
L/98/11/111 27/11/98 Spill Mussels affected by oil spill. Y N Acrylonitrile
L/98/11/115 30/11/98 Water Raised levels in drinking water Y Y Nitrates
L/98/11/123 26/11/98 Leak Sewage overflowed from pumping 
stations and into residential street.
Effluent later found to contain industrial 
compounds. Residents evacuated from their 
homes and remediation work is to be carried 
out
N N Sewage
Butoxyethanol
Cyanide
Toluene
L/98/12/001 02/12/98 Information Concern about raised levels of chemical in private 
water supply
U Y
Atrazine
L/98/12/003 02/12/98 Waste Open canister found on beach, collected by 
Surfers Against Sewage
N N
Phosphine
L/98/12/018 18/12/98 Water Water supply contaminated with fibre glass at 
university students had been washing, bathing 
and drinking with it
N Y
Fibre glass
L/98/12/073 23/12/98 Water Elevated levels found in drinking water supplies Y Y Nitrates
L/98/12/074 24/12/98 Water Elevated levels found in private drinking water 
supply
Y Y
Nitrates
L/98/12/076 30/12/98 Spill Petrol found to be in sewage drains; strong 
smell found in houses
U U
Petrol
L/99/01/035 15/01/99 Water Customers reported discoloration of drinking 
water to local water company
U Y
Iron
L/99/01/059 28/01/99 Water Benzene contaminated water being drunk by 
several members of the public
Y Y
Benzene
CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
L/99/01/064 26/01/99 Water Illegal connection between cooling water and 
mains supply leading to deposit of chemicals
Y Y Glutaraldehyde 
Sodium nitrate
L/99/01/068 28/01/99 Water Accidental ingestion of contaminated water with 
ead by family
U Y
Lead
L/99/01/080 21/01/99 Water Exposure to Cadmium in water Y Y Cadmium
L/99/01/084 12/01/99 Water Water coming out of town fountain has turned 
purple
U N Potassium
permanganate
L/99/02/008 04/02/99 Water Routine sampling of private spring by EHO 
showed high levels of Atrazine
Y U
Atrazine
U99/02/014 09/02/99 Routine check of private water supply detected 
raised levels of chemicals
Y Y Sulphates
Magnesium
L/99/02/044 05/02/99 Water Drinking water in infertility unit contaminated with 
chemical
N Y
Unknown chemical
L/99/02/067 18/02/99 Spill Water tanks contaminated by fibre glass resins 
and curing agents
N Y Hydroxy methyl
pentane
MEK
Fibre glass
L/99/02/077 24/02/99 Water Water supply contaminated with styrene U Y Styrene
L/99/02/106 23/02/99 Water Concerned about levels of chemicals in tap water U Y Chloromethylsilane
L/99/03/006 02/03/99 Other High samples of chemical detected in private 
water supply
u Y
Diuron
L/99/03/038 05/03/99 Water Water post treatment in office block contaminated 
with Copper
N Y
Copper
L/99/03/044 23/03/99 Water Motel had its water system serviced and engineer 
noticed a problem with the water
N Y
Methyl chloroform 
Diesel
L/99/04/013 01/04/99 Leak Water company has become aware of a Petrol 
leak of unleaded Petrol from a garage which 
they think has contaminated a 
borehole/groundwater
U U
Petrol
L/99/04/052 19/04/99 Water Spill of Kerosene into private well Y Y Kerosene
L/99/04/058 22/04/99 Water Rerouting of water supplies to 80 households, 
sampling of samples detected high levels of 
Coal tar in the water
Y Y
Coal tar
L/99/04/073 01/04/99 Info. High levels of Copper detected in water supply 
at a hospital
U Y
Copper
L/99/04/074 22/04/99 Water Complaints of bad taste in the water from 
residential water supply
U Y Xylene
Benzene

CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
L/99/04/093 27/04/99 Land Football pitch size site, not normally available 
to public discovered by accident noticec 
drainage problems due to illegally connectec 
pipes from site to sewer pipe.
N U
Cyanide
L/99/05/025 22/05/99 Water Raised iron levels detected in water supply N Y Iron
L/99/05/026 Other Stream next to old leather works is 
contaminated with chemicals. (Has been going 
on for several years)
Y U Trichloroethylene
Perchlorethylene
L/99/05/033 16/05/99 Spill Plastic drum on back of tractor with a new 
chemical spilt into water source.
Y N
Pyrethroid
L/99/05/053 Land CCDC reported deposit found in water U U Tin
Zinc
L/99/05/081 26/05/99 Water Chlorine dioxide in their water supply exposed via 
skin and eyes
N Y
Chlorine dioxide
L/99/06/010 06/06/99 Water 50L Ferric acid and 80L print screening solution 
spilt into a drainage system in an industrial unit.
N Y Ferric chloride
Print screening
solution
L/99/06/030 24/06/99 Water Pt is 70 yr old pharmacist with colitis whc 
claims his water supply is contaminated with 
lead. EHOs contacted public health.
N U
Lead
L/99/06/052 15/06/99 Water Unknown chemical in water caused oral/bucca 
health effects including swelling, blistering and 
nausea. Water had bad taste/odour after relining 
work done to water pipes.
N Y
Unknown
L/99/06/108 16/06/99 Malicious Terrorist threat to public water supply N U Paraquat
L/99/06/114 28/06/99 Water Fibre glass found in home water supply. N Y Fibre glass
L/99/07/008 07/02/99 Water Accidental ingestion of contaminated water supply 
by a lady.
U Y
Oil
L/99/07/031 07/09/99 Water Water contaminated by Diuron, which was used to 
treat water.
Y U
Diuron
L/99/07/050 19/07/99 Water EHO found high levels of nitrates in a private 
water supply.
U Y
Nitrates
L/99/07/077 01/07/99 Water Water was initially noticed to be blue in the 
hospital. CCDC requested info, on coppei 
toxicity. Blue water was especially noticeable 
on a Monday and a measurement of 14ppir 
was recorded. Typical results ranged from 3-6 
micro-g/L
N Y
Copper
L/99/07/081 31/07/99 Water 77mg/L benzene & petrol found in residential 
water supply of 4-5 houses.
N Y Benzene
Petrol
L/99/07/084 27/07/99 Water Cyclohexane
CIRS
Reference [ 
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Release to
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Release to 
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Chemical
U99/07/121 26/07/99!Spill kerosene oil spill from a damaged tank causec 
and contamination on a private property.
N N
kerosene
L/99/08/005 03/08/99 A/a ter .ady concerned about her lead pipes changed 
o copper used for her water supply.
N Y .ead
Hopper
L/99/08/020 16/08/99 \A/ater 3urst water main petrol in drain. U U Detrol
L/99/08/045 19/08/99 NA/ater Raised levels in drinking water. N Y Hopper
L/99/08/058 16/08/99 A/ater Accidental ingestion of contaminated water with 
ead.
N U
Lead
L/99/08/061 16/08/99 A/ater Water contaminated with chemicals. U Y Benzene
U99/08/069 23/08/99 Water Contamination of water supply by lead. N Y Lead
U99/09/002 02/09/99 Water Raised levels of manganese detected in watei 
supply.
N Y
Manganese
L/99/09/029 10/09/99 Water Water company detected chemicals present in 
water.
U U
Unknown
U99/09/031 01/09/99 Water A private water supply that supplies a primary 
school has high levels of naturally occurrinc 
fluoride.
u Y
Fluoride
L/99/09/066 10/09/99 Water MCPB found in water supply @ 0.134 mg/l - PH 
concerned that water co. says not dangerous.
Y Y
MCPB
L/99/09/073 08/09/99 Water Pathlab found nitrates in the drinking water. GP 
concerned for pregnant patient.
U Y
Nitrates
L/99/09/075 20/09/99 Water Water company found high levels of polyaromatic 
hydrocarbons, creosote, benzofuran, di- 
benzofuran, anthracene, dibenzophthiophine & 
quiniline following complaints by residents.
U Y Polyaromatic
hydrocarbons
Creosote
L/99/09/090 25/09/99 Water Water company detected hydrocarbons and 
kerosene in a private water supply.
N Y Kerosene
Hydrocarbons
L/99/09/099 Water Anti-fouling boat paint somehow (deliberately?) 
contaminated a water supply.
U Y Paint
Xylene
Copper
Ethylbenzene
L/99/09/104 30/09/9S Water Water supply contaminated by heating o 
(320ug/l)
I N Y
Heating oil
L/99/09/107 Water Contaminated water supply in a residentia 
area, due to contaminated pipes.
N Y
Hydrocarbons
L/99/11/010 05/11/95 Water Water contaminated in a block of flats with 
chemicals.
U Y Petrol
Benzene
Toluene
L/99/11/035 12/11/9 9 Spill Spill of diesel a week ago, land contaminate! 
under block of flats. Residents evacuated.
1 N N
Diesel
CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
L/99/11/054 17/11/99 i/Vater ngestion of contaminated water, where there is 
thought to be some sort of water contamination.
U U
Bleach
L/99/11/090 Spill Water contaminated with above chems. U U Petrol
Benzene
Toluene
L/99/11/106 Spill Fuel oil kerosene / petrol spilt in a residential 
well.
N Y Petrol
Kerosene
L/99/12/022 16/12/99 Water Contamination of water supply with chemicals. N Y Iron
Copper
Zinc
L/99/12/029 19/12/99 Water Accidental ingestion of Chlorine from 
contaminated water supply.
U Y
Chlorine
L/99/12/032 Water Contaminated water supply caused illness. N Y Chlorine
L/99/12/035 Leak Fuel oil contaminated residential water supply 
of 3 cottages.
N Y
Oil
L/99/12/036 Leak 45 Gallon pyrene drum found spilled on the side of 
a road in a gully
U N
Pyrene
L/99/12/075 11/12/99 Air Trying to stop water leak. N Y Nitrates
L/99/12/089 24/12/99 Spill 0.5 tonne fuel bunker oil spill in harbour. Washed 
up into gardens & harbour wall.
Y N
Oil
L/99/12/092 16/11/99 Water Raised levels of heavy metals found in drinking 
water
N Y Iron
Copper
Zinc
L/00/01/018 19/01/00 Water Water authority detected high chloride 
contamination, and did further sampling to detect 
source. Some patients have complained of feeling 
unwell, and would like to know if the contaminated 
water is the cause.
Y Y
1,3 Dichloro 5,5 
Dimethyl Hydantoin
L/00/01/024 28/01/00 Water Leak of chemical. N N Formic acid
L/00/01/090 13/01/00 Spill A resident reported an incident at his property 
involving spillage of hydraulic oil from £ 
broken tank. The oil covered his garden anc 
pathway and has now made its way into th( 
house.
N N
Hydraulic oil
U00/01/093 Land Hexachlorobutadiene found in peoples home 
build on the edge of a chemical dump.
U U
Hexachlorobutadiene
L/00/02/011 03/02/0C Water Domestic water supply contaminated with lead (26 
houses).
N Y
Lead
CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
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Chemical
L/00/02/051 23/12/99 Leak Over Christmas 1000 lites of kerosene leaked 
from a fuel tank. Fuel has now leaked into the 
neighbour’s garden and they have reported funny 
smells/headaches, they also have a private well.
U U
Kerosene
L/00/02/071 03/02/00 Water Raised lead levels detected during water sampling 
on a council estate.
U Y
Lead
L/00/02/075 29/02/00 Land 20 damaged drums found on steel works site. Y U Xylene
Toluene
L/00/02/077 02/02/00 Water Tenants in a block of flats, noticed that 
their drinking water was pink.
U Y Caustic soda 
Sodium bicarbonate 
Sodium hypochlorite
L/00/02/082 01/08/99 Leak Leak from the petrol station migrated through 
soil into houses.
Y Y
Petrol
L/00/03/004 02/03/00 Spill 30,000 litres of "slurry" spilt into a river. Health 
authority have been assured that there is no risk 
to Public Health and the water companies have 
been notified that there is no risk to domestic 
water supply.
Y N
Unknown
L/00/03/005 02/03/00 Water Routine sampling of a private water supply 
identified herbicide present in water.
U Y
Herbicide
L/00/03/029 Spill Canning factory own water supply caused ar 
unknown quantity of bromine to enter int< 
mains water supply.
N
I
Y
Bromine
L/00/03/034 Water Insecticide dieldrin (0.099 mg/l) found in private 
drinking water supply following routine sampling.
N Y
Dieldrin
L/00/03/096 25/02/00 Water A shutdown for repairs caused flow  
changes which resulted in disturbance of main 
sediments causing discoloration.
N Y Iron
Manganese
Aluminium
L/00/03/115 28/03/00 Spill Elevated level of this pesticide found in private 
water supply (0.099 mg/l).
N Y
Dieldrin
L/00/03/122 23/03/00 Spill 8000I spill of aviation turbine fuel from a pipeline 
that runs through a residential area.
N U
Aviation fuel
L/00/03/123 Other Family living in a rural area suffering unexplained 
health effects.
U U Unknown
Formaldehyde
L/00/04/003 Water Water contamination by a former Lead Smelting 
Factory.
Y N
Lead
L/00/04/004 Land CCDC concerned that leachate (from a reclaimed 
landfill) collecting in a golf course culvert may 
contaminate water or golfers.
N Y
Unknown
CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
L/00/04/005 14/04/00 Water Pump failure at the waterworks caused 
iron deposits in the mains to be distributed 
Resulted in discoloration of water and health 
effects in customers.
N Y Iron
Manganese
L/00/04/009 03/04/00 Water Maritime & Coastguard agency reported container 
lost overboard containing drums with these 
chemicals.
Y N Cresol
Epichlorhydrin
L/00/04/018 Leak Petrol spill. U U Petrol
L/00/04/070 05/04/00 Leak 8000I of petrol leaked from underground storage 
into sewers. People evacuated by environmental 
health.
U U
Petrol
L/00/04/071 31/03/00 Water Office block's water contaminated with corrosion 
inhibitor.
N Y
Corrosion Inhibitors
L/00/04/077 30/04/00 Fire Fire in a factory warehouse. U U Unknown 
White spirit 
Aniline 
Naphthalene
U00/05/009 05/05/00 Water Person that lives in an army camp was told tc 
stop drinking the water. 62-3mg/l alcohol & 
benzenes found.
U Y
Petrol
L/00/05/010 Water Water company received 20 complaints 
Thought to be contaminated with bitumer 
lined tanks or PAHs.
u Y
Unknown
L/00/05/071 05/05/00 Water Water standing in a bitumen lined water main 
was allowed to enter the distribution system in 
error.
N Y PAH
Naphthalene
L/00/05/079 Water Elevated levels (0.7 ppm) found in private water 
supply.
U Y
Diuron
L/00/05/088 25/04/00 Water Elevated levels of benzene & xylene found in 
water supply after the water tower had be relined 
with bitumen.
N Y Bitumen
PAH
U00/05/090 Water Private water supply persistently fails 
PCVs
U Y Iron
Aluminium
Trihalomethanes
L/00/05/095 Water Raised levels of pesticide found in private water 
supply.
u Y
Pesticide
L/00/05/096 Not Known Raised nitrate levels found in private water supply 
to a food processing site.
u Y
Nitrates
L/00/06/013 08/06/00 Water Water supply contaminated. N Y Iron
L/00/06/034 15/06/00 Water Hydrochloric acid used to clean a water tank 
contaminated water.
N U
Hydrochloric acid
CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
L/00/06/046 23/06/00 Water Solvents contamination in water. U U Solvents
L/00/06/051 Water Yellow water in house. U U Unknown
L/00/06/057 Water Petrochemicals found in domestic water 
supply of 3 families.
N Y Toluene
Benzene
Ethylbenzene
Xylene
U00/06/061 Water Raised levels of bromate found in a domestic 
aquifer.
Y Y
Bromate
L/00/06/080 Waste Elevated levels of lindane found in a river. Y N Lindane
L/00/06/083 Water Benzene & tetrachloroethylene found in water 
stream going through basement of a house.
Y U Benzene
Tetrachloroethylene
L/00/06/094 Land Sampling by water utility found elevated level of 
lead contamination.
N U
Lead
L/00/07/011 07/08/00 Spill Spill of 25 litre drum of acetone. 15 litres into 
Thames
Y N
Acetone
L/00/07/039 22/07/00 Water Scouts water supply in a 20-30 gallon tub was 
contaminated.
N Y
Kerosene
L/00/07/048 Water Hydrocarbons contamination of a private 
water supply.
N Y Hydrocarbons
Oil
L/00/07/079 Water Xylene found in water system of hospital. U Y Xylene
L/00/07/080 19/07/00 Fire Large fire in an industrial estate. Also resulted in 
water contamination & fish kill. Fall out of 
chromium carbonate also occurred.
Y U Smoke
Pesticide
L/00/07/089 Other Chemical recycling works went into liquidation 
and left the cleanup to the site owners.
U N Phenol
Mercury
Solvents
L/00/08/016 18/07/00 Spill Lindane contamination of a reservoir. U Y Lindane
L/00/08/020 07/11/00 Spill Organophosphates spilt in river - Massive fish kill. Y U Fungicide
Organophosphates
Formaldehyde
L/00/08/064 Water Elevated levels Manganese found in water supply. U Y Manganese
L/00/08/074 Leak Former pesticide factory thought to have 
contaminated drinking water supplies with lindane.
Y Y
Lindane
L/00/08/083 Spill Chemical spill into river. Large fish kill. Y U Squalene 
Palmatic oil 
Butanoic oil
L/00/09/009 04/09/00 Spill 1000L of 3 chemicals spilt into a surface drain. Y N Aromatic
hydrocarbons
Acetone
CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
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water
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Chemical
L/00/09/016 Water Hydrocarbons found in water. U U Hydrocarbons
L/00/09/027 Water Raised levels of Manganese found in water 
supply.
U Y
Manganese
L/00/09/061 02/09/00 Malicious Vandals poured barrels of these chemicals down a 
surface drain.
Y U Aromatic
hydrocarbons
N,N-
dimethylacetamide
Solvents
U00/09/067 10/08/00 Air Diesel spill in a basement caused fumes to 
contaminate domestic water supply.
N Y
Diesel
L/00/09/068 Not Known Unknown chemical contamination of water supply. U U Unknown
L/00/10/033 Water Evidence of hydrocarbon contamination of water 
following the floods in South East England.
Y U
Hydrocarbons
L/00/10/041 Waste Elevated levels of Aluminium found in local water 
supply.
U u
Aluminium
L/00/10/051 Spill 80 Gallons latex spilt. Y N Latex
U00/10/069 30/10/00 Fire Fire at a chemical recycling plant. Y Y Hydrocarbons 
Acid (unknown) 
Smoke
Products of 
combustion
Chlorinated phenols
L/00/10/082 Water Raised levels of iron found in a domestic water 
supply.
U Y
Iron
L/00/11/006 03/11/00 Water Transport tanker sunk off an island with full cargo 
of chemicals still on board.
N N
Styrene
L/00/11/028 Water Private water supply contamination. U U Unknown
L/00/11/030 Water Lead thought to be in water supply. U U Lead
L/00/11/062 Not Known Mercury found in water supply. U U Mercury
L/00/11/078 21/11/00 Food & 
Drink
Bottled water contaminated with sewage sludge 
(product recall).
Y U
Sewage
L/00/11/087 Water Water very hard on factory site. U U Magnesium
Calcium
L/00/11/090 Water Elevated levels of iron found in drinking water of a 
boarding school.
U U
Iron
L/00/11/098 Water Elevated levels of Nitrates found in peoples 
homes following flooding.
Y U
Nitrates
CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
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Chemical
L/00/11/107 30/10/00 Waste Elevated levels of Iron and Manganese found in 
drinking water.
U Y
Iron
Manganese
L/00/12/015 Land Dioxins in floodwater contaminated homes. Y N Dioxins
L/00/12/047 Land Heavy rain on chrome dump is leaching out the 
metal.
Y N
Chrome
L/00/12/053 Leak Boat leaking Petrochemical. Y N Petrochemical
L/00/12/056 Water Flood water is passing though a MSW landfill and 
then entering residential homes.
Y N
Unknown
L/00/12/057 Water Elevated levels of chemicals found in flood water. Y N Ammonia
Unknown
L/00/12/068 Water Contaminants present in floodwater potentially 
entering peoples homes.
Y U Sewage
Unknown
Diesel
L/00/12/071 Water Elevated levels of nitrates found in 18 homes. U U Nitrates
L/00/12/072 Water Elevated levels of Copper found in a private watei 
supply.
U u
Copper
L/00/12/073 Spill Kerosene spill in residential area. u u Kerosene
L/00/12/074 Water Elevated levels of Uranium found in drinking 
water.
u Y
Uranium
L/01/01/029 01/08/00 Water Copper in drinking water. u U Copper
L/01/01/054 Spill Spill into a water course. Y N Resins solution
L/01/01/073 Waste Elevated levels found in drinking water. U Y Arsenic
L/01/02/029 05/02/01 Water Water contamination following pipes treated. N Y Unknown
L/01/02/039 Waste Copper in drinking water. U Y Copper
L/01/02/067 Information Elevated levels of aluminium in water. U U Aluminium
L/01/02/073 Waste Chemicals released in small water tank. U Y Unknown
L/01/02/083 Water Relining of water tanks released chemicals to 
drinking water.
Y Y Styrene
Epoxy acrylates
L/01/02/092 Water Elevated concentration of Nitrates in ground water 
following heavy rains.
Y U
Nitrates
L/01/02/093 01/09/00 Water Elevated levels of chemicals in drinking 
water.
U U Zinc
Copper
L/01/02/099 Air Odours from a landfill flooded site. Y N Mercaptan
L/01/02/107 Water Raised levels of Ammonium nitrate found in 
drinking water.
U Y
Ammonium nitrate
L/01/02/115 Information Concerns about radon in soil penetrating water 
supplies.
N N
Radioactive material
CIRS
Reference
Number
Date of Cl Type Circumstances
Release to 
water
Release to
water
supply
Chemical
L/01/02/120 Water Elevated levels of contaminants found ir 
drinking water.
U Y
Arsenic
Fluoride 
Sodium oxide
L/01/02/121 Waste Elevated levels of contaminant found in private 
water supply.
U Y Sodium oxide 
Fluoride
L/01/03/081 Water Rural farmsteads private water supply 
found to have excess levels of chemicals.
u Y Aluminium
Nitrates
L/01/03/084 01/01/01 Water Iron oxide slug released following pipe works. u Y Iron
L/01/03/085 Water Chemical in water mains. u Y Pentachlorophenol
L/01/03/089 01/04/99 Leak Repeated petrol leaks from a petrol station. u U Petrol
L/01/04/054 27/04/01 Not Known Damaged ship at a harbour. Leaking chemicals. 
High population density in area surrounding. 
Incident to Gold Command.
Sodium Chlorite 
Hexafluorosilic acid
Y - release to water or water supply U - unknown
N - no release to water or water supply NA - information not available
N.B. The incidents highlighted in bold have had direct input to their management from 
the research engineer.
Appendix 4
CONFIDENTIAL
To be completed by 2nd tier
CIRS R e f : ........................................................... In c id en t n a m e .................................................................
Exercise:.................................................
CHEMICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE SERVICE 
MEDICAL TOXICOLOGY UNIT, LONDON  
CHEMICAL INCIDENT REPORT FORM
1. NOTIFICATION OF INCIDENT TO CIRS/2nd tier
Date Time
Who Position
Tel No Fax No
Address
Health Aut lority (if known)
2. CIRCUMSTANCES /AGENT(S)/PATIENTS DETAILS
Start date of incident End date of incident
General Text box e.g. site of incident and circumstances
SAMPLES REQUESTED YES NO
Biological YES NO
Environmental YES NO
1
CONFIDENTIAL
Type of incident ✓ Location (address, type or manufacturer etc.)
Air
Explosion
Fire
Food and drink
Land
Leak
Malicious act
Medicines
Spill
Transport accident
Waste
Water
Not known
Other (specify)
Chemical(s) Amount (mls/Its/kgs/tonnes)
1.
2 .
3.
4.
5.
3. PATIENT DETAILS
Number exposed
Number affected
Number dead
Any secondary contamination?
Any tertiary contamination?
Name of patients (if known) Date of Birth/Hosp no.
1.
2.
3.
4.
2
CONFIDENTIAL
4. LABORATORY SAMPLES
4a: Samples already taken
Biological Results Antidotes Dispatched
Blood Yes No
Urine Yes No
Other Yes No
Non-Biological
Type (specify)
Suspect matter
Type (specify)
4b: Samples advised by CIRS
Biological Advised Urgent Non-urgent Cost agreed Antidotes Dispatched
Blood Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Urine Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Other Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Non-Biological
Type (specify) Yes No Yes No Yes No
Suspect matter
Type (specify)
3
CONFIDENTIAL
V
5: CONTACT WITH OR NOTIFICATION OF:
Professional/
Agency
Name Tel No When
(Date/Time)
Action
Public Health
Hospital(s)
Environmental Health
Manufacturer/ 
Company chemist
Other Poisons Centre
Environment Agency
Water Company
Emergency Services
MAFF
FOCUS
Other (specify)
6. CIRS CHECKLIST AND MONITORING OF INCIDENT RESPONSE
Services Date/Time Who Information source
NPIS contact to medic
Medic recall to initial caller
NPIS/CIRS information
Service Action Additional information
Literature search Frequency?
Site visit requested
Report needed For MTU 
For local PH 
For DoH
Press inquiry contact MTU 
Local PH 
DoH
Form completed by 
Date: ......................
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Appendix 5
Faith Goodfellow
14 March 2001
Personal details and experience
N am e:....................................................................................
Job title :.................................................................................
Work address:..........................................................................................
Telephone num ber:..............................................................
Email address:.......................................................................
Please briefly describe your current main job responsibilities:
Please also describe any previous jobs that are relevant to chemical incident management:
For approximately how many years has your work involved aspects of chemical incident 
management?...................................................
Approximately how many chemical incidents have you been involved in during this time?
Please provide any other information relevant to your experience in the management o f 
chemical incidents.
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Development of Best Practice Model and 
Incorporation of Expert Comment
The aim of this consultation process is to incorporate comments and opinions into the best 
practice model for the public health response to chemical incidents. Comments are being 
sought from public health professionals and also additional organisations, agencies or 
companies who may form part o f the overall management o f a chemical incident, including 
local authority environmental health, Environment Agency, water industry and government. It 
is important that a broad range o f expertise is incorporated in the best practice model and your 
input is greatly valued.
Application of the best practice model
In providing comments on the best practice model please remember that:
• the aim is to identify generic issues covering all types o f chemical incident; and
• the purpose behind the model is to prevent or minimise the public health impact of a 
chemical incident.
Please also note that the model is not intended for use by responders in an actual incident, 
specific guidance is being devised for this purpose. The model is a method o f identifying all 
the relevant issues, prior to producing a guidance manual for emergency response.
Comments and opinions
Please provide your comments and opinions on:
• what is already included in the model;
• any additional issues that you think should be included in the model;
• any further comments on the structure of the model or any more general comments about 
the development of the best practice model.
Please also provide a rating for each action in terms of its importance in being 
considered/conducted at the immediate response stage or later in the management process, as 
described below.
Rating the actions
The aim of the rating exercise is to identify which issues should be considered in the initial 
emergency response period, within the first few hours of being alerted to the incident.
Although the model has been split into stages, within each stage the actions will have varying 
levels of importance in terms of whether they should be conducted immediately or form part 
of the extended management process. Please rate, on a scale o f 1-5, how important you feel it 
is that each of the stated actions are considered/conducted in the initial emergency response 
period, where:
1 = essential action for initial emergency response in the first few hours
2 = action required in early hours of the incident, within the first 24 hours
3 = action is part of the management process in the first few days of the incident
4 = action forms part of the extended management process, within 1-2 weeks
5 = action can be delayed until the follow-up stage, after the initial management
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The higher the rating assigned, the longer the timescale available in which to carry out the 
specified action. You may find that the rating you would give depends on whether the incident 
is acute or chronic, if  in doubt, assume the model is for application in acute chemical 
incidents, e.g. spills, fires, as opposed to chronic problems, e.g. routine emissions from 
industrial facilities or historically contaminated land. Try to provide ratings that would be 
applicable to most types of incidents, even if for a specific incident you might rate an action 
differently. The primary focus of the model is on the more frequently occurring minor 
chemical incidents, rather than the rare events at a catastrophic or disaster level.
The stages one to four are not necessarily completed in chronological order, in particular, not 
all the actions in the identification stage need to be completed before moving on to the 
management stage. For stage one (identification) it is expected that the actions stated in the 
model are likely to fall within the initial emergency response (i.e. rating o f 1), and those in 
stage four (post incident review) are not expected to be part of the emergency response (i.e. 
rating o f 5), however, please still rate the actions in these stages to confirm their status.
If  you have any further questions about the best practice model or would like to discuss your 
views in more detail please contact Faith Goodfellow at the Chemical Incident Response 
Service.
telephone: 020 7771 5380
email: faith.goodfellow@gstt.sthames.nhs.uk
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Comments and Ratings
1. It is advised that you browse through the model first, before assigning ratings
2. Please remember that the aim of the model is to prevent or minimise a public health 
impact, when providing ratings this should be the primary consideration
3. The aim is to identify generic actions for all types of incidents, please try to rate on 
the basis of most types of incident
4. Please write comments/amendments in the appropriate section or in the space 
provided at the end of each stage
5. Where you have provided additional issues/actions to be included in the model please 
also provide an associated rating
Stage 1: Identification
initial follow 
response up
1 2 3 4 5 Comments
IN C ID EN T D O C U M EN TA TIO N
record incident details
record 24 hour contact names and numbers 
of all organisations/agencies involved
start logs for incoming and outgoing calls 
and actions taken
Additional suggested actions with ratings
IDENTIFICATIO N OF CH EM ICAL(S)
name, unique number, constituents of a 
mixture
identify manufacturer of product involved 
(where constituents/properties are unknown)
common uses of the chemical/product
physical properties
taste/odour properties
basic human toxicology of the chemicals
synergistic or antagonistic effects of 
multiple chemicals
Additional suggested actions with ratings
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initial follow 
response up
1 2 3 4 5 Comments
IDENTIFICATIO N OF C O N T A M IN A T IO N  SO U R C E
current geographical location of 
contamination source
Additional suggested actions with ratings
DETER M INATIO N OF M O VEM EN 1 O l 'T Im C O N T A M IN A N T
direction of movement of the contaminant
identify nearby vulnerable locations, e.g. 
rivers, aquifers, schools, hospitals, nursing 
homes
Additional suggested actions with ratings
IDENTIFICATIO N OF E X PO SU R E  PA T H W A Y
try to establish what the pathway/route of 
exposure between the source of 
contamination and the human receptors is
Additional suggested actions with ratings
IDENTIFICATION OF A C T U A L/PO T EN TIA L L Y  E X PO SE D  PO PULATIO N
number of people already exposed
total potentially exposed population
nearby populations that may become 
exposed
ascertain if any health effects are reported
Additional suggested actions with ratings
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initial follow 
response up
1 2 3 4 5
IDENTIFICATION OF LEVEL OF EXPOSURE
amount of the contaminant released
concentration of the contaminant in relevant 
media
time period of exposure
Additional suggested actions with ratings
INCIDENT STATUS
Decide on incident status, i.e. whether to 
declare a ‘major incident’ or any other 
incident classification
Additional suggested actions with ratings
ANY FURTHER COMMENTS OR ADDITIONAL SIJGGES1’ED ACTIONS (with ratings)
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Stage 2: Investigation
initial follow 
response up
1 2 3 4 5 Comments
INCIDENT DOCUMENTATION
continue to record incident details
keep current 24 hour contact names and 
numbers
complete logs for incoming and outgoing 
calls and actions taken
Additional suggested actions with ratings
IDENTIFICATION OF CHEMICAL(S)
ensure all chemicals involved have been 
correctly identified and relevant details on 
properties (including environmental 
persistency) and toxicity (including 
biological uptake) are determined 
N.B. there may be multiple chemicals, 
reaction products and additional chemicals 
added as part of the management, e.g. fire 
fighting
Additional suggested actions with ratings
IDENTIFICATION OF CONTAMINATION SOURC
confirm location of contamination source, 
with postcode and/or grid reference where 
possible
where location o f source is in doubt consider 
use of modelling to predict possible sources
Additional suggested actions with ratings
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Faith Goodfellow
14 March 2001
initial follow 
response up
1 2 3 4 5 Comments
DETERMINATION OF MOVEMENT OF TIIE CONTAMINANT
identify all environmental media affected, 
i.e. air, water and land
determine current weather conditions
predictions o f future weather conditions
confirm direction of movement of the 
contaminant and ensure regular updates are 
received to monitor for any changes
when direction of movement o f contaminant 
is in doubt consider use of modelling to 
predict possible areas at risk
confirm nearby vulnerable locations, e.g. 
rivers, aquifers, schools, hospitals, nursing 
homes
Additional suggested actions with ratings
IDENTIFICATION OF EXPOSURE PATHWAY
confirm the pathway/route of exposure 
between source of contamination and human 
receptors, including food contamination
Additional suggested actions with ratings
IDENTIFICATION OF ACTUAL/POTENTIALLY EXPOSED OR AFFECTED POPULATION
confirm number o f people already exposed 
or possibly exposed to the contamination
where possible obtain names and addresses, 
include visitors to the area
confirm type of health effects reported and 
number of people affected
mark cases reported on a map or in 
geographical information system (GIS)
confirm additional nearby populations that 
may become exposed
identify and alert particularly vulnerable 
populations, for example, through health 
visitors, vulnerable patient support groups, 
etc.
Additional suggested actions with ratings
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Faith Goodfellow
14 March 2001
initial follow 
response up
1 2 3 4 5 Comments
IDENTIFICATION OF LEVEL OF EXPOSURE
confirm amount o f the contaminant released
confirm concentrations of the contaminant in 
relevant media and at various locations and 
times
ensure most up-to-date analysis results have 
been received
estimate time period of exposure, 
differentiating between various populations 
if exposed for different time periods
Additional suggested actions with ratings
CONTACT WITH RELEVANT RESPONSE ORGANISATIO1ISIS
health organisations -  chemical incident 
provider unit, neighbouring health 
authorities, A&E hospitals, GPs
emergency services -  police, ambulance, fire 
brigade, Maritime and Coastguard Agency
local authority -  environmental health
local authority - emergency planning, 
housing, social services
water companies -  water supply, sewerage
enforcement agencies - Environment 
Agency, Health and Safety Executive, Food 
Standards Agency
government -  DH, DETR, DWI
occupational health professionals -  industry 
and emergency response organisations
environmental specialists, consultancies
A d d itio n a l su ggested  action s w ith  ratin gs
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Faith Goodfellow
14 March 2001
initial follow 
response up
1 2 3 4 5 Comments
ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN BY OTHER RELEVANT ORGAN ISATIONS
identify contact personnel and record 24 
hour contact details
detail actions taken by other organisations 
involved, as identified through contact stage
Additional suggested actions with ratings
INCIDENT STATUS
Confirm current incident status, i.e. ‘major 
incident’ or any other incident classification
Assess whether the severity of the incident is 
likely to escalate
Additional suggested actions with ratings
ANY FURTHER COMMENTS OR ADDITIONAL SIJGGES1"ED ACTIONS (with ratings)
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Faith Goodfellow
14 March 2001
Stage 3: Management actions
initial follow 
response up
1 2 3 4 5 Comments
IN C ID EN T  D O C U M EN TA TIO N
continue to record incident details
keep current 24 hour contact names/numbers
complete logs for incoming and outgoing 
calls and actions taken
Additional suggested actions with ratings
IN C ID EN T CONTROL TEAM  EORM ATKT*
consider forming an incident control team
identify incident control team members -  
representatives from key organisations 
involved in the management with the 
necessary seniority and expertise to be able 
to take decisions
find appropriate location for incident room
ensure necessary facilities are available -  
telephones, administrative support for 
provision of minutes, etc.
ensure contact numbers for the incident 
control team are provided to other relevant 
parties
determine frequency of meetings
Additional suggested actions with ratings
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Faith Goodfellow
14 March 2001
initial follow 
response up
1 2 3 4 5 Comments
ACUTE HEALTH ASSESSMENT
full record of any health effects reported
patient identification -  through GPs, 
pharmacists, hospitals, reports to 
HA/LA/other agencies
record patient details - names and addresses
compile register of exposed public
compile register of exposed emergency 
responders
ensure patients/exposed population are 
adequately decontaminated
ensure appropriate medical treatment is 
available for patients
toxicological evaluation of exposure data to 
determine possible and most likely impacts 
on health
determine a precise case definition
determine whether there are other possible 
causes of ill health, e.g. viral infections
consider conducting biological monitoring 
of patients and the exposed population to 
identify level of exposure and adverse health 
effects
consider distributing a health questionnaire 
to identify level of exposure and adverse 
health effects
Additional suggested actions w ith ratings
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14 March 2001
initial follow 
response up
1 2 3 4 5 Comments
ACTIONS TO MINIMISE HUMAN EXPOSIJRE
alert affected general population and those 
potentially affected if  movement of 
contaminant is expected, include vulnerable 
populations
provision of appropriate advice to 
prevent/minimise exposure -  e.g. 
evacuation, sheltering, stop drinking/using 
drinking water, find alternative dialysis 
facilities
arrange for provision of alternative water 
supplies, where regular supplies cannot be 
used
alert other water users, e.g. food 
manufacturers, agricultural facilities
ensure personnel directly involved in 
tending to potentially contaminated patients 
or cleaning up the hazard do not become 
contaminated themselves, provide 
appropriate personal protective equipment 
and decontamination facilities
Additional suggested actions with ratings
ACTIONS TO MITIGATE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND MIGRATION OF 
CONTAMINANT
ensure relevant environmental organisations 
have been informed, i.e. Environment 
Agency, MCA
ensure actions are being taken to remove or 
contain the source o f contamination and that 
chemicals or contaminated substances are 
appropriately disposed of
protect vulnerable locations, e.g. drinking 
water abstraction points
Additional suggested actions with ratings
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Faith Goodfellow
14 March 2001
initial follow 
response up
1 2 3 4 5 Comments
E N V IR O N M EN TA L  M O NITO RING
determine if any routine results from 
environmental sampling are already 
available
establish what environmental samples need 
to be take: media, when, where, who will 
take them and what parameters are to be 
tested for
identify laboratory for analysis
agree financing, establish timescales for 
reporting of results
initiate sampling, ensuring samples are 
collected and stored appropriately
ensure samples are sent for analysis, ensure 
appropriate analytical techniques are used 
and quality control procedures are adequate
establish method for interpreting data, define 
limits of detection, limitations from 
sampling procedure, accuracy of analytical 
method, relevant standards for comparison, 
including taste and odour
conduct any repeat sampling and analysis to 
confirm results or to detect changes in 
concentrations
Additional suggested actions w ith ratings
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14 March 2001
initial follow 
response up
1 2 3 4 5 Comments
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC AND MEDIA
ensure awareness of the public and relevant 
organisations of the situation, including 
residents groups
define population ‘at risk’ to avoid 
unnecessary concern from unaffected 
individuals.
provide clear and consistent information on 
the nature o f the hazard and the level of risk
ensure affected populations understand what 
actions they need to take (e.g. stop using 
water, leave home, consult GP etc.)
provision of press releases to alert the public
provision of press releases with follow-up 
information on how the incident is being 
managed
consider setting up a telephone help-line for 
enquiries from the public
Additional suggested actions with ratings
REMEDIATION ACTION
removal and disposal o f the chemical(s), or 
removal o f exposure pathway, i.e. 
containment
decontamination of property, including 
water pipes
Additional suggested actions with ratings
INCIDENT STAND DOWN
prior determination of criteria for incident 
closure
ongoing assessment o f progress towards 
specified criteria
recognition of when to close the incident
ensure all organisations involved in the 
management of the incident and the public 
are informed that the incident is over
Additional suggested actions with ratings
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14 March 2001
initial follow
response up
1 2 3 4 5 Comments
ANY FURTHER COMMENTS OR ADDITIONAL SUGGESTED ACTIONS (with ratings)
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Faith Goodfellow
14 March 2001
Stage 4: Post incident review
initial follow 
response up
1 2 3 4 5 Comments
INCIDENT DOCUMENTATION
summary of the incident
lessons learned regarding management of 
the incident - negative and positive
changes in procedures to improve 
management of future incidents
identification of preventative action to avoid 
the occurrence of similar incidents
identify specific actions to be taken and a 
named person responsible for ensuring 
completion
provision of information for official reports 
to enforcement agencies, e.g. DWI, HSE
Additional suggested actions with ratings
LONG TERM HEALTH MONITORING
continued treatment of casualties with long 
term health effects
consider tagging o f individual patient notes
follow-up epidemiological studies 
(monitoring of relevant health data e.g. 
disease registers, hospital admission 
registers)
Additional suggested actions with ratings
LONG TERM ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING
A consider the necessity for long term 
monitoring of the affected 
environment/media if  remediation is not 
possible
Additional suggested actions with ratings
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14 March 2001
initial follow 
response up
1 2 3 4 5 Comments
ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION
ensure remediation at site of contamination 
is complete and meets required standards
where possible take steps to prevent 
recurrence o f the situation
where remediation is not possible and a 
significant risk to health remains, consider 
permanent re-housing of people in the area 
affected
Additional suggested actions with ratings
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE PUBLIC AND MEDIA
follow-up information to reassure the public 
that the risk to health has been eliminated 
and appropriate actions have been taken to 
prevent a similar event
Additional suggested actions with ratings
ADDITIONAL SUGGESTED ACTIONS (with ratings)
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE BEST PRACTICE MODEL IN GENERAL
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Faith Goodfellow, CIRS DRAFT
14 May 2001 Version 1
Checklist of Actions for Chemical Incident Management 
ACUTE PHASE
1. First few hours (or as soon as practicable)
Assess potential public health impact
ACTION Further
guidance
Com plete
✓
N/A
S
Chemical
Identify name of chemical (common/trade/scientific), unique number, 
constituents o f a mixture
Flowchart 4
Identify taste/odour and visual properties (e.g.colour)
Identify physical and chemical properties, e.g. physical state, pH, 
density, boiling point
Determine basic human toxicology o f the chemicals, including 
availability of antidotes
Identify any synergistic or antagonistic effects o f multiple chemicals
Identify manufacturer o f product involved (where constituents/properties 
are unknown)
Identify any measures for control or mitigation of impact
Incident source and location
Identify current geographical location of contamination source
Identify type of contaminant source (e.g. fixed installation or transport) Flowchart 1
Determine information about the area (e.g. topography, urban/rural)
Population exposure and health effects
Estimate number of people already exposed and nature of exposure
Flowchart 6
Estimate the total potentially exposed population
Identify any nearby populations that may become exposed, for example 
if  contaminant is airborne
Estimate the time period of exposure for the population
Find out if  any health effects have been reported to any agency Flowchart 7
Check any symptoms exhibited are consistent with the chemical 
identified
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Determine approximate amount of the contaminant released
Identify all environmental media affected, i.e. air, water and land Flowchart 1
Determine the concentration o f the contaminant in relevant media and 
where applicable at various impact points
Briefing 3 
Checklist 7
Determine current weather conditions, e.g. temperature, wind 
speed/direction, rainfall
Obtain predictions of future weather conditions
Consider direction o f movement of the contaminant (in all relevant 
media, e.g. from Chemet for air)
Try to establish what the environmental pathway/route of exposure 
between the source of contamination and the human receptors is
Checklist 8 
Flowchart 5 
Flowchart 7
Incident status
Find out if  incident has been declared ‘major’ by any agencies involved
Decide what status to give the incident within the HA
Assess whether the severity of the incident is likely to escalate
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Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
ACTION Further
guidance
Com plete
✓
N/A
✓
Refer to pre-prepared emergency plan
Alert other agencies
Alert relevant health organisations, e.g. CIPU, neighbouring health 
authorities, health authority regional office, A&E hospitals, GPs
Briefing 1 
(Checklist 1)
Alert relevant emergency services, e.g. police, ambulance, fire, MCA
Alert local authority environmental health department, where relevant
Alert National Focus, where relevant
Alert other relevant departments of the local authority, e.g. emergency 
planning, housing, social services
Alert local water companies - water supply and sewage, where relevant
Alert relevant enforcement agencies, e.g. Environment Agency, Health 
and Safety Executive, DWI, Food Standards Agency
Incident control team
Consider forming an incident control team
Briefing 1 
Checklist 2 
Checklist 3
Identify incident control team members -  representatives from key 
organisations involved in the management with the necessary seniority 
and expertise to be able to take decisions, ensure roles are clear
Confirm location for incident room with security access and adequate 
parking (should be pre-planned)
Ensure necessary facilities are available -  telephones, administrative 
support, etc. plus toilets and food/drink (should be pre-planned)
Ensure contact numbers are available for incident control team members
Determine scheduling of meetings
Alert and advise affected population
Identify vulnerable populations within current or potential area of 
exposure, e.g. schools, hospitals, nursing homes Checklist 9 
Checklist 10Ensure affected population is alerted and those potentially affected if 
movement of contaminant is expected, include vulnerable populations
Ensure appropriate advice is provided to prevent/minimise exposure -  
e.g. evacuation, sheltering, stop drinking/using drinking water
(Checklist 1) 
Checklist 8
Ensure affected populations understand what actions they need to take 
(e.g. stop using water, leave home, consult GP etc.)
(Checklist 1) 
Checklist 8
Ensure patients/exposed population are being adequately decontaminated Checklist 4
Ensure appropriate medical treatment is available for patients
Ensure personnel directly involved in tending to potentially 
contaminated patients or cleaning up the hazard do not become 
contaminated themselves by the provision of appropriate personal 
protective equipment and decontamination facilities
Checklist 4
Alert other water users, where relevant, e.g. food manufacturers, 
agricultural facilities
Checklist 1
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Identify nearby vulnerable environmental locations that are or could 
become contaminated, e.g. rivers, aquifers, agriculture
Flowchart 1
Ensure vulnerable environmental locations are protected, e.g. drinking 
water abstraction points
(Briefing 2) 
Checklist 1
Ensure actions are being taken to remove/contain source of 
contamination and chemicals/contaminated substances are disposed of
(Briefing 2) 
Checklist 8 
Flowchart 5
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2. Within 24 hours (or as soon as practicable)
Assess potential public health impact
ACTION Further
guidance
Com plete
S
N/A
✓
Chemical
Where possible confirm that all chemicals involved have been correctly 
identified and relevant details on properties and toxicity are determined 
(including environmental persistency and degradation product, biological 
uptake)
N.B. there may be multiple chemicals, reaction products and additional 
chemicals added as part of the management, e.g. fire fighting
Flowchart 4
Identify common uses o f the chemical/product, to aid chemical 
identification if necessary
Incident source and location
Confirm location of contamination source, with postcode and/or grid 
reference where possible
If location of source is in doubt consider use o f modelling to predict 
possible sources, there may be variations in results from different models
Population exposure and health effects
Confirm number o f people already exposed or possibly exposed to the 
contamination
Flowchart 6
Confirm additional nearby populations that may become exposed
Conduct a toxicological evaluation o f exposure data to determine 
possible and most likely impacts on health
Briefing 4  
Flowchart 7
Confirm type of health effects reported Flowchart 7
Mark cases reported on a map or in geographical information system
Determine a precise case definition
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Confirm amount of the contaminant released
Confirm direction of movement of the contaminant and ensure regular 
updates are received to monitor for any changes
If direction of movement o f contaminant is in doubt consider use of 
modelling to predict possible areas at risk, there may be variations in 
results from different models
Confirm the pathway/route of exposure between source o f contamination 
and human receptors, including food contamination
Checklist 8 
Flowchart 5
Confirm any contaminant concentrations available in relevant media and 
at various locations and times, ensure most up-to-date analysis results 
have been received
Briefing 3 
Checklist 7
Determine if  any routine results from environmental sampling are 
already available
If no or inadequate environmental sampling results are available, 
establish what environmental samples need to be taken: environmental 
media, when, where, who will take them and what parameters are to be 
tested for
If  more environmental sampling is required, ensure an appropriate 
laboratory for analysis is identified, ensure the necessary samples are 
collected and stored appropriately and appropriate analytical techniques 
are used and quality control procedures are adequate
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ACTION Further
guidance
Com plete
✓
N/A
✓
Incident status
Confirm current incident status
Assess whether the severity of the incident is likely to escalate
Determine criteria for incident closure
Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
ACTION Further
guidance
Com plete
✓
N/A
✓
Alert other agencies
Confirm environmental organisations have been informed, e.g. 
Environment Agency, MCA
Briefing 1Alert relevant government departments, e.g. DH, DETR, MAFF
Alert occupational health professionals, where relevant
Alert environmental specialists/consultants, where relevant
Alert and advise affected population
Define population ‘at risk’ to avoid concern in unaffected individuals Flowchart 6
Provide press releases to alert the public and reassure those not affected, 
ensure consistency across all agencies involved
Checklist 9 
Checklist 10
Confirm that particularly vulnerable populations have been identified 
and alerted
Provide clear and consistent information on the nature of the hazard and 
the level of risk, prepare Q&As for common queries
Consider setting up a telephone help-line for enquiries from the public
Confirm that alternative water supplies have been provided where 
regular supplies cannot be used
Briefing 2 
Checklist 1
Consider conducting biological monitoring of patients and the exposed 
population to identify level of exposure and adverse health effects
Checklist 5
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Confirm nearby vulnerable environmental locations that are or could 
become contaminated, e.g. rivers, aquifers
Flowchart 1
Confirm action has been taken to remove and dispose of the chemical(s), 
or to remove the exposure pathway, i.e. containment
Checklist 8 
Flowchart 5
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POST-ACUTE PHASE 
3. Remainder of management (before incident is declared over)
Assess potential public health impact
ACTION Further
guidance
Com plete
✓
N/A
✓
Population exposure and health effects
Confirm population within current area of contamination has been 
identified
Flowchart 6
Estimate time period o f exposure, differentiating between various 
populations if  exposed for different time periods
Ensure all people with health effects have been identified -  through GPs, 
pharmacists, NHS Direct, hospitals, reports to HA/LA/other agencies
Flowchart 6
Determine whether there are other possible causes of ill health, e.g. viral 
infections
Flowchart 7
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Confirm current direction o f movement of the contaminant, if 
appropriate
Confirm current concentration of contaminant in relevant environmental 
media
Briefing 3 
Checklist 7
Where additional samples have requested, agree financing and establish 
timescales for reporting of results
Checklist 7
If  not already available, establish method for interpreting environmental 
analytical data, define limits of detection, limitations from sampling 
procedure, accuracy of analytical method, relevant standards for 
comparison, including taste and odour
Briefing 3 
Checklist 7
Request any necessary repeat sampling and analysis to confirm results or 
to detect changes in concentrations
Checklist 7
Incident status
Assess progress towards specified criteria for incident closure
Recognition of when to close the incident
Ensure all organisations involved in the management of the incident and 
the public are informed that the incident is over
Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
ACTION Further
guidance
Com plete N /A
✓
Alert and advise affected population
Provide press releases with follow-up information on how the incident is 
being managed
Checklist 9 
Checklist 10
Consider distributing a health questionnaire to identify level of exposure 
and adverse health effects
Checklist 6
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Ensure property has been adequately decontaminated, including where 
appropriate, drinking water pipes
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Version 1
Page 5 o f  6
Faith Goodfellow, CIRS 
14 May 2001
POST-INCIDENT PHASE
4. Post incident (after incident is declared over)
Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
ACTION Further
guidance
Complete
✓
N/A
✓
Alert and advise affected population
Ensure follow-up information is provided to reassure the public that the 
risk to health has been eliminated and appropriate actions have been 
taken to prevent a similar event
Checklist 9 
Checklist 10
Ensure continued treatment of casualties with long term health effects Briefing 5
Where remediation is not possible and a significant risk to health 
remains, consider permanent re-housing o f people in the area affected
Consider the necessity for long term monitoring of the affected 
environment/media if  remediation is not possible
Checklist 7
Consider conducting a follow-up epidemiological study (monitoring of 
relevant health data e.g. disease registers, hospital admission registers)
Briefing 5
Consider tagging o f individual patient notes to identify any future health 
problems that may be related to the exposure
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Ensure remediation at site of contamination is complete and meets 
required standards
Checklist 8
Preventative action for future incidents
Identify changes in procedures to improve management in future
Identify preventative action to avoid the occurrence o f similar incidents
Identify specific actions to be taken and a named person responsible for 
ensuring completion
Provide information for official reports to enforcement agencies, e.g. 
DWI, HSE
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Appendix 8
Chemical Incident Management Guidance Manual -  Version 1
Contents 
Introduction
Primary objectives of the public health response to chemical incidents 
Sequence of events flowchart
Checklist of actions for chemical incident management 
Briefings
1. Action taken by organisations involved in chemical incident management
2. Background to the water and wastewater industry
3. Presentation of environmental analyses + Units conversion table
4. Guide to standards for use in chemical incidents
5. Long-term health surveillance
Checklists
1. Chemical water incident checklist for health authorities
2. Suggested resources for chemical incident management
3. Setting up an incident control team
4. Personal decontamination and personal protective equipment
5. Issues involved in biological sampling
6. Issues involved in questionnaire surveys
7. Issues involved in environmental sampling and analysis
8. Remedial action
9. Communications with the public
10. Dealing with the media
Flowcharts
1. Types of chemical incidents
2. Initial detection of a chemical incident
3. Routes to alerting the CCDC to an incident
4. Identifying an unknown chemical
5. Source -  pathway -  receptor model: method for determining and preventing/minimising health 
impact
6. Determining the population at risk
7. Determining the adverse health effects
Forms
1. Pre-planning: Emergency contacts for chemical incidents
2. Pre-planning: Specialist contacts for chemical incidents
3. Pre-planning: Contacting vulnerable groups
4. Incident details
5. Details of the chemical
6. Record o f emergency contacts during an incident
7. Environmental information
8. Record of health/patient information
9. Log of calls and associated actions/decisions taken
10. Log of advice received/provided and decisions/actions taken
11. Post incident report
Appendix 9
Participant details
Evaluation of Performance
Name
Health Authority
Region
Experience/training group
Used manual
Received training on manual
Summary of performance
Issues/Actions Sta;?e 1 Sta;!*e 2 Sta;E*e 3 Post incident
total key total key total key total key
achieved
partially achieved
additional to 
requirements
stage 1
stage 2
stage 3
post inc
extra
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Details of specific actions
1. First few hours
Key actions
Assess potential public health impact
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Chemical
Identify name of chemical, constituents of a mixture, plus unique no.
Identify taste/odour and visual properties (e.g.colour)
Identify physical and chemical properties
Determine basic human toxicology of the chemicals, plus antidotes
Incident source and location
Identify current geographical location of contamination source
Identify type of contaminant source (e.g. fixed installation or transport)
Determine information about the area (e.g. topography, urban/rural)
Population exposure and health effects
Estimate number of people already exposed and nature of exposure
Find out if  any health effects have been reported to any agency
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Determine approximate amount o f the contaminant released
Determine current weather conditions
Consider direction of movement of the contaminant (in all relevant 
media, e.g. from Chemet for air)
Incident status
Find out if incident has been declared ‘major’ by any agencies involved
Decide what status to give the incident within the HA
Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Refer to pre-prepared emergency plan
Alert other agencies
Alert relevant health organisations, e.g. CIPU, neighbouring health 
authorities, health authority regional office, A&E hospitals, GPs
Alert relevant emergency services, e.g. police, ambulance, fire, Maritime 
and Coastguard Agency
Alert local authority environmental health department, where relevant
Alert National Focus, where relevant
Consider forming an incident control team
Alert and advise affected population
Identify vulnerable populations within current or potential area of 
exposure, e.g. schools, hospitals, nursing homes
Identify nearby vulnerable environmental locations that are or could 
become contaminated, e.g. rivers, aquifers
Ensure affected population is alerted and those potentially affected if 
movement of contaminant is expected, include vulnerable populations
Ensure appropriate advice is provided to prevent/minimise exposure -  
e.g. evacuation, sheltering, stop drinking/using drinking water
Faith Goodfellow 2
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Documentation
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Record incident details
Record 24 hour contact names and numbers of all organisations/agencies 
involved
Start logs for incoming and outgoing calls and actions/decisions taken
Remaining actions
Assess potential public health impact
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Identify manufacturer of product involved (where constituents/properties 
are unknown)
Identify any synergistic or antagonistic effects o f multiple chemicals
Identify any measures for control or mitigation of impact
Population exposure and health effects
Estimate the total potentially exposed population
Identify any nearby populations that may become exposed
Estimate the time period of exposure for the population
Check any symptoms exhibited are consistent with the chemical 
identified
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Identify all environmental media affected, i.e. air, water and land
Try to establish what the environmental pathway/route of exposure 
between the source of contamination and the human receptors is
Determine the concentration of the contaminant in relevant media and 
where applicable at various impact points
Obtain predictions of future weather conditions
Incident status
Assess whether the severity of the incident is likely to escalate
Faith Goodfellow
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Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert other agencies
Alert other relevant departments of the local authority, e.g. emergency 
planning, housing, social services
Alert local water companies, both water supply and sewage, where 
relevant
Alert relevant enforcement agencies, e.g. Environment Agency, Health 
and Safety Executive, DWI, Food Standards Agency
Incident control team
Identify incident control team members -  representatives from key 
organisations involved in the management with the necessary seniority 
and expertise to be able to take decisions
Confirm location for incident room (should be pre-planned)
Ensure necessary facilities are available -  telephones, administrative 
support, etc. (should be pre-planned)
Ensure contact numbers for the incident control team are provided to 
other relevant parties
Determine scheduling of meetings
Alert and advise affected population
Ensure affected populations understand what actions they need to take 
(e.g. stop using water, leave home, consult GP etc.)
Ensure patients/exposed population are being adequately decontaminated
Ensure appropriate medical treatment is available for patients
Ensure personnel directly involved in tending to potentially 
contaminated patients or cleaning up the hazard do not become 
contaminated themselves by the provision of appropriate personal 
protective equipment and decontamination facilities
Alert other water users, where relevant, e.g. food manufacturers, 
agricultural facilities
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Ensure actions are being taken to remove or contain the source of 
contamination and appropriate disposal o f chemicals or contaminated 
substances
Ensure vulnerable environmental locations are protected, e.g. drinking 
water abstraction points
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2. Within 24 hours
Key actions
Assess potential public health impact
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Chemical
Where possible confirm that all chemicals involved have been correctly 
identified and relevant details on properties and toxicity are determined
Incident source and location
Confirm location of contamination source, with postcode and/or grid 
reference where possible
Population exposure and health effects
Confirm number of people already exposed or possibly exposed to the 
contamination
Confirm additional nearby populations that may become exposed
Conduct a toxicological evaluation of exposure data to determine 
possible and most likely impacts on health
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Confirm amount of the contaminant released
Confirm direction o f movement o f the contaminant and ensure regular 
updates are received to monitor for any changes
Confirm any contaminant concentrations available in relevant media and 
at various locations and times
Determine if any routine results from environmental sampling are 
already available
If no or inadequate environmental sampling results are available, 
establish what environmental samples need to be taken: environmental 
media, when, where, who will take them and what parameters are to be 
tested for
Incident status
Confirm current incident status
Assess whether the severity of the incident is likely to escalate
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Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert other agencies
Confirm environmental organisations have been informed, e.g. 
Environment Agency, MCA
Alert relevant government departments, e.g. DH, DETR, MAFF
Alert occupational health professionals, where relevant
Alert and advise affected population
Define population ‘at risk’ to avoid concern in unaffected individuals
Provide press releases to alert the public and reassure those not affected
Confirm that particularly vulnerable populations have been identified 
and alerted
Provide clear and consistent information on the nature of the hazard and 
the level of risk, prepare Q&As for common queries
Consider setting up a telephone help-line for enquiries from the public
Confirm that alternative water supplies have been provided where 
regular supplies cannot be used
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Confirm nearby vulnerable environmental locations that are or could 
become contaminated, e.g. rivers, aquifers
Confirm action has been taken to remove and dispose o f the chemical(s), 
or to remove the exposure pathway, i.e. containment
Remaining actions
Assess potential public health impact
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Chemical
Identify common uses of the chemical/product, to aid chemical 
identification if necessary.
Incident source and location
If location of source is in doubt consider use of modelling to predict 
possible sources
Population exposure and health effects
Confirm type of health effects reported
Mark cases reported on a map or in geographical information system
Determine a precise case definition
Contaminant concentrations and movement
If direction of movement of contaminant is in doubt consider use of 
modelling to predict possible areas at risk
Confirm the pathway/route of exposure between source o f contamination 
and human receptors, including food contamination
Ensure most up-to-date analysis results have been received
If more environmental sampling is required, ensure an appropriate 
laboratory for analysis is identified, ensure the necessary samples are 
collected and stored appropriately and appropriate analytical techniques 
are used and quality control procedures are adequate
Incident status
Determine criteria for incident closure
Faith Goodfellow
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Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert other agencies
Alert environmental specialists/consultants, where relevant
Alert and advise affected population
Consider conducting biological monitoring of patients and the exposed 
population to identify level of exposure and adverse health effects
Documentation
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Continue to record incident details
Keep a current record o f 24 hour contact names and numbers for all 
organisations/agencies involved
Continue with logs for incoming and outgoing calls and 
actions/decisions taken
Record minutes and agreed actions of any incident control meetings
Record necessary detail o f actions taken by other organisations involved
Record details o f any health effects reported and how exposure occurred
Where possible obtain names and addresses o f the exposed population, 
including visitors to the area
Faith Goodfellow
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3. Remainder of management
Key actions
Assess potential public health impact
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Population exposure and health effects
Confirm population within current area of contamination has been 
identified
Estimate time period of exposure, differentiating between various 
populations if exposed for different time periods
Ensure all people with health effects have been identified -  through GPs, 
pharmacists, NHS Direct, hospitals, reports to HA/LA/other agencies
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Confirm current direction o f movement of the contaminant, if  
appropriate
Confirm current concentration of contaminant in relevant environmental 
media
If not already available, establish method for interpreting environmental 
analytical data, define limits o f detection, limitations from sampling 
procedure, accuracy o f analytical method, relevant standards for 
comparison, including taste and odour
Incident status
Assess progress towards specified criteria for incident closure
Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert and advise affected population
Provide press releases with follow-up information on how the incident is 
being managed
Documentation
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Ensure records are kept o f any patients, including contact details
Where possible, ensure a register has been compiled of members of the 
exposed public
Where possible, ensure a register has been compiled o f exposed 
emergency responders
Faith Goodfellow
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Remaining actions
Assess potential public health impact
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Population exposure and health effects
Determine whether there are other possible causes of ill health, e.g. viral 
infections
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Where additional samples have requested, agree financing and establish 
timescales for reporting of results
Request any necessary repeat sampling and analysis to confirm results or 
to detect changes in concentrations
Incident status
Recognition of when to close the incident
Ensure all organisations involved in the management of the incident and 
the public are informed that the incident is over
Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert and advise affected population
Consider distributing a health questionnaire to identify level of exposure 
and adverse health effects
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Ensure property has been adequately decontaminated, including where 
appropriate, drinking water pipes
Faith Goodfellow
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4. Post incident
Key actions
Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert and advise affected population
Ensure follow-up information is provided to reassure the public that the 
risk to health has been eliminated and appropriate actions have been 
taken to prevent a similar event
Documentation
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Write a summary o f the incident
Identify and document the lessons learned regarding management of the 
incident -  both negative and positive
Remaining actions
Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Preventative action for future incidents
Identify changes in procedures to improve management in future
Identify preventative action to avoid the occurrence of similar incidents
Identify specific actions to be taken and a named person responsible for 
ensuring completion
Provide information for official reports to enforcement agencies, e.g. 
DWI, HSE
Alert and advise affected population
Ensure continued treatment of casualties with long term health effects
Where remediation is not possible and a significant risk to health 
remains, consider permanent re-housing of people in the area affected
Consider the necessity for long term monitoring of the affected 
environment/media if  remediation is not possible
Consider conducting a follow-up epidemiological study (monitoring of 
relevant health data e.g. disease registers, hospital admission registers)
Consider tagging o f individual patient notes to identify any future health 
problems that may be related to the exposure
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Ensure remediation at site of contamination is complete and meets 
required standards
Faith Goodfellow
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Appendix 10
Evaluation of Exercise Performance
Participant details
Name
Health Authority
Region
Experience/training group
Used manual
Received training on manual
Summary of performance
Issues/Actions Stage 1
total = 53 
key = 26
Stage 2
total = 41 
key =23
Stage 3
total = 18 
key =11
Post incident
total = 13 
key = 3
total key total key total key total key
achieved
partially achieved
additional to stage 1
requirements stage 2
stage 3
post inc
extra
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Details of specific actions
1. First few hours
1.1 Key actions
1.1.1 Assess potential public health impact
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Chemical
Identify name o f chemical, constituents of a mixture, plus unique no.
EH Trichloroethene (trichloroethylene)
EH Any other solvents/chemicals from  drum or previous spills 
'—■ Check fo r  other chemicals used on industrial estate, particularly 
those that react with solvents
/3
Identify taste/odour and visual properties (e.g.colour)
EH Trichlorethene is colourless, sweet chloroform odour 
EH Potentially other solvents with taste/odour.
EH Odour threshold in air
/3
Identify physical and chemical properties 
EH General properties from fa c t sheet
EH Reactivity with sodium hydroxide may cause fire  and explosion 
EH Decomposes in flame or on hot surface, producing phosgene gases 
and hydrochloric acid
/3
Determine basic human toxicology o f the chemicals, plus antidotes 
EH Extract information from fact sheet
Incident source and location
Identify current geographical location of contamination source 
EH Spill site as shown on map (need to confirm address)
Identify type of contaminant source (e.g. fixed installation or transport) 
EH Spill from  fixed industrial unit, metal degreasing
Determine information about the area (e.g. topography, urban/rural) 
EH Near a town
EH Surrounding area agricultural
12
Population exposure and health effects
Estimate number of people already exposed and nature of exposure
EH 2 workers
EH Possibly others at unit
EH Those nearby on industrial estate
EH Those in residential area
EH People passing on trunk road
EH Nearby town
/6
Find out if  any health effects have been reported to any agency
□  A&E
□  GPs
□  NHS Direct
EH Environmental Health
/4
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Contaminant concentrations and movement
Determine approximate amount of the contaminant released 
□  Drum size, amount spilt
Determine current weather conditions 
f~l Wind - fo r  direction o f  vapour movement
l~1 Sunny/rainy, etc - rain may wash spill further and into stream, i f  
warm greater evaporation
12
Consider direction o f movement of the contaminant (in all relevant 
media, e.g. from Chemet for air)
I~1 Check wind direction fo r  movement o f  windborne vapours -  
potentially over industrial estate, residential area or across the 
road affecting passing traffic, i f  spill was large enough and 
weather conditions appropriate may move towards the town 
□  Ask fo r  Chemet via Fire Service
1~1 Check surface runoff o f  solvent from  spill - into surface water 
drains, runoff into stream 
[~1 Movement through soil, check hydrogeology/geology - migration 
through soil into groundwater, migration through soil towards 
plastic water pipes
/4
Incident status
Find out if  incident has been declared ‘major’ by any agencies involved
Decide what status to give the incident within the HA
N.B. Currently limited potential fo r  casualties, i f  very large spill may
have windborne vapours towards town, or across road affecting passing
traffic.
1.1.2 Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Refer to pre-prepared emergency plan
Alert other agencies
Alert relevant health organisations, e.g. CIPU, neighbouring health 
authorities, health authority regional office, A&E hospitals, GPs 
EH A&Es (including any additional to the one already involved)
EH GPs and health visitors 
□  NHS Direct
EH Neighbouring HAs i f  cross boundary 
EH HA regional office 
N.B. C1RS already know
15
Alert relevant emergency services, e.g. police, ambulance, fire, Maritime 
and Coastguard Agency
EH Ambulance service -  check aware o f  possible contamination 
EH Possibly fire  to clean up spill
EH Possibly police to close road and advise population to shelter i f  
appropriate
/3
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Alert local authority environmental health department, where relevant 
N.B. EH  already know, but need to make contact
Alert National Focus, where relevant
N/A (Would be done by CIRS i f  cross boundary, large number o f  people 
exposed or high media interest)
X
Consider forming an incident control team 
N.B. May want a site visit
A lert and advise affected population
Identify vulnerable populations within current or potential area o f 
exposure, e.g. schools, hospitals, nursing homes 
I~1 Others on industrial estate 
□  Residential area 
EH Town nearby
/3
Identify nearby vulnerable environmental locations that are or could 
become contaminated, e.g. rivers, aquifers 
EH Stream 
EH Groundwater 
EH Agriculture -  crops, animals
/3
Ensure affected population is alerted and those potentially affected if 
movement of contaminant is expected, include vulnerable populations 
EH Alert others on industrial estate 
EH Alert residential area nearby i f  appropriate 
EH Consider alerting town but unlikely to be ciffected
/3
Ensure appropriate advice is provided to prevent/minimise exposure -  
e.g. evacuation, sheltering, stop drinking/using drinking water 
f~1 Shelter from  vapours i f  necessary, turn o f  air conditioning on 
industrial estate 
EH I f  stream/river contaminated stop bathing/fishing
/2
1.1.3 Documentation
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Record incident details
Record 24 hour contact names and numbers o f all organisations/agencies 
involved
Start logs for incoming and outgoing calls and actions/decisions taken
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1.2 Remaining actions
1.2.1 Assess potential public health impact
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Chemical
Identify manufacturer of product involved (where constituents/properties 
are unknown)
CD Check all the chemicals used at the site and whether the drum 
would be mixed waste, check with manager at metal degreasing 
unit
Identify any synergistic or antagonistic effects of multiple chemicals
Identify any measures for control or mitigation o f impact
Population exposure and health effects
Estimate the total potentially exposed population 
CD Others on industrial estate 
CD Nearby residents 
CD Passers by on the road
CD Recreational use in stream/river, e.g. fishing, bathing
/4
Identify any nearby populations that may become exposed 
CD Town nearby
Estimate the time period of exposure for the population 
CD Hours from recent spill
Check any symptoms exhibited are consistent with the chemical 
identified 
CD Casualties
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Identify all environmental media affected, i.e. air, water and land
□  Air
□  Soil
CD Potentially stream 
CD Potentially groundwater
/4
Try to establish what the environmental pathway/route of exposure 
between the source o f contamination and the human receptors is 
CD Inhalation o f  vapours near spill 
ED Bathing in stream/river 
ED Vapours on crops, animals 
■—■ Animals drinking from stream.
/4
Determine the concentration of the contaminant in relevant media and 
where applicable at various impact points 
ED Stream samples 
ED Soil samples
12
Obtain predictions of future weather conditions
Incident status
Assess whether the severity of the incident is likely to escalate
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1.2.2 Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert other agencies
Alert other relevant departments o f the local authority, e.g. emergency 
planning, housing, social services
Alert local water companies, both water supply and sewage, where 
relevant
|~1 Alert water companies to check fo r  abstractions downstream o f  
stream and maybe fo r  groundwater abstractions 
I | Alert water/sewage companies and ask where surface water drains 
go and i f  into sewers whether the sewage treatment plant would be 
affected
12
Alert relevant enforcement agencies, e.g. Environment Agency, Health 
and Safety Executive, DWI, Food Standards Agency 
[~~1 Environment Agency 
□  HSE
[~~1 FSA/MAFF (if crops/dairy herd or drinks factory affected)
13
Incident control team
Identify incident control team members -  representatives from key 
organisations involved in the management with the necessary seniority 
and expertise to be able to take decisions
e.g. HA, EH, EA, water company, plus maybe representative from  
industrial estate, fire, HSE, A&E
Confirm location for incident room (should be pre-planned)
Ensure necessary facilities are available -  telephones, administrative 
support, etc. (should be pre-planned)
Ensure contact numbers for the incident control team are provided to 
other relevant parties
Determine scheduling of meetings
Alert and advise affected population
Ensure affected populations understand what actions they need to take 
(e.g. stop using water, leave home, consult GP etc.) 
f~l Shelter from  vapour, close windows and doors, turn o ff air 
conditioning 
EH Stop using stream/river fo r  recreation
12
Ensure patients/exposed population are being adequately decontaminated 
EH A&E casualties should be decontaminated, clothes bagged 
EH Is lorry contaminated, i f  it is stop it leaving site
12
Ensure appropriate medical treatment is available for patients 
I | Treat casualties, make sure A&E and ambulance have the fac t 
sheet
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Ensure personnel directly involved in tending to potentially 
contaminated patients or cleaning up the hazard do not become 
contaminated themselves by the provision of appropriate personal 
protective equipment and decontamination facilities 
n  Possibility o f  ambulance and s ta ff being contaminated and sta ff 
and patients at A&E 
[~1 Make sure EHO and other people investigating spill do not become 
contaminated\ protective clothing fo r  anyone cleaning up the spill
12
Alert other water users, where relevant, e.g. food manufacturers, 
agricultural facilities
[—1 Agriculture, crop irrigation, livestock watering -  i f  stream is 
contaminated and water being used
Prevent/minimise environmental contam ination
Ensure actions are being taken to remove or contain the source of 
contamination and appropriate disposal o f chemicals or contaminated 
substances
| | Clean up spill to stop continuing contamination, possibly remove 
contaminated soil at a later stage
Ensure vulnerable environmental locations are protected, e.g. drinking 
water abstraction points
1~1 I f  thought stream might be affected would check i f  any downstream 
intakes and close i f  likely to be contaminated 
Consider possibility o f  any groundwater supplies being affected
12
Action Stage Key
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2. Within 24 hours
2.1 Key actions
2.1.1 Assess potential public health impact
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Chemical
Where possible confirm that all chemicals involved have been correctly 
identified and relevant details on properties and toxicity are determined 
□  Identify all chemicals from  drum
EH Identify chemicals in soil from  previous contamination/land uses 
EH Taste/odour threshold in water
13
Incident source and location
Confirm location of contamination source, with postcode and/or grid 
reference where possible
Population exposure and health effects
Confirm number of people already exposed or possibly exposed to the 
contamination 
[~1 Those near spill from  vapour 
EH Industrial estate — vapours and drinking water 
EH Residential area -  vapours and drinking water 
EH Town -  vapours and drinking water 
EH Recreational users o f  stream/river 
EH Soft drink consumers
EH Consumption o f  any milk/crops from  agricultural use o f  water from  
affected PWSs
11
Confirm additional nearby populations that may become exposed 
N.B. Population depends on what sources are contaminated
Conduct a toxicological evaluation of exposure data to determine 
possible and most likely impacts on health 
□  Are taste/odour thresholds in water above or below toxic levels
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Confirm amount of the contaminant released
Confirm direction o f movement o f the contaminant and ensure regular 
updates are received to monitor for any changes 
EH Are chemicals from  spill going towards the aquifer?
EH Is any vapour going towards the town?
12
Confirm any contaminant concentrations available in relevant media and 
at various locations and times 
EH Soil 
EH Stream 
EH Groundwater 
EH Drinking water
14
Determine if any routine results from environmental sampling are 
already available 
EH Drinking water 
EH Groundwater abstraction point 
EH Stream/river
EH Drinks factory quality testing
14
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If no or inadequate environmental sampling results are available, 
establish what environmental samples need to be taken: environmental 
media, when, where, who will take them and what parameters are to be 
tested for 
□  Soil 
EH Stream
EH Groundwater at various abstraction point 
EH Drinking water in industrial and residential area 
EH Water at other PWSs including factory
/5
Incident status
Confirm current incident status
Assess whether the severity of the incident is likely to escalate
2.1.2 Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
A lert o ther agencies
Confirm environmental organisations have been informed, e.g. 
Environment Agency, MCA 
EH Environment Agency
Alert relevant government departments, e.g. DH, DETR, MAFF
□  DWI
□  FSA/MAFF
12
Alert occupational health professionals, where relevant
N.B. Any occupational health on industrial estate, may have details o f
chemicals used and effects
Alert and advise affected population
Define population ‘at risk’ to avoid concern in unaffected individuals 
N.B. Once aquifer found to be uncontaminated, stream also 
uncontaminated and vapours unlikely to reach town, only those on 
industrial estate and immediate residential area at risk
Provide press releases to alert the public and reassure those not affected 
n  Joint press release with other agencies
EH Advise people on industrial estate and nearby residential area not 
to use water fo r  drinking, fo o d  preparation or cooking, maybe 
should not use fo r  showering because o f  vapours 
EH Alert other water users, any food/drink manufacturer on industrial 
estate, soft drinks manufacturer, PWS users
/3
Confirm that particularly vulnerable populations have been identified 
and alerted
e.g. Health status o f  those in residential area nearby, any babies, people 
on home dialysis, any PWS to hospitals
Provide clear and consistent information on the nature o f the hazard and 
the level o f risk, prepare Q&As for common queries
Consider setting up a telephone help-line for enquiries from the public 
N.B. Only limited population so could have direct contact with residents
Faith Goodfellow
1 August 2001
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Confirm that alternative water supplies have been provided where 
regular supplies cannot be used 
1~~1 Bottled water to residents, other employees on industrial estate 
should be supplied by employer with water -  wait fo r  results on 
aquifer and abstraction before extending any further
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Confirm nearby vulnerable environmental locations that are or could
become contaminated, e.g. rivers, aquifers
N.B. Need to confirm any contamination o f  aquifer or stream
Confirm action has been taken to remove and dispose of the chemical(s), 
or to remove the exposure pathway, i.e. containment 
□  Clean up spill, remove other contaminated soil 
EH Install metal pipes fo r  drinking water
12
2.2 Remaining actions
2.2.1 Assess potential public health impact
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Chemical
Identify common uses o f the chemical/product, to aid chemical 
identification if  necessary.
EH Other solvents and chemicals used in metal degreasing
Incident source and location
If location of source is in doubt consider use o f modelling to predict
possible sources
N/A
X
Population exposure and health effects
Confirm type o f health effects reported 
EH Respiratory effects in workers
Mark cases reported on a map or in geographical information system 
N.B.Include any reports to the water company, who may already have a 
GIS system with logged complaints
Determine a precise case definition
Contaminant concentrations and movement
If direction of movement of contaminant is in doubt consider use of 
modelling to predict possible areas at risk 
EH Modelling to ascertain i f  aquifer is at risk
Confirm the pathway/route of exposure between source o f contamination 
and human receptors, including food contamination 
□  Dermal contact with spill or inhalation o f  vapours 
EH Dermal contact with soil or inhalation o f  vapours 
EH Water from  aquifer used fo r  crop irrigation, livestock watering 
(food contamination) and drinks factory (food contamination) and 
public drinking water supply -  ingestion 
EH Any food/drink manufacture on industrial estate
/4
Faith Goodfellow
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Ensure most up-to-date analysis results have been received 
1~1 All water types and soil, maybe air at time o f  spill (would have 
dispersed quickly)
If more environmental sampling is required, ensure an appropriate 
laboratory for analysis is identified, ensure the necessary samples are 
collected and stored appropriately and appropriate analytical techniques 
are used and quality control procedures are adequate
Incident status
Determine criteria for incident closure 
e.g. Set safe drinking water levels
2.2.2 Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert other agencies
Alert environmental specialists/consultants, where relevant 
CH Clean up spill 
□  Remove/remediate soil
12
Alert and advise affected population
Consider conducting biological monitoring of patients and the exposed 
population to identify level o f exposure and adverse health effects 
I | Take blood/urine from  those already in hospital 
1 1 Consider taking from  residents, short ha lf life so need to do before 
give alternative water supplies
12
2.2.3 Documentation
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Continue to record incident details
Keep a current record of 24 hour contact names and numbers for all 
organisations/agencies involved
Continue with logs for incoming and outgoing calls and 
actions/decisions taken
Record minutes and agreed actions of any incident control meetings
Record necessary detail o f actions taken by other organisations involved
Record details o f any health effects reported and how exposure occurred
Where possible obtain names and addresses of the exposed population, 
including visitors to the area 
□  Residential area — including visitors 
[Z1 People on industrial estate 
D  Responders
/3
Faith Goodfellow
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Action Stage Key
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3. Remainder of management
3.1 Key actions
3.1.1 Assess potential public health impact
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Population exposure and health effects
Confirm population within current area o f contamination has been 
identified
1 1 Population exposed limited to industrial estate and residential area 
nearby who are supplied with water in plastic pipes through 
contaminated land
Estimate time period of exposure, differentiating between various 
populations if exposed for different time periods 
f~~l Difficult to say fo r  long term solvent contamination o f  drinking 
water as a result o f  ground near plastic pipe being contaminated, 
but no taste previously 
f"~l Short term inhalation exposure fo r  workers and anyone near 
enough to be exposed to vapours
12
Ensure all people with health effects have been identified -  through GPs, 
pharmacists, NHS Direct, hospitals, reports to HA/LA/other agencies 
N.B. Include reports o f  adverse health effects to water company
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Confirm current direction of movement o f the contaminant, if  
appropriate 
ED Confirm not moving towards aquifer
Confirm current concentration of contaminant in relevant environmental 
media
EH Stream, groundwater, drinking water, soil, maybe air
If not already available, establish method for interpreting environmental 
analytical data, define limits of detection, limitations from sampling 
procedure, accuracy o f analytical method, relevant standards for 
comparison, including taste and odour
Incident status
Assess progress towards specified criteria for incident closure
3.1.2 Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert and advise affected population
Provide press releases with follow-up information on how the incident is 
being managed
e.g. Bottled water supplies, replacement ofpipes, clean up o f  land, water 
in taps above guidelines initially but not excessively high and set fo r  
lifetime exposures
Faith Goodfellow
1 August 2001
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3.1.3 Documentation
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Ensure records are kept o f any patients, including contact details
Where possible, ensure a register has been compiled of members of the 
exposed public
Where possible, ensure a register has been compiled of exposed 
emergency responders
3.2 Remaining actions
3.2.1 Assess potential public health impact
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Population exposure and health effects
Determine whether there are other possible causes of ill health, e.g. viral 
infections
EH Possible other causes fo r  nausea/vomiting/headaches in residents
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Where additional samples have requested, agree financing and establish 
timescales for reporting of results
Request any necessary repeat sampling and analysis to confirm results or 
to detect changes in concentrations 
EH Repeat samples on drinking water to try and assess peak 
concentration and whether decreasing 
EH Repeat samples on connection o f  overland pipe and after pipes 
replaced
□  Repeat sampling o f  public abstraction and maybe also aquifer
/3
Incident status
Recognition of when to close the incident
EH When concentrations in water to residents are reduced to a 
satisfactory level
Ensure all organisations involved in the management of the incident and 
the public are informed that the incident is over
3.2.2 Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert and advise affected population
Consider distributing a health questionnaire to identify level o f exposure 
and adverse health effects
N.B. Could use to try and ascertain consumption o f  water in residents 
and onset o f  symptoms
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Ensure property has been adequately decontaminated, including where 
appropriate, drinking water pipes
| | Flushing o f  pipes including internal plumbing after installation o f  
new pipes
Faith Goodfellow
1 August 2001
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Action Stage Key
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4. Post incident
4.1 Key actions
4.1.1 Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert and advise affected population
Ensure follow-up information is provided to reassure the public that the 
risk to health has been eliminated and appropriate actions have been 
taken to prevent a similar event 
CH Pipes replaced and drinking water clean
4.1.2 Documentation
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Write a summary o f the incident
Identify and document the lessons learned regarding management of the 
incident -  both negative and positive
4.2 Remaining actions
4.2.1 Action to prevent/mitigate impact or inform others
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Preventative action for future incidents
Identify changes in procedures to improve management in future
Identify preventative action to avoid the occurrence of similar incidents 
CH HSE to make sure company improves practices
Identify specific actions to be taken and a named person responsible for 
ensuring completion
Provide information for official reports to enforcement agencies, e.g. 
DWI, HSE
Alert and advise affected population
Ensure continued treatment of casualties with long term health effects 
1 1 Possible long term health implications fo r  workers, occupational 
health follow up
I | Possible long term exposure and associated health effects from  
contaminated drinking water i f  there has been previous undetected 
contamination, residents and those on industrial estate
12
Where remediation is not possible and a significant risk to health 
remains, consider permanent re-housing of people in the area affected 
□  Replace pipes and re-route
Consider the necessity for long term monitoring o f the affected 
environment/media if  remediation is not possible
□  Monitor groundwater fo r  contamination and at abstraction points
□  EA to monitor any movement o f  contamination
12
Consider conducting a follow-up epidemiological study (monitoring of 
relevant health data e.g. disease registers, hospital admission registers)
Faith Goodfellow
1 August 2001
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Consider tagging o f individual patient notes to identify any future health 
problems that may be related to the exposure
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Ensure remediation at site of contamination is complete and meets 
required standards
LH Remove contaminated soil at industrial estate
Action Stage Key
Faith Goodfellow
1 August 2001
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Appendix 11
Exercise briefing
Aim
9 The aim of the exercise is to assess the effectiveness of the guidance manual for public 
health response to chemical incidents.
# In order to be able to assess how effective the manual is we need to score the level of 
response to the exercise, however, the aim is not to measure personal performance but to 
assess any improvements brought about by the manual.
Evaluation method
9 The evaluation method specifies actions to be conducted during the incident response.
9 The response is divided into four stages: 
o first few hours 
o within 24 hours 
o remainder of the management 
o post incident
• For each stage several key issues have been identified.
9 Performance will be evaluated on the total actions achieved and key actions missing.
Response to the incident exercise
# In order for the actions you have completed to be included in the evaluation you need to 
write down everything you have considered, actions and decisions you would take, people 
you would contact and information and resources you would require.
• However, do not just list everything you can think of, you need to prioritise your actions 
and consider what is appropriate for the stage o f response and what could practicably be 
achieved in the time available. Scores are assigned on the basis o f actions achieved that 
are relevant to the particular stage of response.
• Remember to note down actions you might consider doing even if  you decide at a later 
stage that it is not necessary.
9 Write your entire response on the forms provided, starting a new page for each stage and 
numbering and initialling any extra sheets used.
# The different sections on the forms are only intended to be a guide to ease analysis, do not 
worry if you are not sure which box to use or if  you think you have written something in 
the wrong box.
Please do not discuss the exercise with other participants until it is finished
There will be an opportunity to go through the exercise and discuss the issues raised in the
afternoon session.
Exercise scenario
Stage 1 -  Monday morning 
Notification
As the on-call public health professional you are alerted to a chemical incident by the 
Chemical Incident Response Service (CIRS) at 1000 on a Monday morning. At 0930 that 
morning 2 adult males were admitted to your local accident and emergency hospital for 
treatment following exposure to solvents, the main constituent is thought to be 
trichloroethene.
Incident details
• The incident has occurred at a small metal degreasing company at a unit on an industrial 
estate on the edge of a medium-sized town (spill site is marked by a red cross on the map).
» 2 workers at the metal degreasing company spilt solvents over themselves when a drum of
used solvent was being loaded onto a lorry to be taken for disposal.
• The workers had dermal exposure and inhalation o f vapours and suffered shortness of 
breath and coughing, they were taken to A&E by ambulance.
9 The ambulance staff reported that on entering the industrial estate from the main road 
there was a strong smell of solvents, they have alerted the A&E to the potential of 
additional casualties.
• The local authority environmental health officer (EHO) has gone to the site to investigate 
the spill, because previous concerns have been raised about the company’s operating 
practices.
• The surrounding area is agricultural, the main town is approximately 1 km from the 
industrial estate, however there is a small residential area adjacent to the industrial estate.
• The main road into the town passes the industrial estate.
• There is a small stream running past the industrial estate on the northern side.
Information available
• CIRS have faxed their information sheet on trichloroethene to you.
• A sketch map of the area is also provided.
Response
For the first few hours after being alerted to the incident, list:
• issues you would consider;
9 actions/decisions you would take;
• people you would contact;
9 further information you require; and
9 resources you require;
You have 25 minutes to write down all the relevant details on the forms provided.
AG
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Stage 2 -  Monday afternoon
Further incident details
• The EHO investigating the spill site has found extensive contamination o f the land around 
the metal degreasing unit. In addition to the recent spill, there appears to be evidence of 
previous solvent spills in the area.
9 The EHO has reported that the soil near the unit appears to be contaminated with solvent­
like substances, however the nearby stream does not appear to be affected on visual 
inspection.
9 The Environment Agency has been asked to take samples to check the stream is not
contaminated as it feeds into a river that is abstracted for drinking water purposes.
• To the south o f the industrial estate is a public drinking water abstraction from a 
groundwater aquifer (marked by the blue cross on the map).
• There are also other private abstractions from the same groundwater aquifer that are used 
for agricultural purposes, crop irrigation and livestock watering.
9 A nearby soft drinks factory also has a private abstraction from the same groundwater
aquifer.
» The local water company has received complaints from the customers in the industrial
estate and the residential area nearby about an unpleasant taste and odour in their drinking 
water.
• The water company has taken samples from the customer taps on the industrial estate and 
nearby residential area and the water mains outside the industrial estate.
« The water company has also taken samples from the water at the public drinking water
abstraction from the groundwater aquifer.
Response
Continue to record your response within 24 hours of being alerted to the incident, list: 
« issues you would consider;
• actions/decisions you would take;
• people you would contact;
• further information you require; and
• resources you require;
You have 20 minutes to write down all the relevant details on the forms provided.
Stage 3a -  Tuesday afternoon 
Further incident details
• The 2 workers that attended A&E have now fully recovered from their acute symptoms.
9 On Tuesday morning there were several complaints to the water company by people in the
residential area, some people have reported they have suffered from nausea, vomiting and 
headaches in the last 24 hours.
• In the afternoon of the Tuesday, you receive some preliminary sample results.
9 Sample results from the Environment Agency:
o initial qualitative analytical results of the soil at the site o f the spill show it to 
be heavily contaminated with trichloroethene and other as yet unidentified 
organic chemicals.
o analysis o f the stream samples show it to be currently free of trichloroethene.
• Sample results from the water company:
0 no contamination has been detected at the public drinking water abstraction 
from the groundwater aquifer, 
o raised levels o f trichloroethene have been detected in the samples taken from 
customer taps at the industrial estate and nearby residential area, 
o no contamination has been found in samples taken from the water mains 
outside the industrial estate.
9 The water company have confirmed that the water main along the trunk road is o f metal 
construction and the pipes to the industrial units and the residential houses are made of 
plastic.
Information available
• Results o f drinking water analysis from customer taps on the industrial estate and the 
residential area.
9 UK drinking water standard and World Health Organisation (WHO) guideline for 
drinking water quality.
Results for water samples taken on Monday 
Analysed for trichloroethene
Location Concentration in mg/1
Customer tap on industrial estate -  unit 1 0.1
Customer tap on industrial estate -  unit 2 0.07
Customer tap in residential house -  house 1 U.02
Customer tap in residential house -  house 2 0.04
Customer tap in residential house -  house 3 0.03
UK drinking water standard 
Trichloroethene = 30 ^g/1
WHO provisional guideline for drinking water quality
Trichloroethene = 70 ^g/1
Response
Continue to record your response for the rem aining managem ent o f the incident, list:
• issues you would consider;
9 actions/decisions you would take;
•  people you would contact;
» further information you require; and 
9 resources you require;
You have 15 minutes initially to write down all the relevant details on the forms provided and 
then a further 10 minutes after additional drinking water sampling results and incident details 
are provided.
Stage 3b (extra information) - Thursday
Further incident details
• Modelling from the Environment Agency shows that contamination o f the groundwater 
aquifer is unlikely to have occurred from solvents spilt at the industrial estate due to the 
soil and underlying rock conditions.
9 Environmental Health and water company investigations have concluded that solvents
were spilt on the industrial estate on land above plastic drinking water pipes, these 
chemicals migrated through the soil and permeated through the plastic pipes 
contaminating the drinking water supply.
« The residential area is supplied with water by a plastic supply pipe that passes through the
industrial estate.
• Some residents continue to report symptoms of nausea, vomiting and headaches and a 
10 month old baby is suffering from vomiting and is becoming dehydrated.
• A temporary overland bypass water supply pipe has been installed to avoid the area of 
contaminated land and bottled water has been provided to people in the residential area 
since late Tuesday afternoon.
• In the long term, the plastic water supply pipes will be replaced with plastic coated copper 
pipes and a separate pipe directly from the iron water mains will be installed to the 
residential area that does not pass through the industrial estate.
Information available
• Results o f drinking water analysis after connection of overland bypass water supply pipe
Results for water samples taken after connection of overland bypass water pipe
Analysed for trichloroethene
Location Concentration in mg/1
Customer tap on industrial estate -  unit 1 0.04
Customer tap on industrial estate -  unit 2 0.03
Customer tap in residential house -  house 1 u.ul
Customer tap in residential house -  house 2 0.01
Customer tap in residential house -  house 3 0.01
Response
You have 10 minutes to finalise your response.
There will be an additional 10 minutes to consider any post incident issues.
Post incident
Final incident details
0 Replacement o f water supply pipes to the industrial estate and residential area has been 
completed.
• Samples from customer taps on the industrial estate and residential area after the 
installation o f the new pipes show drinking water to be free of contamination.
9 The Health and Safety Executive is investigating working practices at the metal 
degreasing company.
Response
You have 10 minutes to detail any further issues and actions that should be part of the post­
incident review, including any long-term investigations or monitoring that should be carried 
out or any changes to the public health response to chemical incidents that should be 
implemented as a result o f lessons learnt during the incident.
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Appendix 13
Univariable Analysis
Unpaired t test
Mean of OVER_TOT_MANUAL_1 = 45.6 
Mean of OVER_TOT_MANUAL_0 = 39.2
Assuming equal variances 
Combined standard error = 1.829265 
df = 77 
t=  3.5211
One sided P = 0.0004 
Two sided P = 0.0007
95% confidence interval for difference between means = 2.798494 to 10.083558
Assuming unequal variances
Combined standard error = 1.826788
df = 76.508303
t(d) = 3.525875
One sided P = 0.0004
Two sided P = 0.0007
95% confidence interval for difference between means = 2.803426 to 10.078625
Comparison of variances
Two sided F test is not significant
No need to assume unequal variances
Unpaired t test
Mean of OVER_TOT_EXPERIEN_0 = 40.690909 
Mean of OVER_TOT_EXPERIEN_1 =44.502857
Assuming equal variances
Combined standard error = 1.93565
df = 77
t=  1.969337
One sided P = 0.0263
Two sided P = 0.0525
95% confidence interval for difference between means = -7.66632 to 0.042424
Assuming unequal variances
Combined standard error = 1.891964
df = 76.924855
t(d) = 2.01481
One sided P = 0.0237
Two sided P = 0.0474
95% confidence interval for difference between means = -7.57933 to -0.044566
Comparison of variances
Two sided F test is not significant
No need to assume unequal variances
1
Unpaired t test
Mean of OVER_TOT_TRAINED_0 = 39.5 
Mean of OVER_TOT_TRAINED_1 = 45.2
Assuming equal variances
Combined standard error = 1.860417
df = 77
t=  3.07072
One sided P = 0.0015
Two sided P = 0.0029
95% confidence interval for difference between means = -9.417384 to -2.008257
Assuming unequal variances
Combined standard error = 1.8612
df = 76.738018
t(d) = 3.069429
One sided P = 0.0015
Two sided P = 0.003
95% confidence interval for difference between means = -9.418943 to -2.006698
Comparison of variances
Two sided F test is not significant
No need to assume unequal variances
One wav analysis of variance
Variables: OVER_TOT_OCCUP_MED, OVER_TOT_OCCUP_CONSULTANT, 
OVER_TOT_OCCUP_OTHER, OVER_TOT_OCCUP_NURSE
Source of Variation Sum Squares DF Mean Square
Between Groups 392.128814 3 130.709605
Within Groups 5515.038781 75 73.53385
Corrected Total 5907.167595 78
F (variance ratio) = 1.777543 P = 0.1587 
OCCUP
Dependent Variable: over total
Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence 
Interval
OCCUP Lower Bound Upper Bound
CONSULTANT 44.819 1.855 41.098 48.540
MED 43.274 1.688 39.888 46.660
NURSE 40.029 2.376 35.263 44.794
OTHER 38.640 2.903 32.816 44.464
a Based on modified population marginal mean.
2
Unpaired t test
Mean of 0VER_KEY_MANUAL_1 = 53.154253 
Mean of OVER_KEY_MANUAL_0 = 45.793651
Assuming equal variances
Combined standard error = 2.002851
df = 77
t=  3.675062
One sided P = 0.0002
Two sided P = 0.0004
95% confidence interval for difference between means = 3.372416 to 11.348789
Assuming unequal variances 
Combined standard error = 2.00075 
df = 76.756814 
t(d)= 3.678921 
One sided P = 0.0002 
Two sided P = 0.0004
95% confidence interval for difference between means = 3.3766 to 11.344605
Comparison of variances
Two sided F test is not significant
No need to assume unequal variances
Unpaired t test
Mean of OVER_KEY_EXPERIEN_0 = 47.691198 
Mean of OVER_KEY_EXPERIEN_1 = 51.609977
Assuming equal variances
Combined standard error = 2.139351
df = 77
t=  1.831761
One sided P = 0.0354
Two sided P = 0.0709
95% confidence interval for difference between means = -8.178773 to 0.341213
Assuming unequal variances
Combined standard error = 2.106187
df = 76.300779
t(d) = 1.860604
One sided P = 0.0333
Two sided P = 0.0667
95% confidence interval for difference between means = -8.112733 to 0.275174
Comparison of variances
Two sided F test is not significant
No need to assume unequal variances
3
Unpaired t test
Mean of OVER_KEY_TRAINED_0 = 47.700448 
Mean of OVER_KEY_TRAINED_1 = 51.111111
Assuming equal variances
Combined standard error = 2.136342
df = 77
t=  1.596497
One sided P = 0.0572
Two sided P = 0.1145
95% confidence interval for difference between means = -7.664664 to 0.843337
Assuming unequal variances
Combined standard error = 2.140489
df = 74.671907
t(d) = 1.593404
One sided P = 0.0576
Two sided P = 0.1153
95% confidence interval for difference between means = -7.672921 to 0.851594
Comparison of variances
Two sided F test is not significant
No need to assume unequal variances
One wav analysis of variance
Variables: OVER_KEY_OCCUP_MED, OVER_KEY_OCCUP_CONSULTANT, 
OVER_KEY_OCCUP_OTHER, OVER_KEY_OCCUP_NURSE
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Corrected Total
Sum Squares 
211.945607 
6957.28683 
7169.232437
DF
3
75
78
Mean Square
70.648536
92.763824
F (variance ratio) = 0.761596 P = 0.5192
OCCUP
Dependent Variable: OVER_KEY
Mean Std. Error 95%
Confidence
Interval
OCCUP Lower
Bound
Upper Bound
CONSULTANT 49.002 1.860 45.294 52.709
MED 51.810 1.621 48.578 55.042
NURSE 46.471 2.529 41.429 51.513
OTHER 47.566 3.369 40.851 54.281
4
Multi variable analysis
Overall total scores
Run 1 with all four dependant variables
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: over total
Source Type III Sum df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta
of Squares Squared
Corrected 1813.777 6 302.296 5.317 .000 .307
Model
Intercept 92351.926 1 92351.926 1624.408 .000 .958
MANUAL 935.929 1 935.929 16.462 .000 .186
EXPERIEN 134.661 1 134.661 2.369 .128 .032
TRAINED 364.981 1 364.981 6.420 .013 .082
OCCUP 182.545 3 60.848 1.070 .367 .043
Error 4093.391 72 56.853
Total 147794.560 79
Corrected 5907.168 78
Total
a R Squared = .307 (Adjusted R Squared = .249)
Run 2 Occup lost as p=0.367 and therefore >0.2 (final model)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: over total
Source Type III Sum df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta
of Squares Squared
Corrected 1631.232 3 543.744 9.537 .000 .276
Model
Intercept 140729.319 1 140729.319 2468.395 .000 .971
MANUAL 878.955 1 878.955 15.417 .000 .171
EXPERIEN 110.398 1 110.398 1.936 .168 .025
TRAINED 514.838 1 514.838 9.030 .004 .107
Error 4275.935 75 57.012
Total 147794.560 79
Corrected 5907.168 78
Total
a R Squared = .276 (Adjusted R Squared = .247)
5
Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: over total
B Std. Error t Sig.
Parameter
Intercept 49.755 1.673 29.748 .000
[MANUAL=0] -6.677 1.700 -3.926 .000
[MANUAL=1] 0
[EXPERIEN=0]-2.471 1.776 -1.392 .168
[EXPERIEN=1] 0
[TRAIN ED=0] -5.305 1.765 -3.005 .004
[TRAINED=1] 0 
a This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.
95%
Confidence
Interval
Lower
Bound
46.423
-6.008
-8.822
Upper
Bound
53.087
-10.064 -3.289
Partial Eta 
Squared
.922
.171
1.066 .025
-1.788 .107
6
Key total scores
Run 1 with all four dependant variables
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: OVER_KEY
Source Type III Sum df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta
of Squares Squared
Corrected 1809.716 6 301.619 4.052 .001 .252
Model
Intercept 126599.065 1 126599.065 1700.738 .000 .959
MANUAL 1240.458 1 1240.458 16.664 .000 .188
EXPERIEN 315.307 1 315.307 4.236 .043 .056
TRAINED 94.578 1 94.578 1.271 .263 .017
OCCUP 278.367 3 92.789 1.247 .299 .049
Error 5359.516 72 74.438
Total 200171.328 79
Corrected 7169.232 78
Total
a R Squared = .252 (Adjusted R Squared = .190)
Run 2 Occup lost as p=0.299 and therefore >0.2 (final model)
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: OVER_KEY
Source Type III Sum df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta
of Squares Squared
Corrected 1531.349 3 510.450 6.790 .000 .214
Model
Intercept 191744.988 1 191744.988 2550.758 .000 .971
MANUAL 1113.108 1 1113.108 14.808 .000 .165
EXPERIEN 192.375 1 192.375 2.559 .114 .033
TRAINED 145.790 1 145.790 1.939 .168 .025
Error 5637.883 75 75.172
Total 200171.328 79
Corrected 7169.232 78
Total
a R Squared = .214 (Adjusted R Squared = .182)
7
Parameter Estimates 
Dependent Variable: OVER_KEY
B Std. Error t
Parameter
Intercept
[MANUAL=0]
[MANUAL=1]
[EXPERIEN=0]
[EXPERIEN=1]
[TRAIN ED=0]
[TRAINED=1]
56.442 1.921 
-7.513 1.953
0
-3.262 2.039 
0
-2.823 2.027 
0
29.389
-3.848
-1.600
-1.393
Sig.
.000
.000
.114
.168
95%
Confidence
Interval
Lower
Bound
52.616
-11.403
-7.323
-6.861
Upper
Bound
60.268
-3.624
.800
1.215
Partial Eta 
Squared
.920
.165
.033
.025
a This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.
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Use of the Summary Checklist of Actions for 
Chemical Incident Management
The target audience for this checklist is public health professionals. The aim is to cover all the 
issues and actions involved in the management of any type o f chemical incident. By working 
through the checklist the public health professional will have considered the main aspects of 
managing the public health response to a chemical incident. References are made in the 
‘further guidance’ column to additional guidance materials providing more detailed 
information on particular chemical incident management issues if  required.
To provide an indication o f the priority o f each action, the checklist is divided into four time 
periods:
1. first few hours
2. within 24 hours
3. remainder of management
4. post incident
Each stage is then also subdivided into the three parts o f the public health response to a 
chemical incident, namely:
• risk assessment of potential adverse impact on public health
• communication with other organisations and the public
• action to prevent/mitigate adverse impact on public health
In some cases, the issue/action may be primarily conducted by a public health professional. 
However, other aspects are largely the responsibility of other agencies/organisations although 
there will be an interaction with the public health response to a chemical incident. For 
example, taking and analysing environmental samples is likely to be conducted by 
environmental health officers, the Environment Agency, or in the event of drinking water 
contamination the local water utility. However, public health professionals rely on the 
analytical results as part o f their exposure and health impact assessment and therefore will 
need to have some involvement in this aspect of the management. The checklist contains a 
column in which the lead agency or agencies are identified, all the issues/actions detailed need 
to be considered as part o f the public health response, even where the primary responsibility 
for conducting the action lies with another agency.
In order to keep track of actions that have been completed, a tick column has been provided. 
Not all the actions will be applicable to all types of chemical incident, therefore, if  the action 
is not applicable write ‘NA’ in the tick column. Although the later stages provide the 
opportunity to confirm some details of the incident it may still be necessary to review the 
earlier checklists in the light o f new information. Progress through the checklist should not be 
delayed unnecessarily if  some information is not immediately available. The incomplete 
actions can be revisited as new information is provided.
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Abbreviations
A&E Accident and Emergency Hospital Department
CIPU Chemical Incident Provider Unit
DEFRA Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DH Department of Health
DPH Director of Public Health
DWI Drinking Water Inspectorate
EA Environment Agency
EH Environmental Health
GP General Practitioner
HA Health Authority
HEPA Health Emergency Planning Advisor
LA Local Authority
MCA Maritime and Coastguard Agency
NHS National Health Service
PH Public Health
Q&A Questions and Answers
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Summary Checklist of Actions for Chemical Incident Management 
ACUTE PHASE
1. First few hours (or as soon as practicable)
Risk assessment o f  potential adverse impact on public health
ACTION Lead
agency
Further
guidance
Complete
✓
Identify name of chemical (common/trade/scientific), unique number, 
constituents of a mixture
Fire/EH/ 
water utility
Section 2 
no.8 
and no.9
Identify taste/odour and visual properties (e.g.colour) Fire/EH/ 
water utility
Identify physical and chemical properties, e.g. physical state, pH, density, 
boiling point
Fire/EH/ 
water utility
Determine basic human toxicology of the chemicals, including availability of 
antidotes PH/CIPU
Identify any synergistic or antagonistic effects of multiple chemicals PH/CIPU
Identify manufacturer of product involved (where constituents/properties are 
unknown) Fire/EH
Identify any measures for control or mitigation of impact (including 
decontamination techniques)
Fire/EH/
water
utility/EA
Incident source and location
Identify current geographical location of contamination source Fire/EH/ 
water utility Section 2 
no.7 1Identify type of contaminant source (e.g. fixed installation or transport) Fire/EH
Determine information about the area (e.g. topography, urban/rural) EH/EA
Population exposure and health effects
Estimate number of people already exposed and nature of exposure PH
Section 2 
no. 10
Estimate the total potentially exposed population PH
Identify any nearby populations that may become exposed, for example if 
contaminant is airborne
PH
Estimate the time period of exposure for the population PH
Find out if any health effects have been reported to any agency PH Section 2 
no. 11 
and no.22Check any symptoms exhibited are consistent with the chemical identified PH/CIPU
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Determine approximate amount of the contaminant released Fire/EH/ 
water utility
Identify all environmental media affected, i.e. air, water and land EH/EA (Sec.l no.2)
Determine the concentration of the contaminant in relevant media and where 
applicable at various impact points
EH/EA/ 
water utility
Sec.2 no. 12 
and no. 13 
(Sec.l no.5)
Determine current weather conditions, e.g. temperature, wind speed/direction, 
rainfall Fire
Obtain predictions of future weather conditions Fire
Consider direction of movement of the contaminant (in all relevant media, e.g. 
from Chemet for air) Fire/EH/EA
Try to establish what the environmental pathway/route of exposure between the 
source of contamination and the human receptors is PH/EH
Section 2 
no. 18
Incident status
Find out if incident has been declared ‘major’ by any agencies involved All
Decide what status to give the incident within the HA PH
Assess whether the severity of the incident is likely to escalate All
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Communication with other organisations and the public
ACTION Lead
agency
Further
guidance
Complete
✓
Alert other agencies
Alert colleagues within the health authority or region, e.g. DPH, press officer, 
chief executive, HEP A, regional epidemiologist PH
Section 2 
no.6 
and no. 14
(Section 1 
no.3 
and no.8)
Alert relevant health organisations, e.g. CIPU, neighbouring health authorities, 
A&E hospitals, GPs, NHS Direct PH
Alert relevant emergency services, e.g. police, ambulance, fire, MCA First to 
respond
Alert local authority environmental health department, where relevant First to 
respond
Alert other relevant departments of the local authority, e.g. emergency 
planning, housing, social services EH
Alert local water utilities - water supply and sewage, where relevant EH
Alert relevant enforcement agencies, e.g. Environment Agency, Health and 
Safety Executive, DWI, Food Standards Agency Fire/EH
Ensure National Focus has been alerted, where relevant CIPU
Make initial contact with local media, press, radio and television All Sec.2 no. 16
Incident control team
Consider forming an incident control team All
Section 2 
no.15
(Section 1 
no.7)
Identify incident control team members -  representatives from key 
organisations involved in the management with the necessary seniority and 
expertise to be able to take decisions, ensure roles are clear
All
Confirm location for incident room with security access and adequate parking 
(should be pre-planned) All
Ensure necessary facilities are available -  telephones, administrative support, 
etc. plus toilets and food/drink (should be pre-planned) All
Ensure contact numbers are available for incident control team members All
Determine scheduling of meetings All
Alert and advise affected population
Ensure affected population is alerted and those potentially affected if 
movement of contaminant is expected.
PH/police/
EH
Section 2 
no. 17
(Section 1 
no. 10)
Identify and alert vulnerable populations within current or potential area of 
exposure, e.g. schools, hospitals, nursing homes
PH/police/
EH
Ensure appropriate advice is provided to prevent/minimise exposure -  e.g. 
evacuation, sheltering, stop drinking/using drinking water
PH/police/
EH/water
utility Section 2 
no.18Ensure affected populations understand what actions they need to take (e.g. 
stop using water, leave home, consult GP etc.)
PH/police/
EH/water
utility
Alert other water users, where relevant, e.g. food manufacturers, agricultural 
facilities
EH/water
utility
Section 2 
no.5
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Action to prevent/mitigate adverse impact on public health
ACTION Lead
agency
Further
guidance
Complete
✓
Refer to pre-prepared emergency plan All
Protect/monitor affected population
Ensure population are prevented from accessing the incident site, where 
possible Police/EH
Ensure appropriate medical treatment is available for patients Ambulance/
A&E
Ensure patients/exposed population are being adequately decontaminated Ambulance/
A&E
Section 2 
no.19
Ensure personnel directly involved in tending to potentially contaminated 
patients or cleaning up the hazard do not become contaminated themselves by 
the provision of appropriate personal protective equipment and 
decontamination facilities
Fire/EH/EA
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Identify nearby vulnerable environmental locations that are or could become 
contaminated, e.g. rivers, aquifers, agriculture
EH/EA/ 
water utility
(Section 1 
no.2)
Ensure vulnerable environmental locations are protected, e.g. drinking water 
abstraction points
EH/EA/ 
water utility
Section 2 
no.5
Ensure actions are being taken to remove/contain source of contamination and 
chemicals/contaminated substances are disposed of
Fire/EH/
EA/water
utility
Section 2 
no.18
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2. Within 24 hours (or as soon as practicable)
Risk assessment o f  potential adverse impact on public health
ACTION Lead
agency
Further
guidance
Complete
✓
Consider conducting a site visit to gather further information All
Chemical
Where possible confirm that all chemicals involved have been correctly 
identified and relevant details on properties and toxicity are determined 
(including environmental persistency and degradation product, biological 
uptake)
N.B. there may be multiple chemicals, reaction products and additional 
chemicals added as part of the management, e.g. fire fighting
Fire/EH/
water
utility/
CIPU
Section 2 
no. 8 
and no.9
Identify common uses of the chemical/product, to aid chemical identification if 
necessary
Fire/EH/
CIPU
Incident source and location
Confirm location of contamination source, with postcode and/or grid reference 
where possible
Fire/EH/ 
water utility Section 2 
no.7If location of source is in doubt consider use of modelling to predict possible 
sources, there may be variations in results from different models
EH/EA/ 
water utility
Population exposure and health effects
Confirm number of people already exposed or possibly exposed PH Section 2 
no. 10Confirm additional nearby populations that may become exposed PH
Estimate time period of exposure, differentiating between various populations 
if exposed for different time periods PH
Conduct a toxicological evaluation of exposure data to determine possible and 
most likely impacts on health PH/CIPU
Section 2 
no. 11 
and no.22Confirm type of health effects reported PH
Mark cases reported on a map or in geographical information system PH
Determine a precise case definition PH/CIPU
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Confirm amount of the contaminant released Fire/EH/ 
water utility
Confirm direction of movement of the contaminant and ensure regular updates 
are received to monitor for any changes Fire/EH/EA
If direction of movement of contaminant is in doubt consider use of modelling 
to predict possible areas at risk, there may be variations in results from 
different models
EH/EA
Confirm the pathway/route of exposure between source of contamination and 
human receptors, including food contamination PH/EH
Section 2 
no.18
Confirm any contaminant concentrations available in relevant media and at 
various locations and times, ensure most up-to-date analysis results have been 
received
EH/EA/ 
water utility
Section 2 
no.12 
and no. 13
(Section 1 
no.5)
Determine if any routine results from environmental sampling are already 
available
EH/EA/ 
water utility
If no or inadequate environmental sampling results are available, establish what 
environmental samples need to be taken: environmental media, when, where, 
who will take them and what parameters are to be tested for
EH/EA/ 
water utility
If more environmental sampling is required, ensure an appropriate laboratory 
for analysis is identified, ensure the necessary samples are collected and stored 
appropriately and appropriate analytical techniques are used and quality control 
procedures are adequate
EH/EA/ 
water utility
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ACTION Lead
agency
Further
guidance
Complete
✓
Incident status
Confirm current incident status All
Assess whether the severity of the incident is likely to escalate All
Determine criteria for incident closure All
Communication with other organisations and the public
ACTION Lead
agency
Further
guidance
Complete
✓
Alert other agencies
Confirm environmental organisations have been informed, e.g. Environment 
Agency, MCA Fire/EH Section 2 no.14
(Section 1 
no.3, 
no.8 
and no.9)
Alert relevant government departments, e.g. DH, DEFRA, DWI All
Alert occupational health professionals, where relevant PH
Alert environmental specialists/consultants, where relevant EH/EA
Consider alerting relevant local volunteer organisations EH/PH
Alert and advise affected population
Define population ‘at risk’ to avoid concern in unaffected individuals PH Section 2 no. 10
Provide press releases to alert the public and reassure those not affected, ensure 
consistency across all agencies involved PH/all
Section 2 
no. 16 
and no. 17
(Section 1 
no. 10)
Confirm that particularly vulnerable populations have been identified and 
alerted PH
Provide clear and consistent information on the nature of the hazard and the 
level of risk, prepare Q&As for common queries PH/all
Consider setting up a telephone help-line for enquiries from the public PH/EH
Consider holding a public meeting to keep the public informed EH/PH
Action to prevent/mitigate adverse impact on public health
ACTION Lead
agency
Further
guidance
Complete
✓
Protect/monitor affected population
Confirm that alternative water supplies have been provided where regular 
supplies cannot be used
water 
utility/ EH
Sec.2 no.5 
(Sec.l no.4)
Consider conducting biological monitoring of patients and the exposed 
population to identify level of exposure and adverse health effects
PH/A&E/
GPs
Section 2 
no.20
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Confirm nearby vulnerable environmental locations that are or could become 
contaminated, e.g. rivers, aquifers
EH/EA/ 
water utility
(Section 1 
no.2)
Confirm action has been taken to remove and dispose of the chemical(s), or to 
remove the exposure pathway, i.e. containment
Fire/EH/
EA/water
utility
Section 2 
no.18
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POST-ACUTE PHASE
3. Remainder of management (before incident is declared over)
Risk assessment o f  potential adverse impact on public health
ACTION Lead
agency
Further
guidance
Complete
✓
Population exposure and health effects
Confirm identification of population in current area of contamination PH Section 2 
no. 10 
and no.22
Ensure all people with health effects have been identified -  through GPs, 
pharmacists, NHS Direct, hospitals, reports to HA/LA/other agencies PH
Determine whether there are other possible causes of ill health, e.g. viral 
infections PH
Section 2 
no. 11
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Confirm current direction of movement of the contaminant Fire/EH/EA
Confirm current concentration of contaminant in relevant environmental media EH/EA/ 
water utility
Section 2 
no.12 
and no. 13
(Section 1 
no. 5 
and no.6)
Where additional samples have been requested, agree financing and establish 
timescales for reporting of results
EH/EA/ 
water utility
If not already available, establish method for interpreting environmental 
analytical data, define limits of detection, limitations from sampling procedure, 
accuracy of analytical method, relevant standards for comparison, including 
taste and odour
EH/EA/ 
water utility
Request any necessary repeat sampling and analysis to confirm results or to 
detect changes in concentrations
EH/EA/ 
water utility
Incident status
Assess progress towards specified criteria for incident closure All
Recognition of when to close the incident All
Ensure that the incident is considered over for all organisations involved in the 
management of the incident and all relevant parties are informed the incident is 
over
All
Communication with other organisations and the public
ACTION Lead
agency
Further
guidance
Complete
✓
Alert and advise affected population
Provide press releases with follow-up information on how the incident is being 
managed PH/all
Section 2 
no. 16 
and no. 17Ensure the public are informed that the incident is over PH/all
Action to prevent/mitigate adverse impact on public health
ACTION Lead
agency
Further
guidance
Complete
✓
Protect/monitor affected population
Consider distributing a health questionnaire to identify level of exposure and 
adverse health effects PH
Section 2 
no.21
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Ensure property has been adequately decontaminated, including where 
appropriate, drinking water pipes
EH/ 
water utility
Section 2 
no.18
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POST-INCIDENT PHASE
4. Post incident (after incident is declared over)
Communication with other organisations and the public
ACTION Lead
agency
Further
guidance
Complete
✓
Compile a report on the health management of the incident PH Section 3 
no.2 
and no.3
Provide information requested by other agencies, particularly for official 
reports by enforcement agencies, e.g., HSE, EA, DWI
PH/all
Alert and advise affected population
Ensure follow-up information is provided to reassure the public that the risk to 
health has been eliminated and appropriate actions have been taken to prevent a 
similar event
PH/all
Section 2 
no. 16 
and no. 17
Action to prevent/mitigate adverse impact on public health
ACTION Lead
agency
Further
guidance
Complete
Protect/monitor affected population
Ensure continued treatment of casualties with long term health effects PH Section 3 no.l
Where remediation is not possible and a significant risk to health remains, 
consider permanent re-housing of people in the area affected EH
Section 2 
no.18
Consider the necessity for long term monitoring of the affected 
environment/media if remediation is not possible EH/EA
Section 2 
no.12
Consider conducting a follow-up epidemiological study (monitoring of relevant 
health data e.g. disease registers, hospital admission registers) PH Section 3 
no.lConsider tagging of individual patient notes to identify any future health 
problems that may be related to the exposure PH/GPs
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Ensure remediation at site of contamination is complete and meets required 
standards EH/EA
Section 2 
no.18
Preventative action for future incidents
Identify changes in procedures to improve management in future All
Section 3 
no.3
Identify preventative action to avoid the occurrence of similar incidents All
Identify specific actions to be taken and a named person responsible for 
ensuring completion All
Identify similar hazards in the area and ensure action is taken to prevent any 
incidents All
Page 9 o f  9
Appendix 15
Revised
Evaluation of Performance
Participant details
Name
Health Authority
Region
Experience/training group
Used manual
Received training on manual
Summary of performance
Issues/Actions Sta;E*e 1 Sta;?e 2 Staj?e 3 Post incident
total key total key total key total key
achieved
partially achieved
additional to stage 1
requirements stage 2
stage 3
post inc
extra
Faith Goodfellow
5 September 2001
1
Revised
Details of specific actions
1. First few hours
Key actions
Risk assessment o f  potential adverse impact on public health
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Chemical
Identify name o f chemical, constituents o f a mixture, plus unique no.
Identify taste/odour and visual properties (e.g.colour)
Identify physical and chemical properties
Determine basic human toxicology o f the chemicals, plus antidotes
Incident source and location
Identify current geographical location of contamination source
Identify type of contaminant source (e.g. fixed installation or transport)
Determine information about the area (e.g. topography, urban/rural)
Population exposure and health effects
Estimate number o f people already exposed and nature of exposure
Find out if  any health effects have been reported to any agency
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Determine approximate amount of the contaminant released
Determine current weather conditions
Consider direction of movement o f the contaminant (in all relevant 
media, e.g. from Chemet for air)
Incident status
Find out if  incident has been declared ‘major’ by any agencies involved
Decide what status to give the incident within the HA
Communication with other organisations and the public
Alert other agencies
Alert colleagues within the health authority or region, e.g. DPH, press 
officer, chief executive, HEP A, regional epidemiologist
Alert relevant health organisations, e.g. CIPU, neighbouring health 
authorities, A&E hospitals, GPs, NHS Direct
Alert relevant emergency services, e.g. police, ambulance, fire, Maritime 
and Coastguard Agency
Alert local authority environmental health department, where relevant
Ensure National Focus has been alerted, where relevant
Make initial contact with local media, press radio and television
Consider forming an incident control team
Alert and advise affected population
Ensure affected population is alerted and those potentially affected if 
movement of contaminant is expected, include vulnerable populations
Identify and alert vulnerable populations within current or potential area 
o f exposure, e.g. schools, hospitals, nursing homes
Ensure appropriate advice is provided to prevent/minimise exposure -  
e.g. evacuation, sheltering, stop drinking/using drinking water
Faith Goodfellow
5 September 2001
2
Revised
Action to prevent/mitigate adverse impact on public health
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Refer to pre-prepared emergency plan
Protect/monitor affected population
Ensure population are prevented from accessing the incident site, where 
possible
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Identify nearby vulnerable environmental locations that are or could 
become contaminated, e.g. rivers, aquifers
Documentation
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Record incident details
Record 24 hour contact names and numbers of all organisations/agencies 
involved
Start logs for incoming and outgoing calls and actions/decisions taken
Remaining actions
Risk assessment o f  potential adverse impact on public health
Information Achieved 1 Missing N/A
Chemical
Identify any synergistic or antagonistic effects of multiple chemicals
Identify manufacturer of product involved (where constituents/properties 
are unknown)
Identify any measures for control or mitigation of impact
Population exposure and health effects
Estimate the total potentially exposed population
Identify any nearby populations that may become exposed
Estimate the time period of exposure for the population
Check any symptoms exhibited are consistent with the chemical 
identified
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Identify all environmental media affected, i.e. air, water and land
Determine the concentration of the contaminant in relevant media and 
where applicable at various impact points
Obtain predictions of future weather conditions
Try to establish what the environmental pathway/route of exposure 
between the source o f contamination and the human receptors is
Incident status
Assess whether the severity of the incident is likely to escalate
Faith Goodfellow
5 September 2001
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Communication with other organisations and the public
Revised
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert other agencies
Alert other relevant departments of the local authority, e.g. emergency 
planning, housing, social services
Alert local water utilities, both water supply and sewage, where relevant
Alert relevant enforcement agencies, e.g. Environment Agency, Health 
and Safety Executive, DWI, Food Standards Agency
Incident control team
Identify incident control team members -  representatives from key 
organisations involved in the management with the necessary seniority 
and expertise to be able to take decisions
Confirm location for incident room (should be pre-planned)
Ensure necessary facilities are available -  telephones, administrative 
support, etc. (should be pre-planned)
Ensure contact numbers for the incident control team are provided to 
other relevant parties
Determine scheduling of meetings
Alert and advise affected population
Ensure affected populations understand what actions they need to take 
(e.g. stop using water, leave home, consult GP etc.)
Alert other water users, where relevant, e.g. food manufacturers, 
agricultural facilities
Action to prevent/mitigate adverse impact on public health
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Protect/monitor affected population
Ensure appropriate medical treatment is available for patients
Ensure patients/exposed population are being adequately decontaminated
Ensure personnel directly involved in tending to potentially 
contaminated patients or cleaning up the hazard do not become 
contaminated themselves by the provision of appropriate personal 
protective equipment and decontamination facilities
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Ensure vulnerable environmental locations are protected, e.g. drinking 
water abstraction points
Ensure actions are being taken to remove or contain the source of 
contamination and appropriate disposal o f chemicals or contaminated 
substances
Faith Goodfellow
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2. Within 24 hours
Key actions
Risk assessment o f  potential adverse impact on public health
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Chemical
Where possible confirm that all chemicals involved have been correctly 
identified and relevant details on properties and toxicity are determined
Incident source and location
Confirm location of contamination source, with postcode and/or grid 
reference where possible
Population exposure and health effects
Confirm number of people already exposed or possibly exposed to the 
contamination
Confirm additional nearby populations that may become exposed
Estimate time period of exposure, differentiating between various 
populations if  exposed for different time periods
Conduct a toxicological evaluation of exposure data to determine 
possible and most likely impacts on health
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Confirm amount o f the contaminant released
Confirm direction of movement of the contaminant and ensure regular 
updates are received to monitor for any changes
Confirm any contaminant concentrations available in relevant media and 
at various locations and times
Determine if any routine results from environmental sampling are 
already available
If no or inadequate environmental sampling results are available, 
establish what environmental samples need to be taken: environmental 
media, when, where, who will take them and what parameters are to be 
tested for
Incident status
Confirm current incident status
Assess whether the severity of the incident is likely to escalate
Faith Goodfellow
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Communication with other organisations and the public
Revised
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert other agencies
Confirm environmental organisations have been informed, e.g. 
Environment Agency, MCA
Alert relevant government departments, e.g. DH, DEFRA, DWI
Alert occupational health professionals, where relevant
Alert and advise affected population
Define population ‘at risk’ to avoid concern in unaffected individuals
Provide press releases to alert the public and reassure those not affected, 
ensure consistency across all agencies involved
Confirm that particularly vulnerable populations have been identified 
and alerted
Provide clear and consistent information on the nature of the hazard and 
the level of risk, prepare Q&As for common queries
Consider setting up a telephone help-line for enquiries from the public
Action to prevent/mitigate adverse impact on public health
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Protect/monitor affected population
Confirm that alternative water supplies have been provided where 
regular supplies cannot be used
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Confirm nearby vulnerable environmental locations that are or could 
become contaminated, e.g. rivers, aquifers
Confirm action has been taken to remove and dispose of the chemical(s), 
or to remove the exposure pathway, i.e. containment
Remaining actions
Risk assessment o f  potential adverse impact on public health
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Consider conducting a site visit to gather further information
Chemical
Identify common uses of the chemical/product, to aid chemical 
identification if necessary.
Incident source and location
If location of source is in doubt consider use of modelling to predict 
possible sources
Population exposure and health effects
Confirm type of health effects reported
Mark cases reported on a map or in geographical information system
Determine a precise case definition
Faith Goodfellow
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Contaminant concentrations and movement
If direction of movement of contaminant is in doubt consider use of 
modelling to predict possible areas at risk
Confirm the pathway/route of exposure between source of contamination 
and human receptors, including food contamination
Ensure most up-to-date analysis results have been received
If more environmental sampling is required, ensure an appropriate 
laboratory for analysis is identified, ensure the necessary samples are 
collected and stored appropriately and appropriate analytical techniques 
are used and quality control procedures are adequate
Incident status
Determine criteria for incident closure
Communication with other organisations and the public
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert other agencies
Alert environmental specialists/consultants, where relevant
Consider alerting relevant local volunteer organisations
Alert and advise affected population
Consider holding a public meeting to keep the public informed
Action to prevent/mitigate adverse impact on public health
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Protect/monitor affected population
Consider conducting biological monitoring of patients and the exposed 
population to identify level of exposure and adverse health effects
Documentation
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Continue to record incident details
Keep a current record of 24 hour contact names and numbers for all 
organisations/agencies involved
Continue with logs for incoming and outgoing calls and 
actions/decisions taken
Record minutes and agreed actions of any incident control meetings
Record necessary detail o f actions taken by other organisations involved
Record details of any health effects reported and how exposure occurred
Where possible obtain names and addresses of the exposed population, 
including visitors to the area
Faith Goodfellow
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3. Remainder of management
Key actions
Risk assessment o f  potential adverse impact on public health
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Population exposure and health effects
Identification of population in current area o f contamination
Ensure all people with health effects have been identified -  through GPs, 
pharmacists, NHS Direct, hospitals, reports to HA/LA/other agencies
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Confirm current direction of movement of the contaminant, if 
appropriate
Confirm current concentration of contaminant in relevant environmental 
media
If not already available, establish method for interpreting environmental 
analytical data, define limits of detection, limitations from sampling 
procedure, accuracy of analytical method, relevant standards for 
comparison, including taste and odour
Incident status
Assess progress towards specified criteria for incident closure
Communication with other organisations and the public
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert and advise affected population
Provide press releases with follow-up information on how the incident is 
being managed
Documentation
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Ensure records are kept o f any patients, including contact details
Where possible, ensure a register has been compiled of members of the 
exposed public
Where possible, ensure a register has been compiled of exposed 
emergency responders
Faith Goodfellow
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Remaining actions
Risk assessment o f  potential adverse impact on public health
Information Achieved Missing N/A
Population exposure and health effects
Determine whether there are other possible causes of ill health, e.g. viral 
infections
Contaminant concentrations and movement
Where additional samples have requested, agree financing and establish 
timescales for reporting of results
Request any necessary repeat sampling and analysis to confirm results or 
to detect changes in concentrations
Incident status
Recognition of when to close the incident
Ensure that the incident is considered over for all organisations involved 
in the management of the incident and all relevant parties are informed 
the incident is over
Communication with other organisations and the public
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert and advise affected population
Ensure the public are informed that the incident is over
Action to prevent/mitigate adverse impact on public health
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Protect/monitor affected population
Consider distributing a health questionnaire to identify level of exposure 
and adverse health effects
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Ensure property has been adequately decontaminated, including where 
appropriate, drinking water pipes
Faith Goodfellow
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4. Post incident
Key actions
Communication with other organisations and the public
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Alert and advise affected population
Ensure follow-up information is provided to reassure the public that the 
risk to health has been eliminated and appropriate actions have been 
taken to prevent a similar event
Documentation
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Write a summary of the incident
Identify and document the lessons learned regarding management o f the 
incident -  both negative and positive
Compile a report on media handling and communications during the 
incident
Provide information requested by other agencies, particularly for official 
reports by enforcement agencies, e.g., HSE, EA, DWI
Remaining actions
Action to prevent/mitigate adverse impact on public health
Action Achieved Missing N/A
Protect/monitor affected population
Ensure continued treatment of casualties with long term health effects
Where remediation is not possible and a significant risk to health 
remains, consider permanent re-housing of people in the area affected
Consider the necessity for long term monitoring of the affected 
environment/media if  remediation is not possible
Consider conducting a follow-up epidemiological study (monitoring of 
relevant health data e.g. disease registers, hospital admission registers)
Consider tagging of individual patient notes to identify any future health 
problems that may be related to the exposure
Prevent/minimise environmental contamination
Ensure remediation at site o f contamination is complete and meets 
required standards
Preventative action for future incidents
Identify changes in procedures to improve management in future
Identify preventative action to avoid the occurrence o f similar incidents
Identify specific actions to be taken and a named person responsible for 
ensuring completion
Identify similar hazards in the area and ensure action is taken to prevent 
any incidents
Faith Goodfellow
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